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State of Florida
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Public Service Commission Capital Circle Office Center ● 2540 Shumard
Oak Boulevard -M-E-M-O-R-A-N-D-U-M- |
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DATE: |
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TO: |
Office of Commission Clerk (Teitzman) |
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FROM: |
Division of Engineering (Wooten, Ellis, King, Ramos, Sanchez, Willis) Division of Accounting and Finance (D. Buys, Byrne, Cicchetti, Dasher, D’Sa, Ford-Green, Gatlin, Higgins, McGowan, Souchik, Vogel) Division of Economics (Barrett, Clark, Guffey, Hampson, P. Kelley, Kunkler, McNulty, Nguyen, Prewett, Ward, Wu) Office of the General Counsel (Hixon) |
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RE: |
Docket No. 20260026-GU – Application for rate increase by Florida City Gas. |
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AGENDA: |
12/01/26 – Special Agenda – Post Hearing Decision – Participation is limited to Commissioners and Staff |
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COMMISSIONERS ASSIGNED: |
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PREHEARING OFFICER: |
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12/20/26 (8-month statutory deadline under Section 366.06(3), F.S.) |
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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: |
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Table of Contents
Issue
1 Projected Test Year (Kunkler)
Issue
2 Customer and Therms Forecast (Kunkler)
Issue
3 Estimated Gas Revenues (Kunkler)
Issue
4 Estimated Total Miscellaneous Revenue (Clark)
Issue
5 Estimated Total Operating Revenue (Kunkler)
Issue
6 Quality of Service (Willis)
Issue
7 Rate Base Adjustment (Wooten, Ford-Green)
Issue
8 Proposed Advanced Metering Infrastructure (Sanchez,
Ford-Green)
Issue
9 Proposed Enterprise Resource Planning Program (Wooten,
Dasher, P. Kelley)
Issue
10 Proposed Advanced Mobile Leak Detection (Wooten,
Dasher)
Issue
11 Adjustment to Area Extension Plan Projects (Ford-Green)
Issue
12 Plant in Service, Accumulated Depreciation and Working Capital (Ford-Green)
Issue
13 Adjustment to the 2024 Atlanta Gas and Light Resources Acquisition (Dasher)
Issue
14 Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization Level (Dasher,
Wu)
Issue
15 Adjustments to Working Capital Allowance (Dasher)
Issue
16 Unamortized Rate Case Expense (Dasher)
Issue
17 Construction Work in Progress (Dasher)
Issue
18 Plant in Service (Ford-Green, Wooten)
Issue
20 Working Capital (Dasher)
Issue
21 Rate Base (Ford-Green)
Issue
22 Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes (D.
Buys)
Issue
23 Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes (D'Sa)
Issue
24 Customer Deposits (Maxwell)
Issue
25 Short Term Debt (Souchik)
Issue
26 Long Term Debt (Souchik)
Issue
27 Equity Balance (Souchik)
Issue
28 Equity Ratio (McGowan)
Issue
29 Return on Equity (McGowan)
Issue
30 Capital Structure and Weighted Average Cost of Capital (D'Sa)
Issue
31 Purchased Gas and Natural Gas Cost Recovery Clause (Ford-Green,
Prewett)
Issue
32 Net Operating Income Adjustment for SAFE Investments (Prewett,
Ford-Green)
Issue
33 O&M Expenses (Prewett)
Issue
34 Uncollectible Accounts (Byrne)
Issue
35 Non-Utility Activities from Operation Expenses Adjustment (Ford-Green)
Issue
36 Transaction Costs (Gatlin, Vogel)
Issue
37 Transition, Integration and Rebranding Costs (Gatlin,
Vogel)
Issue
38 Full Time Equivalent Additions (Byrne)
Issue
39 Salaries and Benefits (Byrne)
Issue
40 Annual Storm Damage Accrual and Cap (Willis,
Byrne)
Issue
41 Rate Case Expense (Byrne)
Issue
42 Directors and Officers Liability Insurance (Byrne)
Issue
43 Projected O&M Expenses (Ford-Green)
Issue
44 AGLR Acquisition Adjestment (Byrne)
Issue
45 Depreciation & Amortization Expense (Dasher,
Wu)
Issue
46 Projected Taxes Other Than Income (Byrne)
Issue
47 Parent Debt Adjustment (D.
Buys)
Issue
48 Projected Income Tax Expense (Byrne)
Issue 49 Projected Total Operating Expense
Issue
50 Net Operating Income (Dasher)
Issue
51 Revenue Expansion Factor and Net Operating Income Multiplier (Dasher)
Issue
52 Annual Operating Revenue (Dasher)
Issue
53 Cost of Service Methodology (Ward)
Issue
54 Approved Revenue Requirement (Ward)
Issue
55 FCG Rate Class Consolidation Proposal (P.
Kelley)
Issue
56 Restructure to Restructure Commercial Rate Schedules (P.
Kelley)
Issue
57 Proposed Customer Charges (Nguyen)
Issue
58 Per Therm Non-Fuel Energy and Transportation Charge (Nguyen)
Issue
59 Proposed Demand Charges (Nguyen)
Issue
60 Proposed Miscellaneous Service Charge (P.
Kelley)
Issue 61 Area Expansion Program Revisions(Guffey)
Issue
62 Minimum Volume Commitment (Guffey)
Issue
63 Land Enhancement Rate Schedule (Guffey)
Issue
64 Service Rider Rate Schedule (Hampson)
Issue
65 Operational Balancing Account (Hampson)
Issue
66 Shipper of Last Resort (Hampson)
Issue
67 Non-Rate Related Tariff Charges (P.
Kelley)
Issue
68 Revised Rates and Charges Effective Date (Nguyen)
Issue
69 Tariff for Commission Approved Rates and Charges (Nguyen)
Issue
70 Interim Increase Refunds (Gatlin,
Vogel)
1CX One Customer Experience
ADIT Accumulated Deferred Income Taxes
AEP Area Extension/Expansion Plan
AGLR Atlanta Gas and Light Resources
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure
AMLD Advanced Mobile Leak Detection
AMR Automated Meter Reading
ARAM Average Rate Assumption Method
Atmos Atmos Energy Corporation
Blue Chip Blue Chip Financial Forecast
BR Brief
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model
CCA Chief Council Advice
Commission Florida Public Service Commission
Company Florida City Gas
COSS Cost of Service Studies
CPI-U Company’s estimates of inflation
CTS Contract Transportation Service Agreement
CUC Chesapeake Utilities Corporation
CWIP Construction Work in Progress
DCF Discounted Cash Flow
DOL Directors and Officers Liability
ERP Enterprise Resource Planning
ERT Encoder Transmission Receiver
ESR Earnings Surveillance Report
EXH Exhibit
F.A.C. Florida Administrative Code
F.S. Florida Statute
FAS Financial Accounting Standards
FCG Proxy Group FCG witness Haag’s proxy group
FEA Federal Executive Agencies
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FGC Florida City Gas
FPL Florida Power and Light
FPSC Florida Public Service Commission
FPUC Florida Public Utilities Company
FTE Full-Time Equivalent
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GS General Service
HDD Heating Degree Days
IBES Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System
IRC Internal Revenue Code
IRS Internal Revenue Service
LDC Local Distribution Company
LE Load Enhancement
MACC Maximum Allowable Construction Cost
MFR Minimum Filing Requirements
MPN Master Page Number
MRP Market Risk Premium
NARUC USoA National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners Uniform System of Accounts
NGCCR Natural Gas Conservation Cost Recovery Clause
NiSource NiSource Inc.
NOI Net Operating Income
Northwest Natural Northwest Natural Holding Company
NSF Non-sufficient Funds
O&M Operational & Maintenance
ONE Gas ONE Gas, Inc.
OPC Office of Public Counsel
OPC Proxy Group OPC witness Walters’ proxy group
OSS Off-System Sales
PDA rule Effect of Parent Debt on Federal Corporate Income Tax
PGA Purchased Gas Adjustment
PHMSA Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
ROE Return on Equity
ROR Rate of Return
RS Residential Service
RSAM Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism
S&P Standard & Poor’s
SAFE Safety, Access and Facility Enhancement
SAP Systems Applications Products
SBAP Solar Battery Access Points
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SERP Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan
Southwest Gas Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc.
Spire Spire Inc.
Storm Reserve Study FCG’s 2022 Storm Damage Self-Insurance Reserve Study
Sunshine Sunshine Water Service Company
TCJA Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
TIP Team Incentive Plan
TOTI Taxes-Other-Than-Income
TR Transcript
UPC Use Per Customer
Utility Florida City Gas
WACC Weighted Average Cost of Capital
On April 20, 2026, Florida City Gas (FCG, Company, or Utility) filed a petition seeking the Florida Public Service Commission’s (Commission) approval of a rate increase and interim rate relief. FCG is a natural gas local distribution company providing sales and transportation of natural gas and is a public utility subject to the Commission’s regulatory jurisdiction under Section 366.04, Florida Statutes (F.S.). FCG is a wholly owned subsidiary of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation (CUC), which acquired FCG from NextEra Energy in November 2023. FCG currently serves approximately 125,000 residential, commercial, and industrial natural gas customers in Miami-Dade, Broward, St. Lucie, Indian River, Brevard, Palm Beach, Hendry, and Martin counties.
FCG requested a permanent increase of $63.3 million in additional annual revenues for the projected 2027 test year. In response to discovery, the Company updated its permanent rate increase request to $63.2 million.[1] This includes an incremental base rate revenue requirement of $46.8 million and the reclassification of $16.4 million from surcharge recovery to base rates, which is associated with the reclassification of the Company’s Safety, Access, and Facility Enhancement (SAFE) program revenues and is ultimately revenue neutral. The Company requested an overall rate of return (ROR) of 8.31 percent based on a mid-point of 11.25 percent return on equity (ROE).
The Company’s last rate case petition was filed on May 31, 2022, and was resolved by the Commission’s decision granting in part and denying in part the Company’s requested rate increase.[2] The Commission-approved rate increase allowed FCG to recover an incremental $14.1 million in base rate revenues, for the projected test year ended December 31, 2023, with the remaining increase associated with the transfer of SAFE investments and a previously approved LNG facility to base rates. The Commission authorized an ROE of 9.50 percent.
The Office of Public Counsel’s (OPC) intervention was acknowledged by Order No. PSC-2026-0051-PCO-GU, issued February 20, 2026. The Federal Executive Agencies (FEA) intervention was acknowledged by Order No. PSC-2026-0245-PCO-GU, issued July 10, 2026. The Commission suspended the proposed permanent increase in rates and charges on June 19, 2026.[3] The Commission subsequently granted interim rates by Order No. PSC-2026-0258-PCO-GU, issued July 24, 2026.
One in-person service hearing was held in Viera, Florida on July 29, 2026. Two virtual service hearings were held on August 17, 2026. Three customers and one elected official spoke at the in-person service hearing and three customers spoke at the virtual service hearings.
A post hearing brief was filed by FEA on October 21, 2026, and by FCG and OPC on October 22, 2026. OPC’s brief did not address every issue in this case. Instead, OPC noted that it will stand on its testimony and positions taken in the prehearing order unless expressly modified by the arguments. (OPC BR 7)
This recommendation addresses the requested permanent rate increase. The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Chapter 366, F.S.
Is FCG’s projected test period of the twelve months ending December 31, 2027, appropriate?
Recommendation:
Yes. FCG’s projected test period comprised of the 12 months ending December 31, 2027, is appropriate. (Kunkler)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Company seeks an increase in base rates effective January 1, 2027. Accordingly, 2027 is the most appropriate year to evaluate the Company’s projected revenue requirements to afford the appropriate match between revenues and revenue requirements.
OPC:
FCG has not demonstrated that the costs that is has projected for inclusion are representative of conditions that will be representative of the time that new rates (if an increase is granted) will be in effect.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
In general, a projected test year methodology uses forecasted data for a 12-month period to match projected revenues and expenses with average rate base investment during the period in which the proposed rates are expected to be in effect.
FCG witness Everngam stated that the Company selected the 12-month period ending December 31, 2027, as the appropriate test period for its request. (TR 40) FCG maintained that the chosen test period reflects the impact of necessary system investments, inflation and other rising costs, and additional staffing and programs needed to improve system performance, enhance cybersecurity and customer service, reduce future costs, and accommodate customer growth. (FCG BR 3)
OPC argued that FCG has not demonstrated that its projected 2027 test year costs are representative of the conditions that will exist when new rates take effect. OPC contends that FCG included elevated operating costs, acquisition-related costs, and projected investments in its Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) and Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) systems without adequately accounting for potential cost savings or uncertainty regarding the timing of implementation. (OPC BR 7–9). FEA took no position on this issue. (FEA BR 3)
Staff recognizes that a projected test year must provide a reasonable basis for estimating a utility’s revenues, expenses, and rate base during the period rates are expected to be in effect. However, staff does not believe that OPC’s concerns establish that FCG’s proposed test period is inherently inappropriate. The appropriateness of the test period is distinct from whether individual costs and investments included in the projected test year are reasonable, prudent, and recoverable for ratemaking purposes.
Staff believes OPC’s concerns regarding FCG’s projected costs, offsetting savings, and proposed ERP and AMI projects should be addressed through the specific issues examining those costs and investments. Projected expense increases do not, by themselves, render the test period unreasonable, and any reasonably supported savings should be reflected in the revenue requirement. Similarly, the reasonableness and timing of the proposed investments, including the amounts included in rate base and operating expenses, can be evaluated and adjusted as necessary without rejecting the projected test period itself.
Based on these considerations, staff recommends that the Commission find FCG’s projected test period of the 12 months ending December 31, 2027, appropriate for ratemaking purposes. Staff’s recommendation on this issue does not preclude adjustments to individual revenue, expense, or rate base items addressed elsewhere in this proceeding.
CONCLUSION
FCG’s projected test period comprised of the 12 months ending December 31, 2027, is appropriate.
Should the Commission approve FCG’s forecasts of customers and therms by rate class for the 2027 projected test year? If not, what adjustment(s) should be made?
Recommendation:
Yes. FCG’s customer and therm forecasts, by rate class, for the projected test year ending December 31, 2027, should be approved, and no adjustments are recommended. (Kunkler)
Position of the Parties:
Yes. The forecasting
methods and input assumptions used by FCG are reasonable and appropriate. Likewise,
the forecast of customers and therms by rate schedule is consistent with the
sales and customer forecast by revenue class and reflects the billing
determinants specified in each rate schedule.
OPC:
No.
FEA:
FEA has no position on this issue.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG’s forecasts of customer counts and therm sales are developed using different methodologies depending on the rate class. For FCG’s residential classes (RS-1, RS-100, and RS-600) and smaller general service classes (GS-1, GS-6K, and GS-25K), FCG witness Taylor developed customer count forecasts and estimates of normal use per customer (UPC).
Witness Taylor did not develop regression-based customer count and UPC estimates for FCG’s larger rate classes. As explained by FCG witness Husted, these customers do not exhibit weather sensitivity or trended customer counts. (TR 918) Therefore, FCG provided customer count and therm sales projections for these classes based on actual customer counts, historical usage patterns, and Company expertise and insights regarding these large customers. (TR 335-336)
FCG witness Taylor stated that he developed customer count forecasts and normal usage estimates for FCG’s residential and smaller general service rate classes, using regression methodology. (TR 335) Witness Taylor further explained that he developed separate customer-count and normal-usage estimates for the Miami and Melbourne regions to “more accurately account for the differing usage patterns and demand response to HDD [heating degree days] across the two regions.”[4] (TR 335) This regional approach recognizes that weather-sensitive usage patterns differ across FCG’s service territory and allows the resulting regional forecasts to be aggregated for the system-wide projection.
Witness Taylor stated that FCG provided historical billing and customer count data beginning in January 2020 and he obtained daily temperature data from The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for the Miami and Melbourne International Airports. Witness Taylor then used a ten-year average of HDDs to represent normal weather for each forecast region. (TR 336-337) For customer counts, Taylor explained that he extrapolated a linear trend based on the prior twelve months of actual customer counts for rate classes/regions showing a clear recent trend. For rate classes/regions lacking a clear recent trend, he projected customer counts based on the last actual customer count for the 2027 test year. (TR 337)
For estimating UPC, witness Taylor utilized differing historical estimation periods across his UPC regression models, ranging from 24 months to 48 months of historical data. These estimation periods were used to estimate the relationships between UPC, HDDs, and the applicable trend variables for each rate class and region. Witness Taylor used the resulting regression models to estimate UPC based on ten-year normal HDDs. These UPC estimates were then multiplied by the forecasted customer counts to develop the forecasted 2027 test year therm sales for each rate class. (TR 337-339) Witness Taylor further stated that the completed projections “…were reviewed by FCG personnel familiar with customer growth and usage trends in their service territory.” (TR 339)
For FCG’s larger customer rate classes, the Company projected customer counts and usage based on actual number of customers and historical usage. To perform this estimation, the Company relied upon its expertise and knowledge of individual large customers and anticipated usage trends. (TR 335-336) The resulting aggregate forecast across all customer classes and both regions is an average of 129,969 customers and approximately 181 million therms sold during the 2027 test year. (EXH 8, MPN K687)
OPC witness Schultz expressed concern that the Company’s
base revenue forecast may be understated because actual customer growth and
therm usage in the first quarter of 2026 were exceeding the Company’s
projections. (TR 1347) Specifically, customer growth had already reached 67
percent of the forecasted annual increase by March 2026, suggesting that the
Company’s projected customer growth of 1.8 percent for 2026 may be understated.
Additionally, annualizing actual therm sales through March 2026 would result in
projected annual sales of approximately 198.0 million therms, compared to the Company’s
forecast of approximately 180.6 million therms. Although witness Schultz
acknowledged that seasonality and weather could affect the therm sales
extrapolation, he identified these discrepancies as grounds for further inquiry
into the reasonableness of the Company’s base revenue forecast but offered no
alternative recommendation or adjustment. (TR 1347)
Witness Taylor rebutted witness Schultz’s arguments stating that his
comparisons do not provide a reasonable basis for concluding that FCG’s
customer or therm sales forecasts are understated. (TR 394) Witness Taylor
contended that witness Schultz’s analysis extrapolates first-quarter 2026
results to the full year without demonstrating that customer additions occur
evenly throughout the year, or that first-quarter therm sales are
representative of annual usage. (TR 394-396) Further, witness Taylor argued
that witness Schultz’s therm sales comparison is not equivalent because FCG’s
forecast is weather-normalized, whereas witness Schultz’s actual usage data reflects
weather conditions experienced only during the first quarter. (TR 395-396)
Witness Taylor concluded by stating that witness Schultz’s analysis does not
establish that FCG’s annual customer or therm sales forecasts are unreasonable.
Staff agrees with witness Taylor’s position that witness Schultz’s comparisons do not provide a sufficient basis to conclude that FCG’s customer or therm sales forecasts are understated. Staff believes that extrapolating first-quarter results to the full year without accounting for seasonal customer growth patterns and weather-related impacts does not provide a reliable basis for evaluating the reasonableness of FCG’s forecasts. Therefore, staff does not believe the observations cited by OPC, standing alone, warrant an adjustment to FCG’s 2027 customer count or therm sales forecasts.
Sensitivity Analysis
As discussed above, witness Taylor utilized differing historical estimation periods, ranging from 24 to 48 months, for FCG’s UPC regression models used to forecast the 2027 test year. Witness Taylor explained that he selected shorter historical estimation periods when including older observations weakened the regression relationship or failed to reflect recent customer usage patterns. (EXH 107; MPN E458)
Staff evaluated the sensitivity of certain UPC forecasts to changes in the historical estimation period to assess the effect of this modeling choice on the resulting forecasts. The UPC forecast for FCG’s Melbourne GS-25K rate class illustrates the potential effect. Using witness Taylor’s as-filed 24-month historical estimation period, the model produced a forecasted 2027 test year UPC of approximately 24,329 therms. Using the same model specification but extending the historical estimation period to 48 months resulted in a forecasted UPC of approximately 27,904 therms, a difference of 3,575 therms, or approximately 14.7 percent. (EXH 159) However, the 48-month model for the Melbourne GS-25K rate class, and other rate classes where a shorter historical period was used, a substantially lower R-squared statistic[5] was observed, as noted by witness Taylor. (EXH 107, MPN E461) Additionally, staff’s sensitivity analysis indicated that extending the historical estimation period did not produce similarly pronounced differences in forecast results for other classes. (EXH 159, MPN E8225) These results demonstrate that changing the historical estimation period can materially affect the forecast for certain classes, but do not establish that the longer estimation period produces a more reliable forecast.
Staff recognizes that the selection of an appropriate historical estimation period may vary by rate class depending on the historical data and the performance of the resulting regression model. Accordingly, staff considered the sensitivity analysis together with the Company's stated rationale for selecting its estimation periods in evaluating whether FCG's UPC forecasts are reasonable. The sensitivity analysis, standing alone, does not establish that either the shorter or longer estimation period is preferable.
Notwithstanding staff’s sensitivity discussion above, staff believes that witness Taylor’s forecasting methodology reasonably incorporates FCG’s historical billing data, regional weather patterns, class-specific customer trends, and input from Company personnel with knowledge of FCG’s service territory. Staff believes FCG’s customer count and UPC forecasts are within the range of reasonableness and appropriate for ratemaking purposes. Staff recommends no adjustment to FCG’s customer or therm forecasts for the 2027 test year.
CONCLUSION
FCG’s forecasts of customer counts and therm sales by rate class for the projected test year ending December 31, 2027, should be approved, and no adjustments are recommended.
Should the Commission approve FCG’s estimated revenues from sales of gas by rate class at present rates for the 2027 projected test year? If not, what adjustment(s) should be made?
Recommendation:
Yes, the Commission should approve FCG’s estimated revenues from sales of gas at present rates for the 2027 projected test year in the amount of $91,496,185. (Kunkler)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. FCG’s sales forecasts were developed using econometric and regression models that are statistically sound and rely upon reasonable drivers. As a result, FCG has correctly estimated the 2027 revenues from sales of gas at present rates, as reflected in MFR E-1.
OPC
No. There is evidence that estimated revenues from sales of gas and other revenues are understated. The Commission should adjust revenues based on the Staff’s analysis as supported by the evidence.
FEA:
FEA has no position on this issue.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This issue addresses whether FCG's estimated revenues from sales of gas, by rate class, at present rates for the projected test year are appropriate. As discussed in Issue 2, FCG developed forecasts of customer counts and therm sales for the 2027 projected test year using econometric and regression models. FCG then applied the applicable rates to its projected billing determinants to calculate revenues by rate class. The Company's projected test year revenue calculations are reflected in MFR Schedule E-2, which detail projected test year customer counts, therm sales, and revenues by rate class under present rates. (EXH 6, MPN K132; EXH 93, MPN E125-127)
The Company forecasted a total of $91.5 million in revenues from sales of gas at present rates for the 2027 test year. This figure consists of approximately $32.6 million in customer charge revenue, $3.3 million in demand charge revenue, and $55.6 million in base non-fuel revenue. (EXH 6; MPN K129).
While OPC witness Schultz raised concerns regarding FCG’s customer and
therm sales forecasts (see Issue 2), arguing that they may be understated, his
testimony did not directly address the reasonableness of FCG’s estimated
revenues from sales of gas at present rates. FEA took no position on this issue.
Staff reviewed FCG’s revenue forecasts for all customer classes and believes they were correctly calculated using current rates and the customer count and therm sales forecasts discussed in Issue 2. Since staff recommends no adjustments to FCG’s customer count or therm sales forecasts, staff recommends no adjustments to FCG’s projected test year revenues from sales of gas.
CONCLUSION
The Commission should approve FCG’s estimated revenues from sales of gas at present rates for the 2027 projected test year in the amount of $91,496,185.
Issue 4:
Should the Commission approve FCG’s estimated amount of Total Miscellaneous Revenue and estimated amount of Third Party Supplier revenue at present rates for the 2027 projected test year? If not, what adjustment(s) should be made?
Recommendation:
Yes. Staff recommends FCG’s estimated amount of Total Miscellaneous Revenue and estimated amount of Third Party Supplier revenue at present rates for the 2027 projected test year of $2,287,122 and $280,181, respectively, are reasonable. Thus, no adjustment to these revenue amounts is required. (Clark)
Position
of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. Projected miscellaneous charge revenues and Third Party Supplier revenues were properly calculated. OSS sales are considered as part of the PGA mechanism and not part of base rates, therefore it is appropriate that the 2027 projected balance for OSS is zero.
OPC:
No. Projected test year revenues should be adjusted. Miscellaneous Revenue should be increased $820,022. Test year revenues should be increased by at least 25% of $1,564,274 or $391,069 for OSS Revenues, to reflect a reasonable inclusion of Off-system Sales in base rates based on historical results. Revenues should be increased at least $1,211,091 before considering any adjustment that are required if adjustments are made to the revenue forecast.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This issue addresses two sources of revenue for the Company: Miscellaneous Revenue and Third Party Supplier revenue. Miscellaneous Revenue is a pooled summary of several different revenue sources. These include the service revenue from fees and charges billed to customers for specialized or incidental services such as installations and disconnections, late payment charges, water heater interest charges, and non-sufficient funds (NSF) charges. Third Party Supplier revenue is derived from the charges applied to third party suppliers selling natural gas to FCG’s transportation customers. (TR 919) All forms of Miscellaneous Revenue are shown on MFR Schedule G-2. (EXH 8, MPN K686; EXH 8, MPN K687)
FCG proposed its test year Miscellaneous Revenue at current rates, totaling $2,287,122, includes six categories of revenue include: 1. Late Payment Charges, 2. NSF Charges 3. Miscellaneous Service Revenue, 4. Water Heater Interest, 5. Off System Sales, and 6. Area Extension Plan (AEP) Revenues. The primary revenue categories include Late Payment Charges ($1,142,643), Miscellaneous Service Revenue ($826,685), NSF charges ($92,475). (EXH 8, MPN K687) FCG calculated its Late Payment Charges by using a three-year average (2022-2024) of historical revenues to forecast 2026, and then applied a three percent growth rate to 2026 to arrive at its 2027 Test Year amounts of $1,142,643. (EXH 94, MPN E135; EXH 8, MPN K687) For NSF charges, the Utility calculated a three-year average (2022-2024) of historical revenues to forecast 2026, and then applied a three percent growth rate to the 2026 value to arrive at its 2027 Test Year amount, $92,475. FCG prepared its 2027 Test Year projected number of Miscellaneous Service Charge transactions by service charge by calculating the three-year average of transactions (2022-2024), then applying the lower limit of the 95 percent confidence intervals to such averages, realigning the 2025 number of transactions due to billing system changes for Connection – Residential, Reconnection – Residential, and Change of Account, and finally, applying a three percent growth adjustment for 2027. (EXH 102, MPN E343) This method resulted in projected total Miscellaneous Service Revenue of $826,685 for 2027. (EXH 8, MPN K687) A smaller category of revenue included under Miscellaneous Revenue is Water Heater Interest revenue, calculated using historical revenues and trended for growth and inflation at three percent per year, resulting in $225,320 in the 2027 Test Year. (TR 919; EXH 8, MPN K687) FCG also included Off-System Sales (OSS) revenue of $0 as a line item under Miscellaneous Revenue for the 2027 Test Year. OSS is the resale of interruptible gas, using FCG’s transportation capacity rights, to any person not connected to FCG’s distribution system. (EXH 6, MPN K336) Finally, FCG included AEP revenue as a line item under Miscellaneous Revenue, also at zero dollars for the 2027 Test Year. (EXH 8, MPN K687)
For the 2027 test year, Third Party Supplier revenue is derived from outside entities selling gas to FCG’s transportation customers and is forecasted as $280,181 for the 2027 Test Year. (EXH 8, MPN K686-687) The amounts were projected by using the current tariff rates multiplied by the actual historical number of gas suppliers and forecasted billing determinants of transportation customers used in Schedule G-2. (TR 919)
OPC witness Schultz presented direct testimony contesting Miscellaneous Revenue amounts FCG included in its estimate of 2027 test year revenue at current rates. Witness Schultz proposed a total of $3,389,195 in adjustments to what he described as an understatement of “Other Revenue” for the 2027 test year. (TR 1349) Witness Schultz’s “Other Revenue,” is a broadly constructed category of revenues that includes both Miscellaneous Revenues and other revenue accounts such as Account 495 (Other Revenues).[6] His $3,389,195 total adjustment consists of three separate adjustments, including $1,564,274 for OSS, $1,004,899 for NARUC USoA Account 495 (Other Revenues), and $820,022 for NARUC USoA Account 488 (Miscellaneous Service Revenue). (TR 1348-1349; EXH 66, MPN C19-851) OPC and FEA did not have a position on Third Party Supplier revenue.
Witness Schultz’s largest proposed adjustment, $1,564,274, is an OSS revenue adjustment which he calculated as the simple average of historical OSS revenue for 2024 ($1,081,039) and 2025 ($2,047,508). (TR 1349) Witness Schultz proposed this adjustment because he does not believe it is reasonable to assume zero future OSS revenues. (TR 1349) Witness Schultz also identified his proposed adjustment for NARUC USoA Account 495 (Other Revenues) of $1,004,899 based on the four-year average (2021-2023 and 2025) of revenues in that account. (TR 1348) His proposed adjustment is, in part, based on his argument that Conservation Revenues should be included in Other Revenues. (TR 1348) Witness Schultz also maintained that FCG did not include certain revenue items in 2024 and 2025 in NARUC USoA Account 495 (Other Revenues), such as Initial Connections and Reconnects for Cause, skewing FCG’s NARUC USoA Account 495 (Other Revenue) downward in the 2025 and 2026 forecast, and these revenue items were also included in his proposed adjustment of $1,004,899. (TR 1348-1349) Finally, Witness Schultz proposed an adjustment to NARUC USoA Account 488 (Miscellaneous Service Revenue) of $820,022 based on his calculated difference of FCG’s five-year average (2021-2025) of revenue for this account per FCG’s Annual Reports ($3,107,144) and the amount reflected in FCG’s 2027 forecast for this account ($2,287,122). (TR 1348-1349)
In OPC’s post hearing brief, OPC changed its proposed adjustment amount from $3,389,195 to “at least $1,211,091.” (OPC BR 12-14) This revised OPC adjustment consists of the previous described $820,022 for NARUC USoA Account 488 (Miscellaneous Service Revenue), excludes the $1,004,899 for NARUC USoA Account 495 and, instead of the full OSS revenue amount of $1,564,274, OPC switched its position on this adjustment to at least $391,069, calculated as 25 percent of its $1,564,274 original adjustment calculation for OSS revenues.
In rebuttal, FCG witness Everngam disagreed with witness Shultz’s adjustment to OSS revenues. Witness Everngam stated that OSS sales are shared with customers, such that 50 percent are used to reduce cost of gas via the Purchased Gas Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause, and the remaining 50 percent of sales is retained by the Company, consistent with the Company’s tariff (FCG Tariff Volume No. 11, Original Sheet No. 71). Witness Everngam further explained that OSS sales are uncertain and unpredictable because, as witness Noia also stated in rebuttal, and such sales depend on the availability of surplus capacity, weather and system demand, and market and upstream conditions. (TR 1722; TR 902-903) (TR 1722) Finally, witness Everngam stated that a zero-dollar OSS forecast in base rates is consistent with the Commission’s treatment of OSS revenue reflected in Florida Public Utilities Company’s (FPUC) most recent rate case in Docket No. 20220067.[7] (TR 1723)
Witness Husted rejected witness Schultz’s adjustments concerning NARUC USoA Accounts 488 and 495 in her Rebuttal Testimony, stating the line items for Initial Connections, Reconnects for Cause, and Collection in Lieu and Returned Check were included in FCG’s 2024 and 2025 annual reports and the subsequent 2027 projection. (TR 947) She also stated that witness Schultz assumed that Conservation Revenues are included in NARUC USoA Account 495, but these revenues are not included in either NARUC USoA Accounts 488 or 495 and are included in the 480, 481, and 489 accounts. (TR 947-948)
Staff reviewed the parties’ positions and arguments as it relates to Miscellaneous Revenue. Staff examined each of the FCG six revenue categories FCG included in Miscellaneous Revenue for reasonableness. Regarding the first two revenue categories, staff agrees with FCG’s methodology as previously described for determining Late Payment Charges and NSF charges at current rates. FCG did not use the year 2025 in developing its projections, and staff reviewed why the Utility took this tact. For that year, the April billing system conversion from Starnik to Systems Applications Products (SAP) One Customer Experience (1CX) resulted in instances of double billing. (EXH102, MPN E341-342) Staff believes the methodology utilized by FCG to be reasonable due to issues from switching its billing system. Upon review, staff agrees with FCG’s projected revenue amounts for Late Payment Charges and NSF charges at current rates.
Regarding the third revenue category, staff considered the projected reduction in transactions associated with FCG’s Miscellaneous Service Revenue. FCG Witness Husted stated that for the 2027 Test Year, FCG revised its Miscellaneous Service Charges, reducing the overall number of identified charges from 16 to 9, which resulted in decreasing the 2026 and 2027 total quantity of occurrences for overall miscellaneous service charges. (TR 917) For instance, the charge item Field Collection Charge accounted for 5,659 transactions in 2024, and with its removal, Field Collection Charge is 0 for 2027. (EXH 94, MPN E133-134) Witness Husted further stated that these changes in miscellaneous service transactions were primarily attributed to revised billing practices after the implementation of SAP 1CX to better align recorded charges with the actual work performed by operations. (EXH102, MPN E345) Staff confirmed that the current rates were correctly applied to generate Miscellaneous Service Revenue.
Staff agrees with witness Husted regarding the elimination of certain billing transactions associated with NARUC USoA Account 488. Staff believes witness Schultz did not take into account the planned FCG revisions to the Company’s miscellaneous billing activity transactions, including Initial Connections, Reconnects for Cause, and Collection in Lieu and Returned Check. (EXH 102, MPN E345; EXH 94, MPN E133-134) These account items are included under Miscellaneous Service Revenue as Connections, Reconnections, and Field Collection Charge. (EXH 94, MPN E133-134) Also, FCG eliminated collection activities in the field due to safety concerns. (TR 918) Upon review, staff agrees with FCG that its 2027 Test Year Miscellaneous Service Revenue in the amount of $826,685 is reasonable. Meanwhile, Issue 31 addresses the exclusion of Conservation revenues and concludes such revenue was appropriately excluded from base rate development in this proceeding.
Regarding the fourth revenue category, staff agrees that FCG’s revenue estimate associated with Water Heater Interest for Test Year 2027 is reasonable. FCG’s $225,320 revenue estimate for Test Year 2027 was trended upward due to inflation and growth from an amount of $204,812 in 2025. (EXH 8, MPN K692; EXH 94, MPN E140-141)
Regarding the fifth revenue category, staff agrees with FCG’s exclusion of OSS in Miscellaneous Revenue from base rates is consistent with the Company’s tariff, as well as the treatment of such revenue reflected in Order No. PSC-2025-0170-TRF-GU.[8] The OSS revenue sharing mechanism has been approved and implemented in the Purchased Gas Cost Recovery Adjustment Clause and are not a part of base rate cost recovery. (EXH 104, MPN E368) Staff believes OSS revenue are properly omitted from total test year revenues in this case.
Finally, regarding the sixth revenue category, FCG projected no revenue for AEP for Test Year 2027. The company has proposed to discontinue the current AEP surcharges when new rates go into effect for existing projects. It plans to transfer all un-recovered excess construction costs from the current AEP program as of December 31, 2026, to the applicable capital plant construction account. (EXH 8, MPN K692; TR 923) The proposal is discussed further in Issue 11. Staff agrees.
Upon review, staff believes Miscellaneous Revenue for Test Year 2027 proposed by FCG ($2,287,122) is reasonable and no adjustment is warranted.
Staff next reviewed FCG’s Third Party Supplier revenue estimates for the test year of $280,181 as presented in Schedule G-2. (EXH 8, MPN K692). Staff agrees with FCG’s Third Party Supplier revenue estimate. Staff confirmed that 2027 Third Party Supplier revenue is supported by a reasonable number of transactions at current rates. Due to FCG including Third Party Supplier revenue in their estimated revenues from sales of gas by rate class, such revenue is accounted for in staff’s recommendation in Issue 3.
CONCLUSION
FCG’s estimated amount of Total Miscellaneous Revenue and estimated amount of Third Party Supplier revenue at present rates for the 2027 projected test year of $2,287,122 and $280,181, respectively, are reasonable. Thus, no adjustment to these revenue amounts is required.
Should the Commission approve FCG’s estimated amount of Total Operating Revenue at present rates for the 2027 projected test year? If not, what adjustment should be made?
Recommendation:
Yes, the Commission should approve FCG’s estimated total operating revenue at present rates for the 2027 projected test year in the amount of $93,783,307. (Kunkler)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
FCG has correctly projected its Total Operating
Revenue at present rates for the projected test year 2027. No adjustments are necessary or appropriate.
OPC:
No. See OPC position on Issue 4.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG’s total operating revenue at present rates for the 2027 projected test year reflects the revenues FCG expects to collect from its projected gas sales and other operating activities under existing rates. These revenues are based on FCG’s projected customer counts and therm sales by rate class, as well as the applicable customer, demand, and base non-fuel charges. The total also incorporates other operating revenues included in FCG’s filing. A breakdown of FCG’s estimated total operating revenues at present rates for the 2027 projected test year is shown in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1
FCG Operating Revenue Projections – 2027 Test Year
|
Revenue Description |
Revenues |
|
Total Revenue from Sales of Gas at Present Rates (From Issue 3) |
$91,496,185* |
|
|
|
|
Water Heater Interest |
$225,320 |
|
Late Payment Charges |
1,142,643 |
|
Miscellaneous Service Revenue |
826,685 |
|
Non-Sufficient Funds Charges |
92,475 |
|
Total Other Revenue |
$2,287,122 |
|
Total Operating Revenues |
$93,783,307** |
Source:
MFR Schedule E-1, page 2 of 3; MFR Schedule G-2, page 1 of 31.
*Includes
Third Party Supplier revenue of $280,181.
**$1 difference from “Total Revenues” reported on line 5 of EXH 8; MPN K671 is
due to rounding.
OPC takes the position that FCG’s estimated total operating revenue is not appropriate, referring to its position on Issue 4, and FEA took no position on this issue. (OPC BR 13-14; FEA BR 3)
Staff reviewed FCG’s estimated operating revenues at present rates and the positions of the parties. Staff believes that FCG’s estimated revenues are reasonable for the 2027 projected test year and that no adjustment should be made.
CONCLUSION
The Commission should approve FCG’s estimated total operating revenue at present rates for the 2027 projected test year in the amount of $93,783,307.
Is the quality of service provided by FCG adequate?
Recommendation:
Yes. Staff recommends that FCG’s quality of service is adequate. (Willis)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. FCG has a high level of customer service and yet it is continually striving to enhance its service to customers.
OPC:
The evidence in this case has not demonstrated that service quality has improved under CUC ownership. FCG service was found to be adequate in the last (2023) rate case. CUC has not materially changed this and service levels (including those relating to gas supply and capacity) were not a basis for vastly increasing O&M and WACC costs to the detriment of FCG customers. Implementation of the 1CX system has imprudently impacted service levels.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Pursuant to Section 366.041, F.S., in fixing rates the Commission is authorized to give consideration, among other things to the efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the facilities provided and the services rendered. The Commission held an in-person service hearing within FCG’s service territory, in Viera, Florida, on July 29, 2026. Additionally, the Commission held two virtual service hearings, one in the morning and one in the afternoon, on August 17, 2026. Service hearings provide an opportunity for FCG’s customers to raise concerns regarding the Company’s quality of service and request for a rate increase. Three customers and one elected official spoke at the in-person service hearing and three customers spoke at the morning virtual service hearing. No customers spoke at the afternoon virtual service hearing. Of the six customers that spoke at the service hearings, only one customer spoke negatively of FCG’s quality of service. All six customers were concerned with the overall rate increase, while five customers had other concerns such as being notified of the interim rate increase after the Commission voted and the rate increase being caused by the acquisition of FCG by CUC. For reference, FCG serves approximately 125,000 customers across eight counties in Florida, including Miami-Dade, Broward, Brevard, Palm Beach, Hendry, Martin, St. Lucie, and Indian River. (EXH 71, MPN C19-2808)
Staff witness Kendrick testified to the number of customer complaints against FCG filed with the Commission from July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2026. During the specified time period, witness Kendrick testified that the Commission received 479 complaints against FCG, with 286 being warm-transfers to the Company for resolution.[9] (TR 1452) The 479 complaints represent approximately 0.38 percent of FCG’s total number of customers. Approximately 48 percent of the complaints concerned quality of service issues, whereas approximately 52 percent of the complaints involved billing issues. (TR 1452) Witness Kendrick further testified that there were six service quality complaints and 20 billing complaints that appeared to demonstrate Commission Rule violations. (TR 1453) The complaints were organized by year and staff further analyzed the complaints logged 18 months before and after the acquisition, to view the impact of the acquisition on FCG’s customers, if any. There were 73 quality of service complaints before the acquisition and 75 quality of service complaints after the acquisition, while there were 45 billing complaints before the acquisition and 88 billing complaints after the acquisition.
The increase in the number of billing complaints coincides with FCG’s transition to CUC’s Customer Information and Billing System, 1CX. As explained by FCG witness Estrada, the increase in customer inquiries was expected as a common short-term consequence associated with technology conversions and operational transformations. (TR 827-828; TR 858-860) FCG anticipates the complaint volumes to decrease as the transition process develops and customers become more familiar with the new software. (TR 828) Therefore, it appears the acquisition had little impact on the quality of service.
Neither OPC nor FEA provided testimony regarding the quality of service. However, in its brief, OPC stated that the evidence in the record suggests that the quality of service since FCG’s last rate case has not improved, and even indicates there may have been a deterioration in the quality of service provided under CUC’s ownership. (OPC BR 14) To support its statement, OPC argued that there was a 38 percent increase in complaints per customer following the acquisition despite FCG’s investments. (OPC BR 15) Staff, along with FCG, recognize that the record demonstrates that complaints have increased post-acquisition. However, staff agrees with witness Estrada’s rationale regarding the short-term consequences of transitioning to a new software.
Pursuant to Rule 25-7.018, F.A.C., each utility shall keep a complete record of all interruptions affecting the lesser of 10 percent or 500 or more of its division meters. According to FCG’s filing, there have not been any service interruptions affecting the lesser of ten percent of 500 or more meters since FCG’s previous rate case. (EXH 10, MPN K769) Based on staff’s review of all witness testimony, customer comments, and FCG’s filing, staff recommends that the Company’s quality of service be determined to be adequate.
CONCLUSION
FCG’s quality of service is adequate.
Has FCG made the appropriate adjustment to rate base to transfer the Safety, Access, and Facility Enhancement (SAFE) investments as of December 31, 2026, from clause recovery to base rates?
Recommendation:
Yes. The Company has made the appropriate adjustment to rate base to transfer SAFE investments, and the SAFE surcharge should be reset. As reflected on Schedule G-1, $16.4 million of SAFE investments was transferred from the SAFE surcharge to base rates in the 2027 test year. (Wooten, Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. Consistent with Order No. PSC-2015-0390-TRF-GU, issued in Docket No. 20150116-GU and as reflected on MFR Schedule G1 page 4, $110.9 million net of accumulated depreciation of SAFE investments through December 31, 2026, were transferred from surcharge recovery to base rates in the 2027 Test Year.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
In 2015, the Commission approved FCG’s SAFE program intended to facilitate the relocation of certain existing gas facilities located in, or associated with, rear lot easements.[10] In 2024, the Commission expanded the SAFE program to include (i) span pipe replacement; (ii) burying shallow and exposed pipelines; and (iii) replacement of obsolete pipe and related facilities.[11] The program dictates that recovery of investments in the SAFE program would be through a SAFE surcharge that would be subject to an annual true-up, and those recovered costs are to be included in any newly approved base rates. Following the inclusion of those approved SAFE investment costs into base rates, the SAFE surcharge would be reset. The Commission has approved the transfer of FCG’s SAFE investments into base rates in 2018 and 2022.[12]
As explained by FCG witness Baugh, the Company seeks to transfer FCG’s current SAFE investments as of December 31, 2026, into base rates, which totals an approximately $16.4 million revenue requirement. The requested recovery reflects the Commission approved 2026 SAFE revenue requirements, which include true-ups for 2024 and 2025 and projected costs for 2026.[13] The $16.4 million revenue requirement reflects a total of $114 million in capital investments for approved SAFE projects between 2024 and 2026. (EXH 132, MPN 3773) The total requested revenue requirement associated with SAFE investments to be transferred from the surcharge to base rates in the 2027 projected test year is $16,402,944. (TR 589) FCG argued that the SAFE investment adjustments were made consistent with the Commission’s requirements and the methodology utilized was consistent with prior Commission decisions. (FCG BR 11)
OPC witness
Schultz testified that the costs associated with the SAFE program should be
audited prior to inclusion in base rates. (TR 1338) In its brief, FCG further argued that although OPC witness
Schultz questioned the costs provided by the Company, he neither explained the
basis for his concerns nor proposed any adjustments to those costs. (FCG BR 11)
Staff notes that the costs for the SAFE program are subject to Commission
review prior to inclusion in base rates, in accordance with the approved SAFE
program terms. Accordingly, Commission staff performed a financial audit of
FCG’s requested SAFE investments and made no adjustments. (EXH 78)
FEA took no position on this issue and
did not put forth evidence or testimony. (FEA BR 3) OPC did not take a position
on this issue. (OPC BR 7)
Based on the evidence in the record, staff recommends that the transfer of SAFE investments reflected in Schedule G-1 meet the requirements of the approved 2026 SAFE program revenue requirements and should be transferred from the SAFE surcharge to base rates. Furthermore, the Company’s request to do so is reasonable and consistent with prior Commission decisions as identified above in 2018 and 2022.
CONCLUSION
The Company has made the appropriate adjustment to rate base to transfer SAFE investments, and the SAFE surcharge should be reset. As reflected on Schedule G-1, $16.4 million of SAFE investments was transferred from the SAFE surcharge to base rates in the 2027 test year.
Should FCG’s proposed Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) costs be included in the 2027 projected test year? If so what amounts, if any, should be included?
Recommendation:
No. The Commission should deny FCG’s proposed Phase 1 AMI costs, disallowing $18,141,069 in capital expenditures and $284,790 in O&M expenses from the 2027 projected test year. Staff recognizes the potential long-term value of AMI technology but does not believe the Company has demonstrated that the proposed investment is prudent and cost-effective for customers at this time. FCG may seek approval in a future proceeding once a comprehensive project cost estimate, including O&M savings, and a clearer demonstration of anticipated customer benefits are available. (Sanchez, Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. Consistent with its adoption by FCG’s industry peers, AMI is a mature technology and its full deployment across FCG’s system will improve operational efficiency, safety, billing accuracy, and system visibility. FCG’s deployment of this technology is reasonable and reflects adoption of technology that has become an industry standard.
OPC:
No. FCG’s proposed 13-month average AMI cost of $18,141,069 should be excluded from the 2027 projected test year, including the 22% contingency fudge factor. Test year accumulated depreciation and depreciation expense should also be reduced by $883,632 and $790,346, respectively.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
As described by FCG witness Gilliam, FCG planned to begin an AMI project, with construction starting in 2026, installing AMI-capable meters, a communication network, and back-office systems to manage the two-way communications. (TR 777) This project would replace FCG’s current Automated Meter Reading (AMR) system, utilizing ‘drive-by’ or ‘walk-by’ meters that allow one-way communication, with an AMI-capable system. (TR 806) The AMI project also represents the beginning of an enterprise-wide project for CUC, with implementation within FCG’s territory being the first phase, for which they are seeking cost recovery. (TR 759-760)
OPC opposes the project in its entirety and recommends its exclusion from the 2027 projected test year. OPC argues that the project is unfair to FCG customers, requiring they fund the project costs inflated by an unneeded 22 percent contingency factor while not providing the benefits of the proposed technology until after the test year. Staff notes that OPC does not argue against the potential benefits of AMI technology, but that FCG has not justified the proposed costs of this project. (OPC BR 22-26) FEA takes no position on this issue. (FEA BR 4)
The Commission had previously approved an AMI Pilot for FCG.[14] As described by FCG witness Haffecke, this pilot was unable to fully function as intended due to its dependence upon Florida Power & Light (FPL) communications network, which was no longer available after FCG’s acquisition by CUC. (TR 723) Witness Haffecke testified that, during the AMI Pilot, information was gathered regarding the performance of the meters, which have been and will continue to operate in AMR mode until the completion of FCG’s communication network. (TR 723; TR 756) OPC witness Schultz testified that FCG did not collect data regarding annual AMI Pilot costs, meter installations, or associated O&M expenses, which it attributes to the acquisition of FCG from FPL and loss of the communication network. (TR 1327; EXH 135, MPN E3873) As noted by witness Schultz, the Commission’s Order approving the AMI Pilot noted that it would be used to quantify benefits associated with remote meter reading, disconnections, and leak/outage detection, after which a report summarizing these findings would be submitted.[15] (TR 1327-1328) Witness Schultz testified no such report was produced despite the $3.4 million capital cost of the AMI Pilot, which OPC argues caused the AMI Pilot to be ineffective. (TR 1328; OPC BR 23) While the Commission determined the AMI Pilot was appropriate without quantification of expected customer benefits, staff notes that pilot programs are typically data-gathering exercises, that allow for the evaluation of the proposed technology or methodology for larger deployments. As discussed below, despite the benefit of the AMI Pilot, FCG did not incorporate any cost savings in its base rate request.
AMI Project Phase 1
FCG is not seeking review or approval of the AMI project as a whole in this proceeding, but rather cost recovery only of what it refers to as Phase 1, which includes the purchase and installation of AMI meters, retrofit of existing meters with Encoder Transmitter Receiver (ERT) devices, and the installation of solar battery access points (SBAP) in its Port St. Lucie and Brevard service territories.[16] (TR 777-778; FCG BR 11-12) The equipment included in Phase 1 of the project is summarized below in Table 8-1.
Table 8-1
AMI Project Phase 1 (2026-2027)
|
Phase 1 AMI Equipment |
Port St. Lucie |
Brevard County |
Total |
|||
|
Purchased |
Installed |
Purchased |
Installed |
Purchased |
Installed |
|
|
AMI Meters |
7,262 |
7,262 |
31,655 |
15,828 |
38,917 |
23,090 |
|
ERT Devices |
12,092 |
12,092 |
23,435 |
11,718 |
35,527 |
23,810 |
|
Meter Set Assemblies |
727 |
727 |
3,166 |
1,583 |
3,893 |
2,310 |
|
SBAPs |
546 |
546 |
1,882 |
941 |
2,428 |
1,487 |
|
Total Devices |
20,627 |
20,627 |
60,138 |
30,070 |
80,765 |
50,697 |
Source: EXH 117, MPN E2465.
In total, 74,444 AMI capable meters and ERT devices, of which 46,900 (63 percent) will be installed, along with associated SBAPs as needed to ensure connectivity. (TR 777-778; EXH 107, MPN E476) The installation of the remainder of the Brevard County meters is included in Phase 2, which is not part of the projected test year. (EXH 90, MPN E104) FCG stated that the total number of AMI capable devices is inclusive of the 5,000 AMI meters installed as part of the AMI Pilot. (TR 755)
Because Phase 1 does not include the full communication network or back-office systems, the devices cannot use their AMI functionality and will be operating as AMR devices as they currently do with no functional difference until the completion of the later phases.[17] (TR 758-759)
Phase 1 Schedule
FCG plans to begin installing replacement meters and ERT devices in September 2026 within its Port St. Lucie territory. (EXH 91, MPN E115) All Port St. Lucie unit installations are anticipated to be completed by April 2027, with unit installations in Brevard County to simultaneously begin and continue until December 2027. (EXH 91, MPN E115) However, only half of the units purchased for Brevard County will be installed within the 2027 test year. (TR 756-757; EXH 91, MPN E115) As noted by OPC witness Schultz, FCG is not proposing to use the dates the meters will be operating for cost recovery purposes. (TR 1330)
For purposes of cost recovery, FCG has proposed treating the plant additions of all meter purchases as taking place in 2026 for Port St. Lucie, and spread evenly over 2027 for Brevard County, while installations costs are based on the projected installation dates, which begin later, in May 2027. (EXH 104, MPN E361-E362) While 100 percent of the equipment costs would be in rate base for Brevard County, only 50 percent of the Brevard County meters would be installed, while installation costs would track actual installations. (TR 1330; EXH 104, MPN E361-E362; EXH 91, MPN E115)
During cross examination, witness Haffecke stated that FCG anticipates completion of its AMI communications network near the end of 2027 or early 2028. (TR 757) Overall, FCG witness Haffecke estimated the AMI project as a whole would take 30 months. (TR 757-758) Based on the September 2026 starting date, that would mean full implementation by approximately February 2029.
Phase 1 Projected Costs
As noted above, FCG’s request in this docket is limited to activities associated with Phase 1 of the AMI project and is not inclusive of cost recovery for purchased equipment or labor associated with future project phases or the AMI communications network previously discussed. (TR 745; EXH 142, MPN E4184) FCG stated that a final estimated cost for the complete AMI project is unavailable at this time, but it expects such an estimate to become available as planning and implementation activities progress. (EXH 90, MPN E101; EXH 142, MPN E4184; EXH 101, MPN E316; EXH 132, MPN E3838) These additional costs will be addressed in future proceeding(s). (TR 1492)
For Phase 1, FCG requested cost recovery for capital costs expenses associated with the AMI project for the period of 2026 and 2027 totaling $29,987,054, and ongoing annual O&M expenses of $348,999. (EXH 90, MPN E102; EXH 142, E4180) The total capital expenditures on a 13-month average are $18,141,069 in the 2027 projected test year. Capital costs associated with the project are inclusive of labor for installation activities and purchase of materials and equipment and are summarized in Table 8-2 below. (TR 778)
Table 8-2
AMI Project Phase 1 Capital Costs
|
Capital Costs |
2026 |
2027 |
Total |
|
Port St. Lucie Equipment |
$5,002,594 |
$0 |
$5,002,594 |
|
Brevard Equipment |
$0 |
$17,631,960 |
$17,631,960 |
|
Subtotal |
$22,634,554 |
||
|
Port St. Lucie Labor |
$1,292,491 |
$1,292,491 |
$2,584,981 |
|
Brevard Labor |
$0 |
$4,767,519 |
$4,767,519 |
|
Subtotal |
$7,352,500 |
||
|
Total |
$6,295,084 |
$23,691,970 |
$29,987,054 |
Source: EXH 90, MPN E102.
As previously discussed, labor costs are inclusive of the installation of 100 percent of the Port St. Lucie metering infrastructure and 50 percent of the Brevard metering infrastructure. (EXH 90, MPN E102; EXH 107, MPN E476; EXH 117, MPN E2465; EXH 142, MPN E4180)
The capital cost for the equipment and installation was increased by a contingency factor of 22 percent. (TR 758) Witness Gilliam argued the contingency factor provides flexibility to address permitting and construction challenges that may arise during the project and that FCG expects to continue at 22 percent in future phases of the project. (TR 798; FCG BR 14) The contingency factor was included both in the equipment costs and the installation costs. (EXH 117, MPN E2464) OPC witness Shultz highlights that this increases the AMI project Phase 1 costs by $5,407,502 and effectively shifts project risk from shareholders to customers. (TR 1331; OPC BR 25) By comparison, when the Commission approved a conversion to AMI infrastructure for Sunshine Water Service Company (Sunshine), a water and wastewater utility of 37,000 meters, that utility did not use a contingency factor in its cost estimates.[18] In addition to capital expenses, FCG identified annual O&M expenses as $64,259 and $284,740 in 2026 and 2027 respectively. (EXH 90, MPN E102; EXH 142, MPN E4180) These O&M expenses do not include additional staffing for three AMI Meter Technicians, nor two AMI Analysts requested by FCG, which are further discussed in Issues 38 and 39. (TR 731-732)
Evaluation of FCG’s Phase 1 AMI Project
As noted above, FCG is not seeking approval of the full AMI project at this time, only those expenses associated with the purchase of metering infrastructure for Port St. Lucie and Brevard customers, and the installation of Port St. Lucie and half of the Brevard customers. (TR 745; TR 1491) However, to evaluate Phase 1 of the AMI project, some investigation of the AMI project as a whole is necessary to determine the reasonableness of the proposed expenditures.
In its description of the program, FCG justifies its decision to proceed with its full AMI deployment across Florida in order to replace aging metering infrastructure, offer improved safety and reliability features, and provide potential cost savings through improved operational efficiency and data accuracy. (TR 724-725; TR 778-780; TR 1481) Witness Haffecke additionally identifies natural gas utility peers as having implemented AMI technology in his testimony, but of these, only Peoples Gas System has been approved for an AMI Pilot program, by Commission Order No. PSC-2025-0413-S-GU.[19] (TR 1477; FCG BR 12) Similarly, witness Gilliam describes AMI as consistent with evolving industry standards, but in cross examination refers to AMI projects as lacking a template and being a new and novel experience. (TR 778; TR 798) Staff reviews each of these areas below.
Replacing Aging Infrastructure
In his direct testimony, witness Gilliam stated that the implementation of the proposed AMI project is necessary to replace aging metering infrastructure. (TR 780) FCG will replace existing AMR meters with an age of 7.5 years or greater with new AMI meters. The remaining AMR meters will be retrofitted with ERTs. As the ERT-equipped AMR meters age, they would be replaced by new AMI in future phases. (TR 724; FCG BR 12) The selection of 7.5 years was based upon FCG’s determination that AMRs have a 15-year service life, which was selected and used for AMI deployment and asset management decisions only. (TR 724; EXH 122, MPN E2960)
However, per the Company’s 2025 depreciation study approved by the Commission, the overall depreciation rate for meters established an average service life of 20 years, with an average remaining service life of 12.6 years, while ERT meters were established at an average service life of 20 years and a remaining service life of 17 years.[20] By comparison, when the Commission approved Sunshine’s AMI project, the Commission noted that the existing metering infrastructure was 90 percent depreciated.[21] Therefore, it appears that FCG may be prematurely replacing assets in Phase 1, rather than replacing aged assets.
Operational Efficiencies & Cost Savings
FCG witness Gilliam identified potential O&M savings associated with the AMI project such as manual meter reading, field service activities, truck roll, and customer call center contacts associated with improved billing accuracy and usage monitoring. (TR 781) However, he testified that the potential savings of implementing AMI was impossible to quantify, estimate, or actualize until after implementation. (TR 781; TR 804)
FCG itself produced a preliminary economic evaluation of the AMI project, dated March 2026, where the Company assessed the long-term economics of the project as a whole. (EXH 117, MPN E2462) This analysis estimated ‘safe’ annual savings of approximately $1.28 million tied to meter reading elimination, reduction in truck rolls, revenue protection, billing accuracy improvements, call center reductions, and gas leak reductions. (EXH 117, MPN E2476) Even without the benefits associated with eliminating meter reading O&M expenses, FCG estimated an annual benefit of $1.0 million upon full implementation. (EXH 117, MPN E2476) FCG asserted that this value was a high-level planning estimate based on completed AMI deployment and should not be used as a definitive projection of future savings. (EXH 107, MPN E474) In the same response, FCG estimated that the Phase 1 portion of the AMI project would produce savings of approximately $0.5 million annually. (EXH 107, E474) In its brief, OPC emphasized that the proposed costs are not accompanied by demonstrated savings. In support of this position, OPC explained that the Company is proposing further expansion without first demonstrating that the technology will produce anticipated benefits and that the Company has not disclosed the savings expected based on the Pilot. (OPC BR 23; OPC BR 25)
Staff agrees with witness Gilliam that some benefits are difficult or impossible to quantify, especially those associated with customer experience and privacy. (TR 807-808) However, these estimates of O&M expenses, even if high level, appear to contradict witness Gilliam’s assertion that savings are impossible to estimate. By comparison, when the Commission approved Sunshine’s AMI project, the Utility was able to estimate expected reduction in meter reading staffing and vehicle expenses.[22] Additionally, FPL was able to provide an estimate of annual cost savings resulting from AMI implementation both during and after completion of its AMI project.[23]
In his direct testimony, witness Haffecke stated the proposed smart meters offer safety features such as integrated shutoff valves, high flow alarms, high temperature detection to detect potential fire at the meter, and air-detection alerts to detect potential tampering. (TR 724-725; EXH 132, MPN E3777; FCG BR 12) These features are integrated within the meters themselves and will be available immediately upon installation without a functioning AMI communications network. (TR 761; TR 1491; FCG BR 12) However, these safety features are only offered by the new AMI meters which represent only 49.2 percent of the total proposed installations in this proceeding, and do not include the ERT retrofitted AMRs or the AMI Pilot meters. (TR 723; EXH 109, MPN E473) Staff agrees that while improving safety is a worthwhile consideration and that these features can be beneficial for FCG customers and employees, the amount of customers that will not see this benefit until future meter replacement lessens the impact of FCG’s argument in this regard.
FCG stated that the Company expects AMI savings to emerge gradually, especially as it does not intend to eliminate meter reading positions, shifting these to AMI meter technicians. (TR 731-732; EXH 132, MPN E3775) Due to the delay in full AMI functionality, staff agrees that any operational efficiencies and cost savings for the AMI project, including Phase 1, would also not begin to accrue until that functionality is realized, estimated towards the end of 2027 or early 2028. (EXH 132, MPN E3831; TR 757; FCG BR 13) FCG asserted that the AMI project remains in the planning and early implementation stages, and described it as not yet fully deployed or placed into service. (EXH 132, MPN E3831) However, the Company is seeking inclusion of the full amount of all AMI infrastructure in Phase 1 rate base, prior to being installed at customer locations, while still seeking a 22 percent contingency factor for the equipment, in addition to incremental O&M and staffing. (TR 722; TR 731-732; TR 763) OPC highlighted this to argue that FCG customers will be paying for the project but will not benefit from the replacement meters for potentially years after the 2027 test year. (OPC BR 24-25)
Staff recognizes that AMI technology offers potential benefits to FCG and its customers, including enhanced safety features, improved meter accuracy, more effective usage monitoring, and reduced operational costs through greater efficiency. However, the record in this proceeding does not adequately demonstrate that the proposed Phase 1 expenditures are reasonable and justified at this time. Staff agrees with OPC that the Company has not sufficiently quantified the anticipated cost savings, has not established that replacing meters with substantial remaining service lives is necessary, and has not provided a final cost estimate for the full AMI deployment. Further, because Phase 1 does not include the communications network and back-office systems necessary to realize the full functionality of AMI, much of the anticipated operational benefits and cost savings will be deferred while customers begin bearing the costs of the investment. Accordingly, while staff acknowledges the potential long-term value of AMI technology, the evidence presented by the Company is insufficient to establish that the proposed investment, as structured, is prudent and cost-effective for customers at this time. Staff agrees with OPC that a more comprehensive evaluation, supported by a complete project cost estimate, quantified and substantiated benefits, and a clearer demonstration of the timing and realization of customer benefits, would better enable the Commission to determine whether and when the investment is warranted. (OPC BR 26)
CONCLUSION
The Commission should deny FCG’s proposed Phase 1 AMI costs, disallowing $18,141,069 in capital expenditures and $284,740 in O&M expenses from the 2027 projected test year. Staff recognizes the potential long-term value of AMI technology but does not believe the Company has demonstrated that the proposed investment is prudent and cost-effective for customers at this time. FCG may seek approval in a future proceeding once a comprehensive project cost estimate, including O&M savings, and a clearer demonstration of anticipated customer benefits are available.
Should allocated costs associated with the proposed enterprise resource planning (ERP) program be included in FCG’s 2027 projected test year, approved for a subsequent step rate increase upon completion, or afforded some other treatment? What adjustments, if any, should be made to the costs allocated to FCG?
Recommendation:
Yes. The allocated costs associated with the proposed ERP program, totaling $23.6 million of rate base and $2.3 million in O&M costs, should be approved for a subsequent step-rate increase upon being placed in-service which is currently scheduled for mid-2027. Further, FCG should be required to file the step increase tariffs for Commission approval following the in-service date of the ERP implementation, which should be limited to the total recovery amount identified in this proceeding. This filing should include documentation supporting the full amount of the project and FCG’s calculations of the incremental revenue increase, reflecting the Commission’s vote on cost of capital issues, net income multiplier issues, and tax issues in this proceeding. (Wooten, Dasher, P. Kelley)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Company has included, in the projected test year, FCG’s allocated portion of the full rate base of $23,584,551 and annual expense recovery on the ERP system of $2,635,078 (net of tax). In the alternative, a step rate increase upon implementation would also be a means to appropriately address the recovery of allocated costs.
OPC:
No. FCG’s proposal to annualize the half-year, per books test year rate base and related costs to a full year should be denied. Projected rate base should be reduced by at least $10,826,950, net of accumulated depreciation, along with depreciation expense of $601,501. The 20% contingency should be rejected. Based on hearing testimony, the entire ERP cost should be removed from the revenue requirement and made subject to the opportunity for a future limited proceeding.
FEA:
FEA takes no position
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
The ERP program is intended to consolidate multiple business functions into a centralized software platform within CUC’s system, in turn replacing FCG’s outdated legacy systems that are difficult to support and maintain going forward. These centralized functions will be employed through an SAP platform and include: financial, procurement, construction and project management, asset management, and human resources. FCG requested recovery of its allocated portion of the ERP costs in the 2027 projected test year which totals to approximately $23.6 million of base rates and $2.3 million in O&M costs, which includes a 20 percent contingency factor and results in a revenue requirement impact of $6,206,353. (TR 141-142; EXH 28; EXH 90, MPN E80; MPN C2-58; TR 1757-1758; FCG BR 15) FCG witness Galtman testified that any unspent contingency dollars would remain unspent at the conclusion of the project, thereby reducing rate base. (TR 178-179) FCG stated that the ERP program is anticipated to be operational in mid-2027, with the legacy systems to be retired at the earliest by the end of 2027. (TR 45; EXH 135, MPN E3864)
The
primary reasons identified by FCG witnesses Bhatwadekar and Galtman for the
transition to the ERP platform are: to improve data security, consolidate
fragmented systems and manual processes, reduce operational risks, improve
regulatory compliance, and accommodate future growth. (TR 143-144; TR 428-430;
TR 437; FCG BR 15) Witness Galtman testified that the SAP platform, being
employed for FCG’s ERP program, is already in use by CUC for many of its
financial and operational systems. FCG argues that utilizing its legacy systems
and not being fully integrated into CUC’s SAP platform not only poses increased
operational risks but also causes a need for manual processes, duplicative data
entry, and data consolidations. (TR 142-143) Additionally, witness Galtman also
argued that as the Company’s legacy systems age, they require external
resources or reliance on specific experienced personnel to maintain, integrate,
and secure them, which in turn, increases operational risks and long-term
support costs. (TR 143; FCG BR 16) OPC argued that FCG failed to
demonstrate that recovery of the proposed ERP program costs is warranted and
that no evidence was presented that the legacy systems suffered from
pre-acquisition service deficiencies that necessitated the ERP program. (OPC BR
26)
In determining what platform would meet its needs, CUC assessed its existing systems and future needs and conducted a competitive request for proposal evaluating vendors’ utility experience, cost and schedule performance, and implementation risk. The review process resulted in the selection of SAP as the ERP platform and IBM as the implementation partner. FCG maintained that CUC’s selection process for the ERP program prioritized implementation, reliability, effective governance, and long-term value rather than choosing a solution based solely on its initial cost. (TR 147-149) In contrast, OPC witness Kollen testified that the Company’s requested pro forma adjustments fail to adequately account for additional potential cost reductions from ERP efficiencies and synergies, customer growth, and refinancing high-cost debt. (TR 1245-1246) However, the witness did not demonstrate or provide evidence that quantified this argument. OPC also argued that the ERP program was not guaranteed to be fully in-service within the 2027 test year and that ERP costs should be removed and subject to Commission approval via a future limited proceeding. (OPC BR 9, 26) However, FCG maintains that the ERP program will be in-service by the end of 2027. (FCG BR 17; TR 1759-1760)
Staff agrees with the Company that retiring legacy systems is expected to produce savings but also agrees with OPC that the projected cost estimates do not account for potential savings from ERP-related efficiencies. Although the Company did not quantify the potential savings associated with these efficiencies, staff recognizes that consolidating fragmented systems and eliminating manual processes should provide operational benefits over time. Additionally, the record demonstrates that replacing the legacy technology platforms with a centralized, integrated software system should improve FCG’s ability to reliably expand, meet growth and increase operational efficiency, as the Company argued. Accordingly, staff recommends approval of FCG’s allocated costs associated with the ERP program.
ERP Annualization
FCG
witness Galtman argued that it is appropriate to annualize the full allocated
amount because the request does not accelerate recovery of speculative costs,
but a known and measurable cost of the ERP project. (TR 1759-1760) OPC witness
Kollen argued that the ERP should not be annualized based on FCG utilizing a
hypothetical in-service date of December 31, 2026, instead of the June 30,
2027, in-service date as reflected in FCG’s testimony. (TR 1244-1245) As a
result, witness Kollen recommended the ERP proforma adjustments to rate base be
reduced by half, $10,826,950, and to reduce the ERP proforma expense by
$2,098,362. (TR 1246-1247) Witness Kollen continued that the adjustment to
expenses included removing all the staff redeployment payroll expense, half of
the ERP software expenses, and removing the ERP depreciation expense
annualization. (TR 1247) OPC witness Kollen stated that the ERP pro forma
adjustments failed to consider customer growth in the test year and as a result
would increase existing revenues and reduce the revenue deficiency if they were
annualized. (OPC BR 29) OPC recommended that the Commission remove the ERP from
inclusion in the revenue requirement, along with the 20 percent contingency
factor, and direct the Company to file a limited proceeding to recover the
projected costs of the ERP program or deny the use of the proposed
annualization adjustment in the 2027 test year. (OPC BR 27)
Witness Galtman contested OPC’s argument against the annualization because the investment in ERP would be functional in 2027 and reliance on a 13-month average, which only reflects a partial year balance during the ERP’s transition into service, would understate the necessary level of rate base required to support the Company’s service. (TR 1759; FCG BR 17) Furthermore, witness Galtman stated that denying the annualization approach and the step increase mechanism would result in the Company under-recovering beginning in June 2027 and therefore would require a costly limited proceeding or rate filing. (TR 1760)
ERP Step-Increase
FCG witness Baugh provided an alternative step-increase mechanism for the ERP if the annualization approach was not approved. (TR 1760; TR 591) FCG witness Baugh testified that if full year recovery of the ERP system costs is not approved by the Commission, the associated revenue requirement should be excluded from rates effective January 1, 2027, and recovered through a step-rate increase when the system enters service. The witness further testified that this approach would reduce rate shock, align cost recovery with the system’s in-service date, and allow full recovery of the necessary costs without an additional rate proceeding. (TR 591-592) FCG asserted that the proposed step increase will function similarly to the approved step increase approved as part of the settlement in FPUC’s electric rate case in Order No. PSC-2025-0287-AS-EI. (TR 1760; TR 591) FCG further argued that utilizing the alternative step-rate increase would avoid a subsequent costly proceeding as well as, alleviate uncertainty concerns, as the Commission would have an opportunity review the actual costs before implementing rates. (FCG BR 18) In opposition, witness Kollen testified that the Commission should deny the ERP expense annualization adjustments but allow half of the requested ERP O&M expense increase which would result in a $10.8 million reduction in FCG’s 2027 projected test year average base rates and a $2.1 million reduction in O&M expenses, respectively. (TR 1247) OPC maintained that a limited proceeding would alleviate the uncertainty associated with the in-service date of the ERP platform and 20 percent contingency factor. (OPC BR 27) OPC further maintained that this limited proceeding would allow ERP costs and associated savings to be more fully realized before the Commission approves cost recovery. (OPC BR 28)
FEA took no position on this issue and did not put forth evidence or testimony on this issue. (FEA BR 4)
Staff believes the ERP program is a reasonable investment in modernizing the Company’s legacy systems, improving data security, reducing operational risks, and supporting future growth. The record demonstrates that the existing systems are increasingly difficult and costly to maintain and that the integration with CUC’s existing SAP platform is expected to improve operational efficiencies. Historically, the Commission has implemented specific accounting treatment of costs tied to the in-service date of projects and staff believes that to be the correct treatment of the costs associated with the ERP program.[24] Therefore, staff recommends that the ERP project be approved with the alternative step increase mechanism to align cost recovery with the actual in-service date of the project. (TR 1760; TR 591) As stated above, this will reduce the revenue requirement by $6,206,353 in this proceeding and will require the Company to request a step increase once the ERP is in service. FCG should be required to file the step increase tariffs for Commission approval following the in-service date of the ERP implementation. This filing should include documentation supporting the full amount of the project, and its calculations of the incremental revenue increase, reflecting the Commission’s vote on cost of capital issues, net income multiplier issues, and tax issues in this proceeding.
CONCLUSION
The allocated costs associated with the proposed ERP program, totaling $23.6 million of rate base and $2.3 million in O&M costs, should be approved for a subsequent step-rate increase upon being placed in-service which is currently scheduled for mid-2027. Further, FCG should be required to file the step increase tariffs for Commission approval following the in-service date of the ERP implementation, which should be limited to the total recovery amount identified in this proceeding. This filing should include documentation supporting the full amount of the project and FCG’s calculations of the incremental revenue increase, reflecting the Commission’s vote on cost of capital issues, net income multiplier issues, and tax issues in this proceeding.
Should FCG’s proposed Advanced Mobile Leak Detection (AMLD) costs be included in the 2027 projected test year? If so, what adjustments, if any, should be included?
Recommendation:
Yes. The proposed AMLD costs, comprised of $1.4 million in capital costs and $141,201 in O&M expenses, should be included in the 2027 projected test year without any adjustments. The proposed AMLD program will provide increased safety and reliability for FCG’s system and its customers. (Wooten, Dasher)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. Equipped with advanced sensors that detect methane and ethane far more precisely than handheld detectors, these vehicle-mounted systems can survey large areas quickly and providing real-time data collection, which reduces the time between detection and repair. They also integrate with GIS mapping and atmospheric modeling, providing detailed leak location, severity, and plume analysis, which will enable FCG to prioritize repairs based on leak size and risk.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG is requesting the addition of two AMLD vehicles to be included in the 2027 projected test year. These two AMLD vehicles would be added to the Company’s existing AMLD two vehicle fleet, for a total of four AMLD vehicles to be utilized in leak detection efforts. FCG witness Haffecke asserted that the AMLD vehicles will enable the Company to perform leak surveys more efficiently and accurately than standard leak detection methods. FCG requested recovery of $1.4 million in capital costs and $141,201 in O&M costs for the two new AMLD vehicles. (TR 718-719) The existing AMLD vehicles have been in-service since 2024, and the proposed additional vehicles are anticipated to be in service before the end of 2026. (EXH 89, MPN E26; EXH 138, MPN E3978)
Witness Haffecke testified that AMLD technology is widely utilized by other gas distribution operators due to the greater detection sensitivity than standard methods and increased survey speeds when vehicle mounted. (TR 719-720) Additionally, FCG claimed that the addition of the two proposed AMLD vehicles would expand daily survey coverage, better coordinate mobile detection with ground-based verification, and allow for prioritization of high-risk areas. The Company also claimed that the additional vehicles would increase system coverage, enable more frequent and timely surveys and reduce survey cycle times. The Company further claimed that based upon FCG’s system size, asset distribution, survey frequency, crew workload, and operational efficiency, increasing the AMLD fleet to four vehicles would provide the optimal balance of increased coverage, efficiency and cost-effectiveness. (EXH 89, MPN E27; FCG BR 19) FCG also argued that the additional vehicles would enhance the Company’s ability to maintain regulatory compliance for both the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and the Commission. (FCG BR 19) While PHMSA regulates gas pipeline leak detection, surveys, grading, and repair timelines under 49 C.F.R. Part 192, PHMSA’s rules do not require the use of AMLD technology in meeting the advanced leak detection requirements at this time. (TR 721)
FCG stated that alternatives to additional AMLD vehicles were explored that included continued reliance on traditional walking surveys, alternative AMLD vendors, and satellite-based detection methods. The Company claimed that these alternatives were ultimately rejected due to the benefits that the AMLD vehicles provided over traditional ground-based leak detection, the enhanced data utilization and integration capabilities of the selected vendor when compared to alternative vendors, and the unproven reliability of satellite-based detection to support distribution-level compliance obligations. (EXH 89, MPN E39 - E40) Witness Haffecke claimed that the enhanced capabilities of the AMLD vehicles would produce potential cost savings due to leak reductions, lower maintenance costs, and increased asset life. (TR 721) However, these potential cost savings were not quantified by the Company as part of the record evidence.
FCG maintained that no other parties
provided testimony or evidence to contradict FCG’s evidence in support of the
additional AMLD vehicles. (FCG BR 20) Neither FEA nor OPC took a position on
this issue. (FEA BR 3, OPC BR 7)
Staff agrees with the Company that there are benefits provided by the utilization of AMLD technology when compared to standard leak detection methods. Staff also agrees that additional AMLD vehicles would provide increased coverage for monitoring FCG’s growing system and could strengthen the efficiency of FCG’s leak detection efforts. Although no quantified cost savings associated with the AMLD vehicles are included in the projected test year, staff believes the increased leak detection capability of the vehicles will enhance the safety and reliability of FCG’s system. Based on the evidence in the record, staff recommends approval of the proposed additional AMLD vehicles in the 2027 projected test year.
CONCLUSION
The proposed AMLD costs, comprised of $1.4 million in capital costs and $141,201 in O&M expenses, should be included in the 2027 projected test year without any adjustments. The proposed AMLD program should provide increased safety and reliability for FCG’s system and customers.
Is FCG’s adjustment to move existing Area Extension Plan (AEP) projects into rate base appropriate?
Recommendation:
Yes, FCG’s adjustment to move existing AEP projects into rate base is appropriate. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Company’s proposal is similar to the approach approved by the Commission in FPUC’s 2022 rate case in Order PSC-2023-0103-FOF-GU.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG witness Husted proposed modifications to its AEP projects to make the program less confusing for customers, reduce billing inquiries, and simplify the administration of the AEP surcharge. (TR 922) As part of the proposed modifications, FCG proposed to transfer all unrecovered excess construction costs associated with the existing AEP program as of December 31, 2026, to the capital plant construction account. (TR 922-923) In Florida Public Utilities Company-Gas’ (FPUC-Gas) last rate case, the Commission approved the remaining costs associated with existing AEP projects were transferred to rate base in a similar manner to which FCG is requesting in this proceeding. [25] On MFR G-1, page 4 of 28, FCG reflected the removal of unrecovered AEP in the amount of $6,594,594 from working capital and a corresponding adjustment to add the costs to plant. (EXH 8, MPN K643)
Neither OPC nor FEA provided any testimony on FCG’s adjustment to move existing AEP projects into rate base. This issue was not included in OPC’s brief. Staff reviewed the Company’s proposed adjustment and concluded that FCG had appropriately transferred the $6,594,594 in unrecovered costs from working capital to plant.
CONCLUSION
Staff agrees that the proposed modifications to FCG’s AEP
projects should make the program less confusing for customers, reduce billing
inquiries, and simplify the administration of the AEP surcharge. Staff
therefore recommends that FCG’s adjustments to move the existing AEP projects
into rate base should be approved.
Has FCG made the appropriate adjustments to remove all non-utility activities from Plant in Service, Accumulated Depreciation, and Working Capital?
Recommendation:
Yes, FCG made the appropriate adjustments to remove all non-utility activities from plant in service, accumulated depreciation, and working capital. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FGC:
Yes. FCG has no non-utility activities; therefore, no adjustment was made or was necessary.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
The Company is responsible for demonstrating that all non-utility activities have been removed from plant in service, accumulated depreciation, and working capital. FCG witness Baugh provided, in a discovery response, that FCG charges all non-utility costs and payroll directly to the appropriate business units. (FCG BR 21, EXH 102, MPN E319) However, on MFR G-1, page 19 of 28, reflected common plant non-utility in the amount of $11,330,741 and common plant accumulated depreciation non-utility in the amount of $2,814,628. (EXH 8, MPN K659) The schedule reflected that the common plant non-utility amounts had been removed from plant in service and accumulated depreciation. Based on staff’s review, no additional adjustments are necessary.
Neither OPC nor FEA provided any testimony or proposed adjustments to remove any non-utility activities from plant, accumulated depreciation, or working capital. This issue was not included in OPC’s brief.
CONCLUSION
Staff agrees that FCG made the appropriate adjustments to remove all non-utility activities from plant in service, accumulated depreciation, and working capital. Therefore, no further adjustments to non-utility activities are necessary.
Should any adjustments be made to the amounts included in the 2027 projected test year for the 2004 Atlanta Gas and Light Resources acquisition adjustment and accumulated amortization of acquisition adjustment?
Recommendation:
No adjustments should be made to the 2027 projected test year for the 2004 Atlanta Gas and Light Resources (AGLR) acquisition adjustment and accumulated amortization of the acquisition adjustment. (Dasher)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
No. Consistent with the Commission’s decision in Docket No. 20220069-GU, FCG has presented evidence and testimony in this proceeding that fully supports that this acquisition adjustment should remain on FCG’s books until fully amortized. As such, no adjustments should be made.
OPC:
Yes. The 2004 acquisition adjustment of $21,656,835 and accumulated amortization of acquisition adjustment of $16,362,943 should be removed from the 2027 projected test year.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
In its initial filing, FCG reflected an acquisition adjustment of $21,656,098 and accumulated amortization of $16,362,943 on its balance sheet originating from the Commission’s approval of a positive acquisition adjustment associated with AGLR’s acquisition of FCG in 2004 (2004 AGLR Order).[26] (FCG BR 22) The Commission evaluated the acquisition using five factors – quality of service, operating costs, ability to attract capital, overall cost of capital, and professionalism and expertise of the staff – and authorized a 30-year amortization period for the acquisition adjustment. (FCG BR 21)
Since the Commission approved the acquisition adjustment in 2007, the acquisition adjustment has remained on FCG’s balance sheet through two subsequent acquisitions, first by Southern Company Gas[27] and then by FPL.[28] (FCG BR 22)
In FCG’s 2023 rate case, the Commission approved the continued amortization of the 2004 AGLR acquisition adjustment through FCG’s next general rate case (2023 FCG Order).[29] The Commission directed FCG to demonstrate in its next general rate case that continued amortization is appropriate by addressing the five factors historically considered by the Commission in evaluating acquisitions adjustments for electric and gas utilities. OPC witness Schultz testified that continuation of the 2004 acquisition adjustment was appealed to the Supreme Court, however, the Commission’s decision was upheld by Supreme Court Order No. SC2023-0988. (FCG BR 24; TR 1320-1321) Witness Schultz continued that neither the Commission nor the Supreme Court stated that the amortization should remain for the full 30-year period initially approved, but only until the next general rate case. (TR 1321)
Five Factor Test
FCG affirmed that it continued to meet all five factors which were the basis of the 2007 AGLR Order. (TR 53) FCG witness Everngam stated that the Five Factor Test is a metric to assist the Commission to determine if the acquisition was in the public interest and provide a basis for the purchase premium to be recognized as a regulatory asset. (TR 53) Witness Everngam testified that FCG still meets the Five Factor Test and therefore should be allowed retain the 2004 acquisition adjustment. (TR 55) OPC witness Schultz argued that FCG’s ability to achieve the five factors, compared to the initial 2004 acquisition, are no longer relevant because of the subsequent acquisition since 2004. (TR 1318-1319) Witness Schultz claimed that FCG failed to meet all the factors of the Five Factor Test when compared to 2023, when CUC bought FCG, and that the acquisition adjustment should not be included as a result. (TR 1322) Witness Everngam maintained that the Five Factor Test should be compared to the 2004 acquisition because that is the acquisition adjustment FCG is requesting to keep amortizing in this general rate case. (TR 1718) Witness Everngam continued that FCG has not requested recovery of the acquisition premium, but instead has requested approval to retain and continue to amortize the acquisition adjustment approved by Order No. PSC-07-0913-PAA. (TR 1719)
Increased Quality of Service
FCG asserted that its customers benefit from increased quality of service related to cost savings, enhanced customer service resources, lower cost capital, dedication to safety and reliability, focused capacity planning, and a committed workforce. (TR 55-56) In 2025, both FCG and FPUC were recognized as Utility Customer Champions by Escalent. This award honors top-performing electric, natural gas, and combination utility companies in the United States for delivering exceptional service and demonstrating a strong commitment to customer satisfaction. (TR 56)
Witness Schultz argued that FCG proving an increased quality of service would be difficult due to FCG lacking information prior to December 2023. (TR 1322) Witness Schultz further argued that FCG has made statements to both the Commission and investors that reflect a commitment to maintain FCG’s existing safe and reliable service levels, rather than an improvement in service quality. (TR 1322-1323) Witness Schultz continued that CUC’s statements to investors following the 2023 acquisition indicated that FCG was a strong contributor to earnings and possessed valuable operational practices that CUC sought to leverage across its system, rather than demonstrating deficiencies under prior ownership or superior resources under CUC. (TR 1323-1324)
Witness Everngam denied the claims made by witness Schultz and maintained that a successful acquisition benefits from the combined strengths of both organizations. Witness Everngam further argued that CUC’s recognition of FCG’s workforce strengths does not cancel out the expertise that CUC can bring to the Company. (TR 1721-1722) Witness Everngam further argued that just because the Commission’s 2023 FCG Order determined that FPL was providing safe and reliable service does not mean that CUC can’t improve FCG operations. (TR 1722) Witness Everngam asserted that CUC’s ongoing investments in ERP, 1CX, AMI, SAFE, and safety facilities demonstrate the efforts to enhance FCG’s reliability, safety, and operational efficiency. (TR 1722)
Lower Operating Costs
Witness Everngam developed Exhibit ME-3 to represent the ongoing cost savings associated with the 2004 acquisition adjustment. (TR 1719-1720) Exhibit ME-3 demonstrated that the acquisition adjustment continues to produce a net cost savings for customers by comparing the actual amortization of the acquisition adjustment against the ongoing cost savings that resulted from the acquisition. (TR 1719-1720) By Order No. PSC-12-0010-PAA-GU, the Commission approved an acquisition adjustment that utilized a similar exhibit to demonstrate cost savings.[30] (TR 1719-1720)
Witness Schultz contended that Exhibit ME-3 does not provide justification for lower operating costs because the calculation escalates costs using an inflation and growth compound multiplier from 2003 through 2027 and applied the multiplier to costs that are not representative of costs applicable in 2023 when the acquisition occurred. (TR 1324-1325) Witness Everngam contended that witness Schultz misunderstood that the purpose of the exhibit was to support the retention of the 2004 acquisition adjustment, and therefore the appropriate starting point for the analysis was 2003. (TR 1719-1720)
Ability to Attract Capital & Lower Overall Cost of Capital
Witness Everngam stated that FCG and its customers have benefited from the Company’s ability to attract capital and at a lower cost. (TR 56-57) Witness Everngam continued that CUC’s credit rating is significantly higher than FCG’s at the time of the 2004 acquisition. (TR 57) The Company maintained that CUC’s investment grade credit rating facilitates competitively priced financing for infrastructure, safety, reliability, and customer service projects at costs lower than those available under FCG’s ownership at the time of the 2004 acquisition. (FCG BR 23)
OPC did not provide testimony on this metric.
Managerial, Financial, Technical, and Operational Resources
Witness Everngam testified that customers have benefited from more professional leadership and enhanced resources since the 2004 acquisition by AGLR. (TR 57-58) Witness Everngam affirmed that FCG is continuing to benefit from CUC’s management team that has a primary focus on natural gas. (TR 57-58) The Company stated it is dedicated to enhancing customer service and providing operational excellence and that is reflected in the investments CUC is making in technical and operational upgrades. (TR 57-58) Furthermore, witness Everngam noted that CUC has been recognized as a Top Workplace for over ten years and in 2021 and 2022 received a Top Workplace USA award for a mid-size company. (TR 58) Further demonstrating that CUC retains engaged employees that deliver high quality job performance that assist the Company in generating lower operating costs and enhancing customer service. (TR 58)
OPC did not provide testimony on this metric.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
FCG witness Navo testified that the acquisition adjustment is a regulatory asset. (TR 648) Witness Navo also stated that recording the acquisition adjustment as a regulatory asset is fully consistent with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. Since the 2004 acquisition of AGLR was approved by the Commission, witness Navo argued, then it should be recognized as a regulatory asset. Eliminating the acquisition adjustment due to the previous changes in ownership will reverse a prior Commission ruling, witness Navo contested. (TR 649)
Total Evaluations
Staff recognizes that the Commission’s 2023 order did not guarantee continued recovery for the remainder of the originally authorized amortization period. Rather, it required FCG to demonstrate in this proceeding that continued recovery remains appropriate under the five factors. Staff’s recommendation rests on the evidence presented in this proceeding, rather than on the prior approval alone.
Staff agrees with FCG that the appropriate starting point is the 2004 acquisition because the adjustment at issue arose from that transaction. FCG is not seeking recovery of a new acquisition premium associated with CUC’s 2023 purchase. Subsequent changes in ownership do not, by themselves, establish that the benefits supporting the existing adjustment have ended. The relevant inquiry is whether those benefits continue under current ownership.
Regarding operating costs, staff finds that Exhibit ME-3 addresses that inquiry by comparing the continuing cost of the acquisition adjustment with estimated ongoing savings attributable to the original acquisition. Using a 2003 baseline is consistent with evaluating the benefits of the 2004 transaction. OPC’s objection that the exhibit does not reflect conditions at the time of the 2023 acquisition does not make that baseline inappropriate. Staff accepts the inflation and growth adjustments as a reasonable means of comparing historical costs with projected test-year costs, and finds the exhibit supports FCG’s position that customers continue to receive net savings.
Regarding quality of service, staff acknowledges the limitations of the historical information and OPC’s observation that FCG already provided safe and reliable service before CUC’s acquisition. However, continued recovery of the existing adjustment does not depend on demonstrating that CUC acquired a deficient utility. Staff gives weight to FCG’s customer service recognition and the testimony concerning its continuing safety, reliability, and customer service resources as evidence that customers continue to receive service benefits. Staff also finds that the testimony concerning access to competitively priced capital and specialized natural gas management and technical resources supports the remaining factors. These findings do not depend solely on anticipated benefits from proposed projects.
Taken together, this evidence supports continued recovery under the five factors. Accordingly, staff recommends no adjustments to the 2027 projected test-year acquisition adjustment or its accumulated amortization. If FCG seeks continued recovery in its next general rate case, it should again demonstrate that the benefits supporting the adjustment continue.
As such, staff recommends no adjustments in the 2027 projected test year for the 2004 AGLR acquisition adjustment of $21,656,835 or the accumulated amortization of $16,362,943. Further, staff recommends that if in the next general rate case FCG requests a continuation of the 2004 acquisition adjustment, it should provide support of further continuance under the Five Factor Test.
Regarding the above claim by OPC witness Schultz that it is no longer valid to compare the Five Factor Test to the former ownership during the 2004 acquisition, staff agrees with FCG witness Everngam. Comparing the Five Factor Test to this acquisition adjustment would still be valid when comparing to the ownership during the 2004 acquisition and the comparison better aligns with Order No. PSC-07-0193-PAA-GU, in Docket No. 20060657-GU.
CONCLUSION
No adjustments should be made to the 2027 projected test year for the 2004 AGLR acquisition adjustment and accumulated amortization of the acquisition adjustment.
What is the appropriate level of Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization that should be approved for the 2027 test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate level of Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization for the 2027 test year is $236,756,252. (Dasher, Wu)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate level of Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization for the projected test year is $238,244,616.
OPC:
The appropriate level of Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization that should be approved for the 2027 projected test year is no more than $219,816,070.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Although this is a fallout issue, adjustments recognized by the Company will be addressed. In FCG’s initial filing, it reflected an amount of $238,164,640 for Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization for the 2027 projected test year. (EXH 8, MPN K640) As discussed in Issue 18, FCG witness Haffecke submitted supplemental testimony to recognize an adjustment to plant based on a change in the damage prevention software. The corresponding adjustment to accumulated depreciation is a reduction of $1,103. (EXH 33) FCG also agreed to an adjustment based on staff’s Audit Finding Three, that determined an adjustment to the 2025 depreciation expense in the amount of $78,873 was appropriate and a corresponding reduction to accumulated depreciation with an overall reduction of $8,848 to the 2027 projected test year revenue requirement. (EXH 143, MPN E4191) FCG’s adjusted amount of Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization is reflected as $238,244,616. (FCG BR 27-28)
OPC stated the appropriate amount of Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization that should be approved for the 2027 projected test year is $219,816,070. (OPC BR 32) OPC continued that it updated its position based on the change in amortization balances due to the complete removal of the PERP system and the assignment of the Starnik loss to the shareholders. (OPC BR 32) As addressed in Issue 36, staff is not recommending an adjustment based on the removal of Starnik. Additionally, staff assumes by PERP, the OPC is referencing the ERP in its brief. For clarity, staff is recommending approval of the ERP project with cost recovery through a step-rate increase upon being placed in-service (Issue 9). Therefore, staff removed the ERP project’s associated depreciation for this proceeding.
Based on the adjustments above and staff’s recommendations in Issues 8 and 9, the appropriate level of Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization is $236,756,252.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate level of Plant Accumulated Depreciation and Amortization for the 2027 test year is $236,756,252.
Has FCG made the proper adjustments to the Working Capital Allowance to reflect under recoveries and over recoveries related to the Purchased Gas Adjustment and Energy Conservation Cost Recovery clauses?
Recommendation:
No, staff recommends a reduction to working capital of $400,000 to recognize the 2027 projected test year over-recovery. (Gatlin, Vogel, Prewett)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. FCG appropriately forecasted zero balances for clause over/under recoveries in the projected test year as reflected on page 4 of MFR G-1.
OPC:
No. Working Capital Allowance should be reduced by at least $4,056,838 by reducing Customer Accounts Receivable for the estimated clause net underrecoveries adjustment that has historically been required by the Commission to remove the debit effect of that receivable that is otherwise embedded in base rates working capital as shown on Exhibit 66 (HWS-2, Schedule B-4 at MPN C19-845-846).
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG stated that it has made the appropriate adjustments to remove forecasted under or over recoveries to its cost recovery clauses from working capital as reflected on MFR G-1 page 4. (EXH 8, MPN K643) However, OPC witness Schultz argued to reduce working capital by $4,056,838 to account for the estimated clause net under-recovery adjustment associated with the consolidation of Purchased Gas Adjustments (PGA) clause recoveries for FPUC Gas Division and FCG, which has historically been necessary to eliminate the debt effect of the related receivable included in base rates.[31] (OPC BR 33; TR 1343-1345)
Witness Schultz stated that the even though CUC was consolidated with FPUC Gas Division and FCG operations for purposes of the PGA, the base rates have not been consolidated, nor is a consolidation of base rates being proposed in this rate case. (TR 1344-1345) Witness Schultz continued that the result of consolidation of PGA clause recoveries is that net under-recoveries are included in the working capital of FCG and must be adjusted for or rates will be overstated. (TR 1344-1345) The staff audit report noted in Finding No. 6, that solely FCG reported under-recoveries in 2025 in the amount of $4,452,951 and interest income in the amount of $227,729. (EXH 78, MPN C23-3332) Additionally, the audit report stated that it was an informational finding and that the company should determine the effect on the general ledger. (EXH 78, MPN C23-3332)
FCG witness Baugh contested that both witness Schultz and staff’s audit finding adjustment to PGA under-recoveries was not appropriate. (FCG BR 30) In regard to staff’s audit Finding No. 6, witness Baugh stated that the $4,452,951 identified by staff does not represent PGA under-recoveries balance as of December 31, 2025, but represent a portion of the over-recovery associated with the FCG PGA during 2025. (TR 1512; EXH 83) Additionally, witness Baugh stated that staff did not include the beginning balance of the over-under recovery. (TR 1512) Witness Baugh explained that FCG had an over-recovery in the 2025 historic year of $6,361,451, that was unintentionally included in working capital, which resulted in a reduction to rate base. (TR 1505; EXH 83; FCG BR 30) As reflected on Exhibit JB-5, this error resulted in an understatement of FCG’s interim revenue requirement of $615,576. (EXH 83)
Concerning witness Schultz’s under-recovery adjustment of $4,056,838, witness Baugh argued that the adjustment included the consolidated PGA of FPUC Gas Division and FCG for the period of 2025, and not the year-end balance of $4,786,499. (TR 1505) Witness Baugh agreed with witness Schultz that under-recoveries should be removed from working capital and continued that FCG had not included any under-recoveries to the historic or projected test years. (FCG BR 30; TR 1505)
FCG stated in its brief that the most recent PGA projections for 2027 reflect a consolidated over-recovery of $1.8 million and a 13-month average allocation to FCG over-recovery of $400,000. (FCG BR 30) Witness Baugh maintained that including a projection of zero in working capital is appropriate because at any point in the year an under or over recovery can exist. (TR 1520-1522; FCG BR 30) In OPC’s brief, it recommended a reduction to working capital by including $400,000 over-recovery effect in the 2026 PGA filing. (TR 1520-1522; OPC BR 34) However, OPC also stated that it is Commission practice to exclude under recoveries from working capital as they are assets and to include over recoveries because they are liabilities. Therefore, the $400,000 reflected as an over-recovery should be included in working capital. (OPC BR 33-34; TR 1520-1522) Staff notes that this adjustment is from the PGA True-Up testimony filed in Docket No. 20260003-GU on September 25, 2026. Staff agrees that the $400,000 over-recovery should be included in working capital for the 2027 projected test year based on it being a known and measurable projection in the 2027 test year as stated by witness Baugh. (FCG BR 30; TR 1520-1522)
As discussed above, staff agrees that the initial adjustment to working capital allowance appropriately reflected a zero-balance concerning PGA and Energy Conservation Cost Recovery. However, with the information brought forth in the hearing and the parties’ briefs, staff recommends reflecting the $400,000 over-recovery in the 2027 projected test year.
CONCLUSION
Staff recommends a reduction to working capital of $400,000 to recognize the 2027 projected test year over-recovery.
What amount of the unamortized balance of Rate Case Expense, if any, should be included in Working Capital for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
Staff recommends unamortized rate case expense not be included in working capital for the 2027 projected test year. (Dasher)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
No position.
OPC:
None.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
On MFR Schedule G-1, page 4 of 28, the $3,793,736 unamortized rate case expense amount was totally removed pursuant to Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU in Docket No. 20220069-GU. (EXH 8, MPN K643) FCG witness Baugh further stated that adjustments to working capital were made and the appropriate amount of working capital is shown on the Company’s MFR Schedule G-1. (TR 574) OPC offered no adjustments to the unamortized balance of rate case expense included in working capital for the 2027 projected test year. FCG’s initial filing and internal audit revealed that the Company has removed $3,793,736 in unamortized rate case expense from the 2027 projected test year.
CONCLUSION
The unamortized rate case expense should not be included in working capital for the 2027 projected test year.
What is the appropriate level of Construction Work in Progress (CWIP) to include in the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate level of CWIP is $28,875,285 for the 2027 projected test year. (Dasher)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate level of CWIP in the projected test year is $28,875,285.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
On MFR Schedule G-1, page 1 of 28, the amount of requested CWIP is $28,875,708 for the 2027 projected test year. (EXH 8, MPN K640) FCG accepted Audit Finding No. 2 presented in staff witness Mouring’s testimony that related to a reduction of $423 for Allowance of Funds Used During Construction. (EXH 143, MPN E4191) OPC offered no adjustments to CWIP for the 2027 projected test year. This issue was not included in OPC’s brief. As such, the reasonable and appropriate CWIP is $28,875,285.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate level of CWIP is $28,875,285 for the 2027 projected test year.
What is the appropriate level of plant in service for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate level of plant in service for the 2027 projected test year is $880,039,888. (Gatlin, Vogel, Wooten)
Position of the Parties
FCG:
The appropriate total level of plant-in-service is $922,370,239.
OPC:
The correct level of plant in service for the 2027 projected test year is no more than $859,396,987 (including allocated plant), less the amount associated with complete removal of the ERP program capital costs, AMI expansion costs and any stranded Starnik write-off costs.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Although this issue is identified as a fallout issue, adjustments recognized by the Company will be addressed, as well as OPC’s concern regarding common plant. FCG requested $922,313,317 in plant in service, plus corporate plant allocated and the gross amount of acquisition adjustment, as reflected in MFR Schedule G-1, page 1 of 28. (EXH 8, MPN K640) FCG made an adjustment to increase plant of $56,922, based on a change in the amount for damage prevention software, resulting in an increase to plant of $922,370,239 from the initial request of $922,313,317. (EXH 33, MPN C11-363-C11-364)
OPC witness Kollen proposed an adjustment to common plant based on the calculation of the allocation methods including the parent companies, CUC and FPUC. (TR 1221-1222) FCG witness Navo contested OPC witness Kollen’s adjustment to common plant, stating that OPC’s recalculation of the allocation factors included parent companies that are not operating business units. (TR 650) Witness Navo maintained that including the parent companies as additional allocation recipients reduced the allocation percentages assigned to the operating business units without a corresponding benefit from the common plant assets. (TR 650) Furthermore, witness Navo stated that FCG’s established practice under the modified Distrigas methodology was to allocate common plant among the operating entities that benefited from the associated assets and services. (TR 1546-1547) Staff agrees that FCG utilized the correct allocation methodology, and no further adjustment should be made to the 2027 projected test year level of plant, based upon OPC’s recommended adjustment to common plant.
In OPC’s brief, it stated that the level of plant in service should be reduced to reflect the removal of the ERP, the assignment of Starnik loss to the shareholders, and for the reduction AMI plant. As addressed in Issue 36, staff is not recommending an adjustment based on Starnik.
As discussed in Issues 8 and 9, staff recommends an adjustment to plant for the 2027 projected test year based on a future filing for the ERP program and the disallowance of the AMI program. Based on staff’s recommendations on previous issues, the appropriate level of plant in service for the 2027 projected test year is $880,039,888. Staff’s recommended plant in service balances and adjustments are reflected below in Table 18-1.
Table 18-1
Staff Adjusted Plant in Service
|
MFR Requested Amount |
$922,313,317 |
|
Staff Adjustments: |
|
|
Damage Prevention Software |
$56,922 |
|
ERP |
(24,189,283) |
|
AMI |
(18,141,069) |
|
Total Staff Adjustments |
($42,273,430) |
|
|
|
|
Staff Adjusted Amount |
$880,039,888 |
Source: Staff Calculations.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate level of plant in service for the 2027
projected test year is $880,039,888.
Did FCG utilize the RSAM mechanism from December 1, 2023, through December 31, 2024, in a manner inconsistent with the approval of that mechanism such that otherwise disallowable costs were recovered? If so, what adjustments, if any, should be made to rate base?
Recommendation:
No. FCG utilized the Reserve Surplus Amortization Mechanism (RSAM) from December 1, 2023, through December 31, 2024, in a manner consistent with the approval of that mechanism such that otherwise disallowable costs were recovered. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
No. FCG utilized the RSAM consistent with Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, issued in Docket No. 20220069-GU, which did not limit the use of the RSAM to specific categories of costs or revenues resulting in below-target net operating income. FCG utilized the RSAM in 2023 and 2024 to earn a ROE within its authorized range, as contemplated. Moreover, the Company did not utilize RSAM to recover Transaction Costs associated with the acquisition of FCG by Chesapeake.
OPC:
Yes. The recognition of a regulatory liability of $16,610,324 should be included in rate base for the 2027 projected test year. This will correct an overstatement of test year rate base based on costs being improperly offset by amortization of the Reserve Amount.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG stated it utilized the RSAM consistent with Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU (2023 Rate Case Order), issued in Docket No. 20220069-GU. (FCG BR 33) As stated in the 2023 Rate Case Order, the RSAM was intended to give FCG the ability to manage its day-to-day business fluctuations and be able to remain within its approved ROE range. (TR 1750-1751) FCG continued that the approval of the RSAM did not specify or limit the categories of costs or revenues that could be included. (TR 1750-1751) Rather, the order provided that, if the Company’s achieved ROE fell below the authorized range and the RSAM remained available, the Company could record the necessary entries to recognize earnings within the authorized range. (TR 1750-1751)
OPC witness Schultz argued that FCG did not utilize the RSAM in the manner intended because the Company included transaction costs from the 2023 acquisition from FPL in the entries that were charged to RSAM in 2023 and 2024. (TR 1304-1305) Witness Schultz argued that any expenses related to the acquisition, including transition costs, should not have been reported as above the line contributing to FCG’s perceived need to utilize the RSAM while simultaneously increasing the rate base. (TR 1303-1304)
OPC asserted that the RSAM was not intended to be used for costs incurred by the Company that are beyond normal operating costs or below-the-line costs. (TR 1303) OPC stated $10.6 million and $2.9 million of transaction and transition costs were included above-the-line in 2023 and 2024, respectively. (TR1315) Witness Schultz claimed that these transaction and transition costs are not part of day-to-day operations and by the prior order should not be included. (TR 1302-1303) OPC argued in its brief, that the 2023 Rate Case Order did not include anything on mergers or acquisition to being considered day-to-day expenses. (OPC BR 37) OPC recommended an RSAM correction liability in order to charge the transaction and transition costs below the line as OPC claimed they should have been recorded initially and to reverse the improper increase to rate base. (TR 1314)
Witness Schultz calculated an additional $10,996,455 to be included in the RSAM correction liability based on the loss of deferred taxes and the difference of the debt rate compared from FCG’s ownership under FPL and subsequently CUC. (TR 1316-1317) However, witness Schultz only included 50 percent, $5,548,228, in the proposed RSAM correction liability to reflect an equal share between customers and shareholders. (TR 1316-1317) Based on staff’s recommendations on the cost of capital issues, staff believes that no further adjustments are needed to correct the loss of deferred taxes and the difference of the debt rate for the 2027 projected test year.
FCG witness Galtman argued that establishing the proposed RSAM correction liability would constitute retroactive ratemaking by adjusting RSAM utilization for 2023 and 2024. (TR 1749) FCG referred to the Commission’s precedent of prohibiting retroactive ratemaking to support its position that prior-period earnings should not be adjusted through prospective rates. (TR 1749)
FCG contested the amounts of transaction and transition costs cited by OPC because witness Schultz lumped transaction and transition costs together as below-the line expenses. (TR 1754) FCG stated it incurred $14,929,586 of transaction costs, but those costs were not included in FCG’s financial statements, or the earning surveillance report and RSAM calculations. (TR 1753-1754, EXH 87) FCG stated that $5,391,323 of recurring and non-recurring transition costs were included FCG’s financial statements, including earning surveillance reports and RSAM calculations. (EXH 87; TR 1754-1755) FCG contended that transition costs were incurred after the closing of the acquisition and were necessary to operate, stabilize, and integrate FCG into CUC’s operations. (TR 1754) Furthermore, witness Galtman testified that the transition costs supported the day-to-day operations of FCG and allowed the Company to maintain a continuity of service during the integration period. (TR 1754-1755) In the 2023 Rate Case Order, day-to-day fluctuations were not defined, nor did the Order limit the use of the RSAM to day-to-day fluctuation. (FCG BR 36) Witness Galtman provided an example of the non-recurring transition cost, as cost from the transition service agreement where FPL continued to provide services for FCG during the integration period. (FCG BR 36-37; TR 1754) A specific service FPL provided to FCG was the support for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) monitoring, billing services, information technology, finance, and supply chain processes. (FCG BR 37; TR 1754) Witness Galtman further explained that excluding the non-recurring transition costs from FCG’s operating results would not have affected its RSAM calculations, as FCG’s achieved ROE would have remained within the authorized range, even after accounting for the use of the RSAM. (TR 1755-1756; EXH 88)
Witness Galtman testified that FCG incurred $14,456,094 of transaction costs to evaluate, negotiate, finance, and close the acquisition of FCG. (TR 1753) Additionally, these transaction costs were incurred during 2023 and 2024 and reported on CUC’s consolidated financial disclosures for investor reporting, not in FCG’s financial statements or included for regulatory purposes. (TR 1753-1754) Witness Galtman concluded that the transaction costs were never included for recovery through the RSAM and therefore to impose a RSAM correction liability for transaction costs would not be appropriate. (TR 1754)
Staff recognizes
that the 2023 Rate Case Order did not explicitly define day-to-day
fluctuations, therefore, staff agrees that FCG can include transition costs as
day-to-day operations because they funded services necessary to maintain
continuity of utility service, including SCADA monitoring, billing, information
technology, finance, and supply chain support. (TR 1754-1755) Staff agrees that
transaction costs should not be included in FCG’s financial statements, nor be
allowed to be charged to the RSAM. Based on staff’s review of Witness Galtman’s
testimony and Exhibit 108, MPN E503-E506, FCG did not include transaction costs
in FCG’s financial statements for regulatory purposes. Further, Witness
Galtman’s analysis in Exhibit 108, MPN E503-506 demonstrates that, even
excluding the nonrecurring transition costs, FCG’s earnings with the recorded
RSAM amortization would remain within the authorized range, supporting the
amount of amortization recorded. (TR 1755-1756; EXH 108, MPN E503-E506) Staff
therefore finds that the transaction and transition costs do not support OPC’s
proposed correction.
Staff agrees that
FCG utilized the RSAM from December 1, 2023, through December 31, 2024, in a
manner consistent with the approval of that mechanism and that no disallowable
costs were recovered. Staff does not recommend any adjustments be made to rate
base based on the use of the RSAM.
CONCLUSION
FCG did not utilize the RSAM from
December 1, 2023, through December 31, 2024, in a manner inconsistent with the
approval of that mechanism such that otherwise disallowable costs were
recovered.
What is the appropriate level of working capital for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate level of working capital for the 2027 projected test year is $29,988,570. (Dasher)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of working capital for the 2027 projected test year is $29,388, 571 (adjusted).
OPC:
Working capital should be reduced by at least $20,189,850 for taxes accrued and by $34,438 for DOL insurance. With these adjustments and the net clause under recoveries adjustment in Issue 14, the appropriate level of working capital for the 2027 projected test year should be no more than $4,707,445.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG requested $29,388,571 for the total amount of working capital for the 2027 test year, as reflected on MFR Schedule G-1, page 3 of 28. (EXH8, MPN K642) The requested amount of working capital included a $10,072,799 reduction, comprised of eliminating AEP receivables, eliminating 50 percent of Directors and Officers Liability (DOL) insurance, eliminating SAFE over/under recovery, and eliminating unamortized rate case expense. (EXH 8, MPN K643) FCG witness Baugh stated that to determine the appropriate amount of working capital for the 2027 projected test year, FCG performed an analysis of working capital accounts, reviewed historical methodology, and reviewed expense related items to determine the appropriate factor to use to project working capital. (TR 574) Based on these findings, FCG contended that the requested working capital was necessary to run day-to-day operations during the 2027 test year. (TR 573)
OPC Witness Schultz recommended a total adjustment decrease of $14,186,201, comprised of $10,094,925 for taxes accrued, $4,091,276 for working capital under-recoveries, and a complete disallowance of the DOL insurance. As a result, OPC suggested a working capital amount of $15,202,370. (EXH 66, MPN C19-845) However, in OPC’s brief it updated its position that the appropriate level of working capital should be no more than $4,707,445 based on the full removal of $20,189,850 for taxes accrued and its updated adjustments discussed in Issue 15. (OPC BR 37-38)
Witness Schultz argued that a 50 percent adjustment to the $20,189,850 amount included in current liabilities for taxes accrued income, is necessary based upon FCG witness Russell’s response to OPC’s Interrogatory No. 195, which stated that the federal portion of this amount is owed to FCG from CUC. (EXH 135, MPN E3898-3899) In OPC’s brief, it revised its position that the adjustment should be the full amount of $20,189,850. (OPC BR 38) However, in response to Staff Interrogatory No. 236, witness Russell explained that the $20,189,850 represented tax benefits arising from FCG’s Florida net operating losses, calculated based on FCG’s individual tax position. (EXH 110, MPN E552) Witness Russell stated in rebuttal testimony that the debit balance is appropriately included in the rate making process because it represents the current federal and state net operating losses and at the end of the year, once actuals are known the Company will reclass to a deferred tax asset. (TR 1613) As such, staff does not recommend an adjustment to for taxes accrued income.
As discussed in Issue 42, staff recommends allowing half of DOL insurance expense. Therefore, no further adjustment is necessary because FCG appropriately removed half of DOL insurance from working capital in its initial filing.
As discussed in Issue 15, staff recommends the $400,000 over-recovery associated with the PGA clause be included in working capital, resulting in a $400,000 reduction to working capital.
CONCLUSION
Based on staff’s recommended adjustment in issues 15, 16, 41, and 42, the appropriate level of working capital for the projected test year is $29,988,570.
What is the appropriate level of rate base for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate level of rate base for the 2027 projected test year is $701,147,491. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate total revised rate base in the projected test year is $742,389,478.
OPC:
The 2027 projected test year rate base should be no more than $656,509,746.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fallout issue. Based on staff’s recommendations on previous issues, the appropriate level of rate base for the projected test year is $701,147,491.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate level of rate base for the 2027 projected
test year is $701,147,491.
Should the Commission make any adjustments to account for the IRC Section 338(h)(10) election utilized in the 2023 transaction in which CUC acquired FCG? If so, what adjustments should be made?
Recommendation:
No. The Commission should not make any adjustments to reverse or adjust the accounting methods related to the election by CUC to purchase FCG under the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) Section 338(h)(10). (D. Buys)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
No. Moreover, neither the actual post-acquisition tax position nor sound normalization principles support including a hypothetical deferred tax balance in FCG’s regulatory capital structure. Recharacterizing the amount as a regulatory liability does not cure that defect. The inclusion of a regulatory liability in lieu of the extinguished ADIT would result in an indirect violation of the normalization rules. The Commission should therefore reject OPC’s proposals as it related to the 338(h)(10) election in their entirety.
OPC:
Yes. A regulatory liability of $38,814,000 should be recognized in the 2027 projected test year to neutralize the harm caused by CUC’s imprudent, self-serving decision associated with the Section 338(H)(10) election utilized in the 2023 transaction in which CUC acquired FCG that wiped out customer-funded, cost-free capital.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Both CUC and FPL elected to structure CUC’s acquisition of FCG from FPL under the IRC Section 338(h)(10).[32] The IRC Section 338(h)(10) election allows an eligible stock acquisition to be treated as an asset purchase for federal income tax purposes. (TR 1227) Because a Section 338(h)(10) election generally provides significant tax benefits to the buyer while potentially increasing the seller’s tax burden, it can become an important negotiating point. The buyer may agree to pay a higher purchase price to compensate the seller for the additional tax costs associated with the election. (TR 1228-1229)
To determine an acceptable purchase price, CUC prepared an economic analysis that compared the costs of a higher purchase price with the IRC Section 338(h)(10) election to the lower purchase price without the election to determine its break-even amount where it was indifferent as to the election. (TR 1229) CUC concluded that the tax benefits from the Section 338(h)(10) election were equivalent to $113.375 million on a present value basis, and thus, CUC could pay an additional $113.375 million to acquire FCG. (OPC BR 43; TR 1229-1230) The additional $113.375 million also increased the acquisition goodwill by the same $113.375 million, all else equal, which allowed CUC to also amortize and deduct the acquisition goodwill; further reducing its income tax expense and providing additional cash flow. (TR 1228)
The Section 338(h)(10) election had several different effects on CUC and FPL. For CUC, it acquired the depreciable assets of FCG at a stepped-up tax basis based on the $923 million purchase price of the acquired assets. (OPC BR 43; TR 1228) The increased value of the assets is depreciable for tax purposes, thus allowing CUC to record higher depreciation expense. (TR 1228) The higher depreciation expense reduces income tax expense which contributes to an increase in cash flow. (TR 1228) The Section 338(h)(10) election also reversed the pre-acquisition deferred tax liabilities of $38.814 million on FCG’s accounting books at closing. (TR 1229) The only deferred tax balance retained was the regulatory liability associated with excess accumulated deferred income taxes (ADIT) arising from the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) and the related Average Rate Assumption Method (ARAM) calculation. (FCG BR 42; TR 513-514; TR 1228-1229)
OPC argued that the elimination of approximately $38.814 million in deferred tax liabilities, or ADITs, deprived customers of zero-cost capital previously reflected in rates under FPL’s ownership by removing the zero-cost ADITs from the capital structure. (OPC BR 43; TR 1229) OPC witness Kollen contended the loss of the deferred tax liabilities is a result of the 338(h)(10) election intentionally made by CUC and FPL in the stock purchase agreement to treat the acquisition as an asset purchase for income tax purposes. (TR 1251) OPC witness Kollen proposed establishing an equivalent regulatory liability in the capital structure to preserve the customer benefit on the zero-cost ADITs that were eliminated due to the acquisition transaction. (TR 1231)
FCG witness Russell countered that OPC’s proposed regulatory liability would not reflect an actual deferred tax obligation going forward or appear in FCG’s post-acquisition tax position. (TR 1601, TR 1611) It would instead recreate the ratemaking effect of the extinguished ADITs through a different accounting mechanism. (TR 1665) FCG witness Reno contended that this approach would indirectly circumvent federal normalization requirements and could expose FCG to penalties that would ultimately have a detrimental effect on customers in the future as a result of a potential normalization violation. (TR 1665)
FCG argued that no adjustments are necessary or appropriate. (FCG BR 49) The acquisition of FCG was structured as a stock purchase with a valid IRC Section 338(h)(10) election – substantially all historical deferred tax assets and liabilities of the acquired entity were eliminated as of the acquisition date. (FCG BR 49; TR 513) The historical book-tax temporary differences did not carry forward, and deferred taxes were reset based on the post-acquisition tax basis of the assets. (FCG BR 49) The only deferred tax balance carried forward was the regulatory liability associated with excess accumulated deferred income taxes resulting from the TCJA corporate tax rate change and the related ARAM calculation, which was preserved to ensure compliance with normalization requirements and prior Commission orders. No other deferred tax balances were retained through the acquisition. (FCG BR 42; TR 513-514)
FCG emphasized that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has consistently stated that deferred taxes cannot be created where they do not exist in reality. (TR 1666) Because those deferred taxes are no longer deferred and were extinguished at the time of the transaction, there is no remaining deferred tax balance available to include as zero-cost capital in the capital structure. (TR 1468) As such, it is inappropriate to include an ongoing tax obligation of deferred tax liabilities or an equivalent regulatory liability in the calculation of revenue requirement and rates. (TR 1468) CUC did not get, nor will it get in the future, any tax benefit associated with the legacy FCG ADIT balance in question. (TR 1468) FCG witness Reno postulated that neither the actual post-acquisition tax position nor sound normalization principles support including a hypothetical ADIT balance in FCG’s regulatory capital structure. OPC’s proposal to recharacterize the amount as a regulatory liability does not cure that defect and seeks to circumvent accounting and regulatory practices and regulations to accomplish the establishment of an extinguished liability, resulting in a normalization violation. (TR 1471)
FCG witness Reno testified that Section 168(i)(9)(A) of the IRC sets out the direct normalization rules, and IRC Section 168(i)(9)(B), then extends those rules to cover indirect circumventions by capturing any “procedure or adjustment” that produces results inconsistent with subparagraph (A), even if the taxpayer has not explicitly flowed through the tax benefit. (TR 1666) Witness Reno postulated that based on certain phrases in the IRC, it is clear that a normalization violation can occur indirectly, that is, a violation can occur not only through a direct deviation from the accounting method required by the rule, but also through any ratemaking procedure or adjustment that achieves the same effect indirectly. (TR 1666) Witness Reno contended that the IRS examines whether the result of the ratemaking procedure is consistent with normalization, regardless of the mechanism used. If the methodology produces numbers that do not reflect the proper deferral, it is a violation, whether direct or indirect. (TR 1666) Witness Reno opined that in the IRS Chief Council Advice (CCA), CCA 200641005, the IRS advised that it is a violation of §203(e) of the [Tax Reform] Act [of 1986] for taxpayers to adopt any accounting treatment that, directly or indirectly, circumvents the rule set forth in Section 168(i)(9)(A) of the IRC. (TR 1666) Witness Reno asserted that if a utility fails to use the normalization method of accounting, the utility may not claim accelerated depreciation on any of its public utility property. (TR 1667) Consequently, the utility would lose its ability to include zero-cost ADITs in its regulatory capital structure which would be detrimental to customers. (TR 1667)
During cross examination, witness Reno admitted the IRC rule and IRS CCA opinion he cited relates to investment tax credits and not necessarily to deferred tax liabilities or ADITs. (TR 1677-1678) Witness Reno also agreed that if the IRS intended to express their intent about indirect violations, it could have included it in IRC Section 167. (TR 1681) Witness Reno admitted IRC 168 or 1.167 do not specifically prohibit the Commission from establishing a regulatory liability to replace the former deferred tax liabilities but establishes the rules for using accelerated depreciation and the penalties for not following those rules. (TR 1683) Witness Reno could not be certain that a direct normalization violation would occur if the Commission required FCG to establish a regulatory liability to replace the pre-acquisition ADITs as zero-cost capital in the calculation of the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) for rate making purposes. (TR 1685) Witness Reno agreed that the normalization rules set forth in the IRC are designed to ensure that the tax depreciation in excess of book depreciation balances are not flowed back or otherwise provided to FCG’s customers faster than on a straight-line basis over the service lives used for the book depreciation. (TR 1694)
FCG, through its witness testimony, has provided evidence that replacing the pre-acquisition ADITs in the capital structure with an equivalent regulatory liability could result in a potential direct or indirect normalization violation which would put FCG at risk of losing its eligibility, through CUC, to use accelerated depreciation to reduce income tax expense at the parent level and create zero-cost ADITs that benefits ratepayers. The result would be a higher WACC that would ultimately increase the revenue requirement and rates charged to customers. (TR 1667, TR 1683)
OPC argued that the IRC cited by FCG witness Reno doesn’t explicitly define a direct or indirect normalization violation and the CCA and Private Letter Rulings presented as evidence address Investment Tax Credits and not deferred tax liabilities. (OPC BR 47-48) OPC argued that the IRS private letter rulings witness Reno contended support his testimony that OPC witness Kollen’s proposed regulatory liability would violate normalization regulations cannot be cited as precedent. (OPC BR 47; TR 1689) Staff agrees with OPC that this is significant as the Commission is unable to judge whether the risk of a normalization violation exists, and if so, to what extent. (OPC BR 48) Nevertheless, witness Reno agreed with OPC that the Commission has broad discretion to set rates and make an adjustment to hold the customers harmless relative to the way the FCG transaction was structured. (TR 1697) As such, OPC recommended that the Commission implement a regulatory liability to inure to the benefit of FCG’s customers the value of the zero-cost ADITs that were eliminated as a result of CUC’s decision to acquire FCG under the Section 338(h)(10) election. (OPC BR 42-48)
Staff believes the evidence in the record demonstrates that OPC’s proposal to establish a regulatory liability of $38.814 million included as zero-cost capital in the capital structure could trigger a normalization violation. The re-creation of the pre-acquisition ADITs under a different name, but with the same effect, is an obvious attempt to circumvent the tax provisions of the IRC Section 338(h)(10) election and return the benefit of the deferred tax liabilities to the customers although the tax liability no longer exists.
CONCLUSION
The Commission should not make any adjustments to reverse or adjust the accounting methods related to the election by CUC to purchase FCG under IRC Section 338(h)(10).
What amount of accumulated deferred income taxes should be approved for the 2027 projected test year capital structure?
Recommendation:
The amount of accumulated deferred taxes to be included in the projected test year capital structure is $21,063,242. (D'Sa)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of accumulated deferred taxes in the projected test year is $14,286,935. The appropriate amount of Regulatory Liability FAS 109 Deferred Tax is $9,105,416.
OPC:
The amount of accumulated deferred income taxes should be at least $22,813,547 for the 2027 projected test year. These customer provided funds should not be transferred to shareholders by way of a pro rata reconciliation of rate base and capital structure.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG requested a total per-books ADIT balance of $22,365,075 and a per-books Financial Accounting Standards (FAS) 109 balance of $14,715,746 for the 2027 projected test year, as presented on MFR Schedule G-3, page 2 of 11. (EXH 8, MPN K724) As reflected in FCG’s brief, the company adopted witness Russell’s agreement with OPC witness Kollen’s specific adjustment to add $448,472 of deferred income taxes associated with allocated CUC common plant, bringing FCG's adjusted pre-reconciliation ADIT balance to $22,813,547. (FCG BR 45; EXH 143, MPN E4189-4190; TR 1605)
As originally filed on MFR Schedule G-3, page 2 of 11, FCG witness Russell testified that the projected per-books ADIT balance was $22,365,075, which was reduced pro rata to $13,838,900 to reconcile capitalization to jurisdictional rate base. (EXH 8, MPN K724) However, as amended by the Company’s response to OPC Interrogatory No. 275 and in witness Russell’s rebuttal testimony, FCG agreed that $448,472 of projected ADITs associated with allocated CUC common plant had been omitted from the initial filing. (EXH 143, MPN E4189-4190; TR 1605) As reflected in FCG’s brief, the Company agreed to the addition of the omitted $448,472, which increased FCG's adjusted ADIT balance to $22,813,547 and increased FCG’s revised pro rata adjusted ADIT balance in the projected test year to $14,286,935. (FCG BR 45)
Additionally, witness Russell explained that because CUC’s acquisition of FCG was structured as a stock purchase with an IRC Section 338(h)(10) election, all historical deferred tax assets and liabilities were eliminated as of the acquisition date and reset based on the post-acquisition tax basis of the assets. (TR 513-514) The only deferred tax balance carried forward was the FAS 109 regulatory liability associated with excess accumulated deferred income taxes resulting from the TCJA corporate tax rate change and the related ARAM calculation, which was preserved to ensure compliance with normalization requirements and prior Commission orders. (TR 513-514; FCG BR 45) FCG reflected a per-books FAS 109 balance of $14,715,746 on MFR Schedule G-3, page 2 of 11, and as seen in FCG’s brief, the company proposed an adjusted balance of $9,105,416 in its original filing after applying a pro rata reconciliation adjustment across all capital structure components. (EXH 8, MPN K724; FCG BR 45)
As noted in FCG's brief, OPC witness Kollen argued that $448,472 of omitted common plant ADIT should be added to FCG's per-books balance of $22,365,075, establishing an adjusted pre-reconciliation base of $22,813,547. (TR 1221-1223; FCG BR 45) In its brief, OPC stated that “CUC has erred in its reconciliation of rate base and capital structure that will deprive customers of the benefits of accumulated deferred income taxes apart from those lost due to the section 338(h)(10) election.” (OPC BR 49) Specifically, witness Kollen strongly opposed applying FCG's pro rata reconciliation to ADIT, arguing that deferred taxes represent zero-cost funds provided directly by customers through rates rather than investor-supplied capital. (TR 1222-1224) Witness Kollen contended that subjecting customer-supplied zero-cost capital to pro rata reductions improperly shifts capital value to shareholders by forcing higher-cost investor equity and debt to back net assets, artificially inflating the overall WACC and unnecessarily increasing customer rates. (TR 1223-1224)
The difference between the parties' proposed amounts stems from capital structure reconciliation and the removal of acquisition goodwill as discussed in Issues 26 and 30. OPC witness Kollen recommended exempting zero-cost customer-supplied capital from pro rata reductions, whereas FCG witness Russell applied a pro rata reconciliation across all capital structure components to reconcile capitalization to approved jurisdictional rate base. The main arguments regarding reconciliation methodology are addressed in Issue 30. (FCG BR 46; OPC BR 49)
Because FCG does not issue its own debt or equity and relies on CUC for the entirety of its capital, a reasonable hypothetical capital structure must be developed for regulatory purposes. As discussed further in Issue 30, staff believes a reasonable methodology for developing a per books capital structure is to use FCG’s customer deposits and deferred taxes and allocate investor sources of capital using CUC’s 2027 projected percentages of investor capital. Subsequently, all capital structure adjustments should be made on a pro rata basis unless there is a justifiable reason to adjust a specific capital structure component. Consistent with staff's recommended method to reconcile the capital structure and rate base, the adjusted per-books ADIT balance of $22,813,547 is reduced by a pro rata adjustment of $1,750,305, yielding a final recommended jurisdictional ADIT balance of $21,063,242. Similarly, the per-books FAS 109 balance of $14,715,746 is reduced by a pro rata adjustment of $1,129,024, resulting in a final recommended adjusted FAS 109 balance of $13,586,722.
CONCLUSION
The amount of accumulated deferred taxes to be included in the projected test year capital structure is $21,063,242.
What amount and cost rate for customer deposits should be approved for the 2027 projected test year capital structure?
Recommendation:
The amount and cost rate for customer deposits to include in the projected 2027 test year capital structure is $6,961,151 at a cost rate of 2.64 percent. (Maxwell)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
As reflected on MFR Schedule A-5, the appropriate amount and cost rate for customer deposits for the 2027 test year are $4,665,303 (adjusted), subsequently corrected to $4,665,155, and 2.64 percent, respectively. (Baugh, Russell; FCG BR 46-47)
OPC:
The amount and cost rate for customer deposits are $7,539,606 and 2.64%, respectively, for the 2027 projected test year. These customer-provided funds should not be transferred to shareholders by way of a pro rata reconciliation of rate base and capital structure. (Kollen; OPC BR 49)
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG and OPC agree that the appropriate cost rate for customer deposits in the 2027 projected test year capital structure is 2.64 percent. (FCG BR 46; OPC BR 49) Pursuant to Rule 25-7.083(6)(a) and (b), F.A.C., customer deposits earn interest at the applicable rates established by the rule. On MFR Schedule G-3, page 7, FCG calculated a total per-books 13-month average customer-deposit balance of $7,539,606 for the 2027 projected test year based on projected deposit activity, customer growth, and the Company’s deposit policies set forth in its tariff. (EXH 8, MPN K731) Applying interest rates of 2.00 percent for residential accounts and 3.00 percent for commercial accounts pursuant to Commission rules yields a total interest expense of $199,026. Dividing the total interest expense of $199,026 by the total customer-deposit balance of $7,539,606 results in an effective cost rate of 2.64 percent. (EXH 8, MPN K731)
The disagreement between FCG and OPC regarding the amount of customer deposits to include in the regulatory capital structure arises from their differing approaches to reconciling capital structure components to rate base. (FCG BR 46-47; OPC BR 49; TR 492; TR 1215-1216; TR 1643) OPC argued that customer-provided funds, including customer deposits, should be protected from being lost to shareholders or reduced through a pro rata reconciliation of rate base and capital structure when removing non-utility amounts, transaction costs, and acquisition premium-related amounts. (OPC BR 49) Specifically, OPC testified that applying pro rata reductions across all capital sources improperly subsidizes investor-level acquisition goodwill at the expense of customer-funded capital. (OPC BR 49: TR 1215-1217)
FCG’s requested overall capital structure reflected total per-books capitalization of $1,199,849,223, including $7,539,606 in customer deposits. (EXH 8, MPN K724) To reconcile its capitalization to its proposed rate base, FCG applied a pro rata reduction over all sources of capital, reducing the per books balance by $2,874,303 to an adjusted balance of $4,665,303: subsequently revised to $4,665,155 in FCG’s response to OPC Interrogatory 275. (EXH 8, MPN K724; EXH 143, MPN E4189-4190; TR 492; FCG BR 46-47) FCG witness Russell testified that the Company chose to apply the pro rata adjustment across all capital components which allocates all components of the capitalization equally over the rate base amount. (TR 492; TR 1643; FCG BR 46-47)
OPC contended that FCG’s pro rata reduction methodology is improper because customer deposits, deferred taxes, and FAS 109 amounts represent cost-free or low-cost capital supplied by customers rather than investor-supplied capital. (TR 1215-1216; TR 1223; OPC BR 49) OPC testified that pro rata reductions resulting from investor-level goodwill and accounting adjustments should be allocated solely to investor-supplied capital components (common equity, long-term debt, and short-term debt). (TR 1216; TR 1223; OPC BR 49) In witness Kollen’s analysis, customer deposits are retained at their full per-books balance of $7,539,606 prior to final reconciliation. (TR 1218-1232; OPC BR 49)
Because FCG does not issue its own debt or equity and relies on CUC for the entirety of its capital, a reasonable hypothetical capital structure must be developed for regulatory purposes. As discussed further in Issue 30, staff believes a reasonable methodology for developing a per books capital structure is to use FCG’s customer deposits and deferred taxes and allocate investor sources of capital using CUC’s 2027 projected percentages of investor capital. Subsequently, all capital structure adjustments should be made on a pro rata basis unless there is a justifiable reason to adjust a specific capital structure component. Consistent with staff's recommended method to reconcile the capital structure and rate base as discussed in Issue 30, the per books balance of customer deposits is $7,539,606. After reconciliation of the capital structure to rate base over all sources of capital, the staff adjusted customer deposit balance is $6,961,151, as presented on Attachment 2. Staff reviewed the record evidence and recommends that including $6,961,151 of customer deposits at a ratio of 0.99 percent and a cost rate of 2.64 percent in the 2027 projected test year capital structure is reasonable and appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The amount and cost rate for customer deposits to include in the 2027 projected test year capital structure is $6,961,151 at a cost rate of 2.64 percent.
What amount and cost rate for short-term debt should be approved for the 2027 projected test year capital structure?
Recommendation:
The amount and cost rate for short-term debt that should be approved for inclusion in the capital structure for the 2027 projected test year is $36,573,527 and 4.66 percent, respectively. (Souchik)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of short-term debt in the projected test year is $39,612,128 at a cost rate of 4.66%.
OPC:
The amount and cost rate for short-term debt are $32,936,468 and 4.66%, respectively, for the 2027 projected test year.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Both FCG and OPC agree the appropriate cost rate for short-term debt is 4.66 percent. (FCG BR 47; OPC BR 49) The recommended amount of the short-term debt in the 2027 projected test year capital structure differs between FCG’s and OPC’s recommendation. FCG initially requested in its petition a short-term balance of $39,638,250 as presented in its MFR Schedule G-3, page 2 of 11, with a cost rate of 4.66 percent. (EXH 8, MPN K274) In response to OPC Interrogatory 275, FCG amended the amount to $39,612,128, a reduction of $26,122, while retaining the original requested cost rate. FCG’s revised amount reflects the Company’s adjustment to its 2027 projected test year capital structure. (EXH 143, MPN E4189)
In support of its 4.66 percent cost rate, FCG explained CUC has a syndicated revolver facility for short-term borrowing with six participating banks with the ability to add additional lines of credit or term loans to meet short-term financing goals. The facility provides an interest rate of 0.80 percent above the Secured Overnight Financing Rate, plus a 10-basis point credit adjustment and a 0.10 percent unused commitment fee. (TR 489; MPN C16 – 458)
OPC recommended a short-term debt balance of $32,936,468 resulting from a series of recommended adjustments to remove financing costs associated with the transaction of the acquisition of FCG. OPC witness Kollen explains FCG’s error in calculation of the capital structure was including goodwill in the per books rate base used to calculate the equity, long-term debt and short-term debt allocated to FCG from CUC. (TR 1215) Witness Kollen contended the removal of goodwill from long-term debt, equity, and short-term debt should be reduced as specific ratemaking adjustments before pro rata making adjustments in the next steps. (TR 1217) Resulting from removal of goodwill components and adjusting a pro rata adjustment to rate base, OPC argued the short-term debt amount is $32,612,128.
CUC provides all capital to FCG at the capital structure ratios of CUC. (TR 491) FCG applied the capital structure of CUC, which includes a ratio of 5.55 percent of short-term debt, to its 2027 projected test year capital structure and reconciled the amount over all sources to the rate base balance. (EXH 8, MPN K724) After reconciliation, the ratio of short-term debt in the 2027 projected test year capital structure is 5.34 percent. This ratio equates to short-term debt balance of $39,612,128. (EXH 8; MPN K724)
Because FCG does not issue its own debt or equity and relies on CUC for the entirety of its capital, a reasonable hypothetical capital structure must be developed for regulatory purposes. As discussed further in Issue 30, staff believes a reasonable methodology for developing a per books capital structure is to use FCG’s customer deposits and deferred taxes and allocate investor sources of capital using CUC’s 2027 projected percentages of investor capital. Subsequently, all capital structure adjustments should be made on a pro rata basis unless there is a justifiable reason to adjust a specific capital structure component. As discussed in Issue 30, the per books short-term debt balance of $39,637,569 is derived from removal of acquisition goodwill from the per-books capital structure before applying the pro rata reconciliation to rate base. In Issue 30, staff applies a pro rata adjustment of $3,039,173 to the adjusted short-term debt balance of $39,612,700, resulting in a final short-term debt balance of $36,573,527.
Staff reviewed FCG’s estimates for the short-term debt cost rate of 4.66 percent and believe it reflects market rates available to CUC. Based on the record, staff recommends the Commission find the amount and cost rate for short-term debt to include in the 2027 projected test year capital structure is $36,573,527 at a cost rate of 4.66 percent.
CONCLUSION
The amount and cost rate for short-term debt that should be approved for inclusion in the capital structure for the 2027 projected test year is $36,573,527 and 4.66 percent, respectively.
What amount and cost rate for long-term debt should be approved for the 2027 projected test year capital structure? What adjustments, if any, are necessary to account for the direct assignment of acquisition-related long-term debt to FCG?
Recommendation:
The amount and cost rate for long-term debt that should be approved for inclusion in the capital structure for the 2027 projected test year are $292,242,614 and 5.15 percent, respectively. The cost rate should be based on CUC’s consolidated embedded cost of long-term debt, and the direct assignment of acquisition-related long-term debt to FCG should not be approved. (Souchik)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of long-term debt in the projected test year is $316,522,706 with a blended, weighted cost rate of 6.12%. Use of the proposed blended rate, which includes the “FCG Direct” long term debt rate is still lower than the rate would have been utilizing the methodology of the prior owner, while also appropriately recognizing the cost of debt issue in the fourth quarter of 2023 to acquire FCG.
OPC:
The amount and cost rate for long-term debt are $263,180,522 and 4.72% respectively, for the 2027 projected test year. The incremental debt cost due solely to the acquisition is a cost CUC and its shareholders incurred to obtain the economic value and other benefits from the acquisition without providing any commensurate cost savings to customers. The Commission should assign this cost to CUC and its shareholders and deny recovery from customers of this indirect, but nevertheless real, acquisition cost from FCG’s customers.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Long-Term Debt Amount and Cost Rate
In its filing, FCG requested a bifurcated long-term debt component consisting of CUC consolidated long-term debt and FCG direct long-term debt attributable to the acquisition of FCG. As reflected in MFR Schedule G-3, FCG’s original proposed long-term debt balance was $316,731,450, consisting of $102,116,089 in CUC long-term debt at a cost rate of 4.72 percent and $214,615,361 in FCG direct long-term debt at a cost rate of 6.78 percent. These components result in a blended weighted cost rate of approximately 6.12 percent. (EXH 8, MPN K724)
FCG subsequently revised its initially filed long-term debt balance to $316,522,706 in response to OPC Interrogatory No. 275. The revision reduced the original proposed amount by $208,744. FCG witness Russell agreed that the revised balance and any resulting changes to the allocation of the debt components should be reflected consistently in the final capital structure schedule. (EXH 143, MPN E4189-4193) FCG also removed $21,107 from the CUC consolidated debt related to lease obligations. (EXH 98, E239)
OPC witness Kollen recommended a long-term debt balance of $263,180,522 at a cost rate of 4.72 percent. OPC’s recommendation addresses both the amount of debt included in the capital structure and its associated cost rate. OPC’s proposed adjustments are intended to remove acquisition-related financing costs from FCG’s capital structure, including the direct-assigned long-term debt component and adjustments associated with the removal of acquisition goodwill. (EXH 66, MPN C19-867; EXH 157, MPN E7329)
Acquisition-Related Long-Term Debt
FCG witness Russell testified that CUC issued $550 million in long-term debt in 2023, of which $432,239,500 was directly attributable to financing the acquisition of FCG. FCG argues that because this debt was issued specifically to fund the acquisition, its associated cost rate should be directly assigned to FCG for ratemaking purposes. (FCG BR 48; TR 486) According to FCG, “This approach ensures that FCG customers bear the cost of the debt that financed the assets and operations from which they directly benefit.” (TR 486) Witness Russell explained direct assignment of CUC’s debt used to finance its purchase of FCG prevents customers of other CUC utilities from subsidizing the cost of debt used to support FCG. (TR 486; FCG BR 48)
FCG further explained that the higher-cost acquisition debt was obtained under the market conditions existing at the time of the transaction when interest rates were higher. (TR 1625) CUC intentionally structured a portion of the debt with shorter maturities to permit refinancing when market conditions became more favorable. FCG witness Russell testified that as the acquisition debt is retired or refinanced, its effect on the weighted average cost of long-term debt will decline, and CUC’s embedded cost of long-term debt will become the predominant rate applied to FCG’s capital structure. (TR 487; FCG BR 49) However, the maturities of half of the debt issuances ($250,000) are 7, 10, and 15 years and carry the highest cost rates of 6.62 percent, 6.71 percent, and 6.73 percent; those higher debt costs will not abate in the near term. (EXH 8, MPN K727)
OPC argued that the incremental cost of the acquisition-related debt should not be borne by FCG’s customers. (OPC BR 50) OPC witness Kollen testified that the acquisition-related debt has an average cost of 6.78 percent, compared with CUC’s non-acquisition long-term debt cost of 4.72 percent, and FCG’s pre-acquisition long-term debt cost of 4.28 percent. (OPC BR 50; TR1224-1225) OPC contends that CUC issued higher-cost debt to finance the acquisition rather than continuing to use FCG’s existing lower-cost debt, resulting in an incremental cost to the customers attributable solely to the acquisition of FCG. (TR 1217; TR 1224–1227) OPC recommended that the Commission assign the incremental long-term debt cost above 4.72 percent to CUC and its shareholders and deny recovery of the indirect acquisition cost from FCG’s customers. (OPC BR 51) OPC asserted that the acquisition was undertaken for the economic value and other benefits obtained by CUC and its shareholders and that the record does not establish commensurate cost savings or benefits to FCG customers. (OPC BR 50-51)
FCG objected to OPC witness Kollen’s reference to possibly apply the 4.28 percent long-term debt cost approved in FCG’s prior rate case. (FCG BR 50; TR 1224) FCG witness Russell explained that the previously approved rate was based on the December 2021 Blue Chip Financial Forecast (Blue Chip) for Corporate Baa bond yields and reflected forecasted market borrowing costs rather than solely a historical embedded cost of debt. (TR 1608; EXH 84 and 85) According to witness Russell, applying the same forecasting methodology to the 2027 projected test year would produce an indicated cost of approximately 6.30 percent, which exceeds FCG’s proposed blended cost rate of 6.12 percent. (TR 1608) FCG maintained that its proposed debt cost rate calculation more reasonably reflects the financing costs and market conditions applicable to the 2027 projected test year than OPC’s proposal to continue to use 4.28 percent from FCG’s 2022 rate case. (FCG BR 49-50; TR 1601, 1608-1609, TR 1625)
Acquisition Goodwill Allocation
FCG and OPC also disagree on the appropriate method to remove the acquisition goodwill from the long-term debt in capital structure.
On MFR Schedule G-3, page 2, FCG reconciled the capital structure to rate based on a pro rata basis across all sources of capital (common equity, long-term debt, short-term debt, customer deposits, ADITs, and the FAS 109 regulatory liability). (EXH 8, MPN K724) Under this approach, adjustments to rate base, including goodwill, are reflected proportionately across the capital structure rather than assigned directly to specific sources of capital. (TR 492) FCG witness Russell contended this methodology is consistent with Commission-approved approaches in prior proceedings involving FPUC, including the 2022 gas rate case in Docket No. 20220067-GU, the 2024 electric rate case in Docket No. 20240099-EI, and the earlier electric rate case in Docket No. 20150025-EI. (TR 1600) However, during live testimony, witness Russell confirmed that the 2022 FPUC gas rate case reconciled the capital structure to rate base using the consolidated capital structure and did not include a bifurcated long-term debt component. (TR 1644-1645) Russell also confirmed that in the FPUC 2022 gas rate case and the FPUC 2024 electric rate case, the capital structure was reconciled to rate base over only investor sources of capital and is not the same as FCG’s proposed reconciliation method in this case. (TR 1643-1645)
OPC disagreed with FCG’s reconciliation methodology. OPC witness Kollen contended that the acquisition goodwill should be removed from the financial capitalization before any other ratemaking adjustments. (TR 1217) Witness Kollen explained the correct approach is to remove the acquisition goodwill from the financial capitalization components actually used to finance the goodwill, and not from the regulatory capitalization, which includes capitalization components that were not used to finance the goodwill (customer deposits, ADITs, and the FAS 109 regulatory liability). (TR 1217) OPC argued the acquisition-related debt should be reduced first when removing goodwill from the investor-supplied components of the capital structure because that debt was specifically issued to finance the acquisition and not reduce the lower-cost debt that was not used for that purpose. (OPC BR 52-53; TR 1224-1227)
FCG objected to witness Kollen’s proposed goodwill adjustment. (TR 1603-1604) FCG witness Russell contended that the adjustment misunderstands the mechanics of MFR Schedule G-3, and if made, would understate the level of investor funding and improperly reduce the WACC. (TR 1602) Witness Russell testified that the pro rata adjustment applied to all the components in the capital structure is consistent with the Company’s prior rate cases. (TR 1644) In FCG’s last rate case, the Company was owned by FPL and did not include a goodwill adjustment in its regulatory balance sheet or capitalization. Witness Russell testified that if witness Kollen’s adjustment was made to remove the acquisition goodwill from only investor-supplied capital, a corresponding adjustment should be made to reflect the acquisition financing at the time of the transaction (November 2023). (OPC BR 52; TR 1602) In his rebuttal testimony, witness Russell recalculated OPC witness Kollen’s goodwill adjustment. (Exhibit 84, MPN D11-327, Table 4) In his calculations, witness Russell removed the acquisition goodwill based on the ratios of the sources of capital CUC used to purchase FCG in November 2023. (TR 1602-1603; EXH 84) Those ratios are 39.25 percent common equity, 23.32 percent CUC debt, 33.56 percent FCG-Direct debt, and 3.87 percent short-term debt. (EXH 84, MPN D11-327) FCG’s proposed alternative adjustment would increase its requested regulatory equity ratio from 48.28 percent to 53.49 percent, resulting in a 59-basis point increase of the weighted cost of equity. (EXH 84, MPN D11-327) Because the investor-supplied equity ratio in the regulatory capital structure (56.86 percent) would now be more than CUC’s equity ratio (50.14 percent), a parent debt adjustment would be warranted as inferred by OPC. (OPC BR 86) However, staff is not recommending a parent debt adjustment in this case because the ratios of investor-supplied capital are consistent with CUC’s capitalization ratios as discussed in Issue 47.
OPC disputed FCG’s rebuttal analysis and argued it does not resolve the underlying disagreement regarding the removal of the acquisition goodwill allocation because it applies FCG’s own methodology rather than correcting an error in witness Kollen’s analysis. (OPC BR 52)
CUC Embedded Cost of Debt and Cost Allocation
FCG witness Russell explained that CUC raises external capital and provides funding to FCG through intercompany accounts as a cash infusion. (TR 491) All the capital from CUC is recorded as “Accounts Payable to Associated Companies” in the amount of $1,176,744,603 on MFR Schedule G-1, page 8, line 12. (EXH 8, K648) Therefore, the debt-cost rate at the CUC level funds the level of debt at FCG. This indicates that FCG’s requested blended cost rate of 6.12 percent is hypothetical and not the actual cost rate paid by CUC in the 2027 projected test year. During cross-examination, witness Russell explained that CUC maintains additional debt and equity at the parent-company level to fund its subsidiaries beyond the amounts attributable to FCG. (TR 1628-1629) Witness Russell further explained that capital is fungible, and that debt and equity are issued to finance a mix of corporate activities. (TR 1636) Witness Russell also acknowledged that a company may use different sources of capital for various corporate purposes, subject to applicable debt covenants, that CUC could have used the $550 million debt issued in November 2023 for any corporate purpose. (TR 1637-1638) Staff understands this testimony to establish that CUC raises capital at the parent-company level to support its overall operations and subsidiaries.
Staff believes the record demonstrates that FCG’s method to calculate its projected cost of long-term debt does not reflect the actual cost of debt available to FCG from CUC in the 2027 projected test year. As testified by FCG witness Russell, CUC provides all incremental capital on a going forward basis. (TR 486) Witness Russell admitted that the embedded cost of long-term debt of 5.15 percent at the parent level reflects the cost of debt CUC is obligated to pay for its outstanding debt in the 2027 projected test year. (TR 1639-1640) As discussed previously, CUC did not record debt and equity on FCG’s capitalization balance sheet for ratemaking purposes and instead created a hypothetical cost rate for long-term debt based on its acquisition costs for FCG. (OPC BR 50-53) Staff therefore believes the record supports implementing CUC’s consolidated embedded cost of debt of 5.15 percent rather than a separate cost rate based on a hypothetical cost rate that includes the direct assignment of acquisition-related debt.
OPC did not agree with using the CUC consolidated long-term debt cost rate of 5.15 percent. In response to a staff interrogatory, OPC stated that the 5.15 percent consolidated average cost of debt includes the full effect of the FCG acquisition debt, including the portion used to finance the goodwill portion of the acquisition prices. OPC instead recommends a cost of long-term debt of 4.72 percent. (EXH 154, MPN E6789)
Staff believes FCG’s long-term debt cost rate should reflect FCG’s reliance on CUC’s consolidated financing structure without treating acquisition-related debt as a separate source of capital for ratemaking purposes. Accordingly, staff recommends using a single consolidated long-term debt component and applying the adjustments necessary to determine the appropriate balance for the 2027 projected test year.
Staff recommends the Commission approve $292,242,614 as the long-term debt amount as detailed in Table 26-1. Staff further recommends applying CUC’s consolidated embedded cost of long-term debt of 5.15 percent to this balance.
Table 26-1
Staff Recommended Long-Term Debt Balance
|
Description |
Adjustment |
|
Per-books long-term debt |
$316,747,106 |
|
Specific adjustments – Remove lease obligations per FCG |
(21,107) |
|
Adjustment per OPC Interrogatory 275 |
(198,720) |
|
Pro rata reconciliation to rate base |
(24,284,665) |
|
Staff recommended long-term debt balance |
$292,242,614 |
Source: Staff analysis.
Because FCG does not issue its own debt or equity and relies on CUC for the entirety of its capital, a reasonable hypothetical capital structure must be developed for regulatory purposes. As discussed further in Issue 30, staff believes a reasonable methodology for developing a per books capital structure is to use FCG’s customer deposits and deferred taxes and allocate investor sources of capital using CUC’s 2027 projected percentages of investor capital. Subsequently, all capital structure adjustments should be made on a pro rata basis unless there is a justifiable reason to adjust a specific capital structure component. As discussed in Issue 30, the per books long-term debt balance of $316,747,106 is derived from removal of acquisition goodwill from the per-books capital structure before applying the pro rata reconciliation to rate base. In issue 30, staff applies a pro rata adjustment of $24,284,665 to the adjusted long-term debt balance of $316,527,279 resulting in a final long-term debt balance of $292,242,614.
Based on the record, staff recommends that the Commission approve a single long-term debt component of $292,242,614 at a cost rate of 5.15 percent for the 2027 projected test year. This approach recognizes that FCG obtains its financing through CUC’s consolidated financing structure and that CUC maintains debt and equity at the parent-company level to fund its subsidiaries. It also avoids separately assigning the 6.78 percent acquisition-specific cost rate to FCG’s long-term debt component. Staff believes that applying CUC’s consolidated embedded cost of long-term debt appropriately reflects the overall cost of debt financing available through the parent company while avoiding the direct assignment of acquisition-related debt costs to FCG customers.
CONCLUSION
The amount and cost rate for long-term debt that should be approved for inclusion in the capital structure for the 2027 projected test year are $292,242,614 and 5.15 percent, respectively. The cost rate should be based on CUC’s consolidated embedded cost of long-term debt, and the direct assignment of acquisition-related long-term debt to FCG should not be approved.
Has FCG made the appropriate adjustments to remove all non-utility activities/investments from the common equity balance for the 2027 projected test year capital structure?
Recommendation:
Yes. FCG has made the appropriate adjustments to remove non-utility and investments from common equity for the 2027 projected test year capital structure. (Souchik)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
FCG has no non-utility activities/investments; therefore, no adjustments were required.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG’s regulatory common equity is supported by CUC’s consolidated financing structure. Staff recommends the Commission find that FCG appropriately removed non-utility activities and investments from common equity for the 2027 projected test year.
FCG’s response to Staff Interrogatory No. 136 directly addresses the adjustments at issue. The Company states that non-utility costs and payroll are charged directly to the appropriate business units. It further states that non-utility investments and activities were removed in the historic base year and, because the 2027 projection was trended from the adjusted 2025 historic base year, those amounts were not included in the 2027 projected test year. (EXH 102, MPN E319)
Staff accepts the Company’s explanation that the non-utility exclusions were incorporated before the projection was developed. On that basis, the absence of a separately labeled 2027 adjustment does not establish that non-utility investments were retained in common equity. Repeating the same exclusion in the projected year would duplicate an adjustment already incorporated into the adjusted base-year amounts. Staff believes the record demonstrates that all non-utility activities/investments have been removed from the common equity balance.
Staff notes that this issue was not included in OPC’s brief, and FEA takes no position on this issue.
CONCLUSION
FCG has made the appropriate adjustments to remove non-utility and investments from common equity for the 2027 projected test year capital structure.
What equity ratio should be approved for the 2027 projected test year capital structure?
Recommendation:
An equity ratio of 50.14 percent based on investor sources should be approved for the 2027 projected test year capital structure. (McGowan)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
FCG’s equity ratio should be 50.14% based on investor sources. This is appropriate due to the fact that FCG does not issue its own debt or equity and obtains all short- and long-term financing through its parent, Chesapeake.
OPC:
The equity ratio for the 2027 projected test year should be no more than 50.14%, but it should be lowered to the most recent actual. OPC recommends that, given the unreliability of the Chesapeake Utilities Corporation’s equity ratio, the Commission should determine that the last actual equity ratio of 49.7% be used for setting rates and all regulatory purposes.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
In its filing, FCG requested a 2027 projected test year capital structure consisting of an equity ratio of 50.14 percent as a percentage of investor-supplied capital. (EXH 8, MPN K724) FCG witness Russell affirmed all funding needs for the Company are provided by its parent, CUC. (TR 485) As a result, FCG does not issue its own debt or equity and therefore employs CUC’s capital structure to determine the ROR. (TR 485) Witness Russell explained CUC’s target capital structure is 50 to 60 percent equity as a percentage of total capitalization (including short-term debt), which was approved by the Board of Directors, and the CUC strives to approximate the midpoint of 55 percent equity to total capitalization. (FCG BR 52-53; TR 484) Witness Russell noted just prior to the acquisition of FCG, CUC achieved an equity ratio of 53.00 percent, which has since moved from approximately 47.00 percent to above 49.50 percent as it seeks to achieve the target range of 50 percent for the 2027 projected test year. (TR 485; FCG BR 52) Witness Russell asserted the capital structure at the end of the 2027 projected test year will consist of common equity of 50.14 percent, long-term debt of 44.31 percent, and short-term debt of 5.55 percent. (FCG BR 52; TR 490; EXH 8, MPN K724)
Furthermore, witness Russell testified CUC’s long-term debt profile is supported by its sound credit quality, which is reflected in the CUC’s Fitch Ratings Issuer Default Rating of BBB+. (TR 485) Witness Russell stated an investment-grade credit rating of BBB+ indicates strong creditworthiness and low expectation of default risk. (TR 485) Witness Russell continued by confirming the BBB+ rating reflects Fitch’s assessment of CUC’s regulated business mix, stable cash flows, prudent financial policies, and balanced capital structure. (TR 485) Witness Russell affirmed this rating helps ensure access to capital at competitive rates, which benefits both the CUC and its subsidiaries, including FCG. (TR 485) Additionally, the equity ratios of the selected companies in FCG witness Haag’s proxy group (FCG Proxy Group), which is discussed in Issue 29, ranged from 36.15 percent to 60.12 percent, with an average of 46.87 percent. (TR 254-255; EXH 18, MPN C10-319) The average credit rating of the FCG Proxy Group is just above a Standard & Poor’s (S&P) BBB+, which is comparable to CUC’s credit rating of BBB+ from Fitch. OPC witness Walters’ proxy group (OPC Proxy Group), which is also discussed in Issue 29, had an average common equity ratio of 48.3 percent. (TR 1124; EXH 44, MPN C20-3243) The OPC Proxy Group has an average credit rating of A- and Baa1 from S&P and Moody’s, respectively. (TR 1124; EXH 44)
OPC witness Walters noted FCG’s requested equity ratio of 50.14 percent is slightly higher than his proxy group’s average equity ratio of 48.3 percent. (TR 1124; EXH 44, MPN C20-3243) Witness Walters contended that the equity ratio and authorized ROE must be evaluated together because they jointly determine a utility’s cost of capital. Since equity is more expensive than debt, a higher equity ratio reduces financial risk and should generally be accompanied by a lower authorized ROE. (TR 1164) Conversely, combining a higher equity ratio with a higher ROE increases the equity component of the cost of capital, compounding the impact on revenue requirements and ratepayers beyond the effect of increasing either factor alone. (TR 1164) Witness Walters explained when the cost of equity is estimated using companies with lower equity ratios that carry greater financial risk, their estimated cost of equity may reflect that additional risk. Furthermore, applying the same estimate to FCG, which has lower financial risk due to its higher equity ratio, could overcompensate the utility and increase costs for ratepayers. (TR 1165) Witness Walters suggested to avoid overcompensation, the equity ratio could be aligned with the proxy group, or the authorized ROE could be reduced to reflect the utility’s lower financial risk. (TR 1165) However, witness Walters testified that after consideration of his proxy group’s typical equity ratio, as well as what is being awarded to other regulated gas utilities throughout the nation, that FCG’s proposed financial capital structure, including the 50.14 percent common equity, is not unreasonable. (TR 1166)
OPC witness Walters did not object to FCG’s requested equity ratio of 50.14 percent for the 2027 projected test year. However, in its post hearing brief, OPC recommended the Commission should use the most recent reported equity ratio of 49.70 percent, based on the December 31, 2025, Earnings Surveillance Report (ESR). (OPC BR 53) OPC argued, “[t]he Commission should only use an actual reported equity ratio in its calculations, even if it is a synthetic or hypothetical ratio that is not made up of amounts recorded on the books of FCG.” (OPC BR 53) OPC argued that the Commission should apply its well tested policy of using known and measurable adjustments to utilize the actual equity ratio of 49.7 percent, and the Commission should require that it be used for all purposes. (OPC BR 54) OPC argued FCG’s sister subsidiary, FPUC natural gas, never achieved the 55.10 percent equity ratio approved by the Commission in its last rate case, thereby increasing the capital cost to customers. (OPC BR 54) Consequently, OPC argued, FPUC natural gas customers overpaid based on CUC’s ability to change the equity ratio at the parent level as its financing needs change. (OPC BR 53) Staff disagrees with OPC’s last minute recommendation to use an actual or historical capital structure, rather than a projected equity ratio, to determine the cost of capital in a projected test year, simply because the equity ratio may not be achieved or fluctuates in the future. Further, OPC failed to cite any Commission rule or precedent that supports its new position to set the equity ratio based on historical earnings surveillance reports.
FCG argued its proposed equity ratio of 50.14 percent is the only equity ratio supported by the record of this proceeding and therefore, asked that it be approved. (FCG BR 53) Furthermore, witness Russell asserted the 2027 projected test year equity ratio of approximately 50.14 percent reflects a strong, well-balanced capital structure that enables FCG, through CUC, to access capital markets on competitive terms. (TR 515; FCG BR 53) Staff agrees with FCG that the record supports FCG’s proposed equity ratio of 50.14 percent based on investor sources and the level of equity will maintain CUC’s financial integrity and credit metrics to the benefit of FCG’s customers.
CONCLUSION
An equity ratio of 50.14 percent based on investor sources should be approved for the 2027 projected test year capital structure.
What return on equity (ROE) should be approved for establishing FCG’s 2027 projected test year revenue requirement?
Recommendation:
The ROE that should be approved for establishing FCG’s 2027 projected test year revenue requirement is 10.50 percent, with a range of plus or minus 100 basis points. (McGowan, D. Buys)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The Commission should authorize 11.25% as the mid-point return on common equity.
OPC:
The ROE for establishing the 2027 projected test year revenue requirement should be 9.45%.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Summary
The ROE is the allowed cost of common equity included in a utility’s regulatory capital structure used to determine the overall ROR used to establish a revenue requirement. In its filing, FCG requested an ROE of 11.25 percent for establishing its 2027 projected test year revenue requirement. The OPC proposed a lower ROE of 9.45 percent. FCG’s common equity is not publicly traded, and as such, a proxy group of similar risk companies must be used to estimate FCG’s required ROE. Consequently, FCG witness Haag and OPC witness Walters applied cost of equity financial models to their respective proxy groups of publicly traded utility companies with similar risk to FCG to derive estimates of the required ROE. The cost of equity model results of FCG witness Haag and OPC witness Walters are summarized in Table 29-1.
Table 29-1
Summary of Cost of Equity Model Results
|
ROE Model |
FCG witness Haag (Direct) |
FCG witness Haag (Rebuttal) |
OPC witness Walters |
|
DCF (analyst growth estimates) |
- |
- |
10.56% |
|
DCF (sustainable growth estimates) |
- |
- |
9.34% |
|
DCF (Multi-Stage) |
9.19% |
9.72% |
7.70% |
|
CAPM |
11.52% |
11.81% |
8.79% |
|
Risk Premium |
- |
- |
9.90% |
|
Range of Results |
9.75% - 12.01% |
10.23% - 12.44% |
9.00% - 9.90% |
|
Average of Median Results |
10.36% |
10.77% |
9.30% |
|
Recommended ROE |
11.25% |
11.25% |
9.45% |
Source:
EXH 17, MPN C10-293; EXH 80, MPN D6-194a; TR 1137, 1148, 1159.
FCG witness Haag’s recommended ROE of 11.25 percent was calculated using the results of the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) model and Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) applied to a proxy group of natural gas utility companies. (TR 214, 216) OPC witness Walters recommended an ROE of 9.45 percent based on a DCF model and CAPM analysis as well, but he also included a risk premium (RP) analysis. OPC’s recommended ROE would reduce FCG’s requested revenue requirement by approximately $8.7 million annually. (OPC BR 55; TR 1084, TR 1189) Witness Walters explained the increase in the ROR makes up approximately 48.98 percent of FCG’s requested incremental revenue requirement based on the Company’s filing. Additionally, the revenue requirement of the requested ROE, including the associated income taxes required, is approximately 35.19 percent of the proposed total base rate revenue requirement. (TR 1085)
Legal Standard
Both FCG witness Haag and OPC witness Walters agreed that the U.S. Supreme Court Hope and Bluefield decisions established standards for setting the fair cost of equity for a regulated utility providing service to the public.[33] (TR 219; TR 1118) In these decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court found that a utility is entitled to such rates as would permit it to earn a return on a property devoted to the convenience of the public that is generally consistent with the same returns available in other investments of corresponding risk. (TR 219, TR 1118) In the Bluefield decision, the U.S. Supreme Court also found that the utility has no constitutional rights to profits such as those realized or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises or speculative ventures, and defined the ratepayer-investor balance as follows:
The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties.[34]
(TR 1119)
A fair ROE is based on the expectation that a utility’s costs reflect efficient and economical management, and the return will support its credit standing and access to capital, but the return will not exceed this level. (TR 1119) Utility rates that are consistent with these standards will be just and reasonable, and compensation to the utility will be fair and support financial integrity and credit-standing, under economical management of the utility. (TR 1118-1119) To be consistent with the Hope and Bluefield standards, the allowed ROE should be commensurate with returns on other investments with comparable risk. As such, a proxy group of similarly situated companies of comparable risk is needed to determine FCG’s ROE under this standard. (TR 1123, TR 219-220)
FCG Proxy Group
FCG witness Haag selected six companies from Value Line’s Natural Gas Utility Group. (TR 221) The FCG Proxy Group included Atmos Energy Corporation (Atmos), NiSource Inc. (NiSource), Northwest Natural Holding Company (Northwest Natural), ONE Gas, Inc. (ONE Gas), Spire Inc. (Spire), and Southwest Gas Holdings, Inc. (Southwest Gas). (FCG BR 54; TR 232; TR 1169) The equity ratios of the selected proxy group companies range from 36.15 percent to 60.12 percent, with an average of 46.87 percent. (TR 254-255; EXH 18, MPN C10-319) The average credit rating of the FCG Proxy Group is just above an S&P BBB+, which is comparable to CUC’s credit rating of BBB+ from Fitch.
OPC Proxy Group
OPC witness Walters selected five of the natural gas companies relied upon by witness Haag but excluded Spire due to its announced acquisition of Piedmont Natural Gas. (TR 1124) In addition, witness Walters included four water utilities followed by Value Line. (TR 1123-1124) Witness Walters’ proxy group consisted of a total of nine regulated utilities: five natural gas utilities and four water utilities. The OPC Proxy Group included Atmos, NiSource, Northwest Natural, ONE Gas, Southwest Gas, American States Water Company, California Water Service Group, Middlesex Water Company, and H2O America. (TR 276-277) The OPC Proxy Group has an average credit rating of A- and Baa1 from S&P and Moody’s, respectively. (TR 1124, EXH 44) Additionally, the OPC Proxy Group has an average common equity ratio of 48.3 percent (including short-term debt), and 51.3 percent (excluding short-term debt) as calculated by S&P Global MI and Value Line, respectively. FCG’s requested common equity ratio of 50.14 percent is marginally higher than the OPC Proxy Group’s equity ratio of 48.3 percent (including short-term debt). (TR 1124)
Staff believes both parties’ proxy groups are reasonable and represent comparable risk characteristics to FCG that satisfy the Hope and Bluefield standard for estimating an ROE.
Cost of Equity Models
FCG witness Haag submitted both direct and rebuttal testimony in this rate case. In his rebuttal testimony, witness Haag applied updated market data and information to the same methods and ROE models used in his direct testimony. Therefore, in the interest of brevity, staff will discuss and analyze only the ROE model results in witness Haag’s rebuttal testimony with brief references to compare the results from his direct testimony. As described in greater detail in the analysis below, the average of the results of FCG’s rebuttal and OPC’s DCF models and CAPM analyses is 9.83 percent and 11.23 percent, respectively. The average of the DCF model and CAPM analysis is 10.53 percent. Staff believes more weight should be given to the results of the DCF model because it reflects actual stock prices and projected growth rates of the proxy companies. Therefore, staff believes 10.50 percent based on the ROE model results is a fair and reasonable estimation of FCG’s required ROE and meets the Hope and Bluefield standard.
DCF Model
The DCF model is based on the theory that a stock’s current price represents the present value of all expected future cash flows in the form of dividends discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted ROR. (TR 232) In its basic form, the DCF model can be mathematically expressed as ROE = (dividend ÷ stock price) + growth rate. (TR 232-233) In summary, both parties’ application of the DCF model are mostly similar. FCG’s average of the median results (9.81 percent and 9.64 percent) from two identical applications of the DCF model using different analyst growth sources rates is 9.72 percent. OPC’s average of the median results (10.56 percent and 9.34 percent) from two constant growth DCF models comparable to FCG’s DCF model is 9.95 percent. The average growth rate used in FCG’s and OPC’s DCF models is 7.2 percent and 7.3 percent, respectively. Accordingly, staff believes a fair and reasonable estimation of the ROE using the DCF model is the average of the witnesses’ results of 9.83 percent.
OPC witness Walters also presented a multi-stage DCF model that resulted in a median ROE of 7.70 percent. Staff believes witness Walters’ multi-stage DCF result is unreasonable due to the low growth rates used in the derivation and it is 180 basis points below FCG’s current authorized ROE of 9.50 percent. In response to a staff interrogatory, OPC provided the results of witness Walters’ ROE models excluding the water utilities. The median results for the OPC DCF models without the water utilities was 10.56 percent, 9.89 percent, and 7.83 percent, averaging 9.43 percent. (EXH 154) The results were slightly higher without the water utilities in the proxy group. Staff notes that OPC’s gas utility only DCF model result using the sustainable growth rate is comparable to the averaged results of 9.83 percent.
FCG
FCG witness Haag relied on a version of a two-stage DCF model which combined an estimate for long-term growth and analyst short-term projected growth rates. (TR 233) The long-term growth projection — which represents the U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) — was based on the average of forecasts from three sources, which included the Energy Information Administration, S&P Global Connect, and the Social Security Administration. (TR 233-234) The average of the three estimates resulted in a long-term GDP growth rate of 3.79 percent. (TR 234; EXH 80, MPN D6-194e) In regard to the analyst short-term projected growth rate estimates, witness Haag relied on the five-year growth forecasts for each proxy group company as published by both the Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES) and Value Line. (TR 234-235) Witness Haag applied a two-thirds weighting to the short-term analyst growth rate forecasts and a one-third weighting to the long-term GDP growth forecasts for calculating a combined growth rate in his DCF model. (TR 235)
Witness Haag calculated the dividend yield (dividends paid ÷ stock price) using the average of the high and low stock prices for each of the most recently reported six months (January 2026 – June 2026); dividing the indicated annual dividend for each month by the average stock price for the same month (resulting in a dividend yield for each of the reported six months); and averaging the monthly dividend yields. (TR 235) To account for the fact that dividends are typically paid on a quarterly basis, he adjusted the dividend upward by multiplying one-half of the Value Line short-term growth rates (1 + 0.5 growth rate) in his DCF calculations. (TR 236) Witness Haag’s DCF model results using IBES growth rates produced ROEs that ranged from 9.55 percent to 14.23 percent, with a median of 9.81 percent. The DCF model results using Value Line growth rates produced ROEs that ranged from 8.65 percent to 10.90 percent, with a median of 9.64 percent. (EXH 80, MPN D6-194b-c) The average of the two median results is 9.72 percent (9.81% + 9.64% = 19.45% ÷ 2 = 9.72%). (EXH 80, MPN D6-194a)
OPC
OPC witness Walters applied three different variations of the DCF model in his analysis. Witness Walters used two constant growth DCF models: one with analysts’ growth estimates and a second with a sustainable growth rate. (TR 1125-1137) Additionally, witness Walters employed a multi-stage DCF model. (TR 1132-1137) The averaged results of witness Walters’ DCF model analysis ranged from 7.90 percent to 11.24 percent, with a mean of 9.55 percent (medians ranged from 7.70 percent to 10.56 percent). (TR 1137) In the constant growth DCF model with analysts’ growth rates, witness Walters relied on the proxy group average stock price over the 13-week period ended June 12, 2026, to calculate an adjusted dividend yield of 3.13 percent. (TR 1125-1126; EXH 46) To calculate the adjusted dividend yield, witness Walters used the same (1 + 0.5 growth rate) multiplier as did FCG witness Haag. (TR 1126) For the growth rate estimate, witness Walters relied on the average of professional securities analysts’ projected earnings growth estimates from three publicly available sources: Zacks, S&P Capital IQ Market Intelligence, and IBES from LSEG Workspace. (TR 1127) The growth rates relied upon by witness Walters had a mean and median of 8.11 percent and 7.91 percent, respectively. (TR 1128; EXH 45) As reflected in Exhibit CCW-5, witness Walters’ constant growth DCF model analysis using analysts’ growth rate estimates resulted in a mean and median of 11.24 percent and 10.56 percent, respectively. (TR 1128, EXH 46)
Witness Walters applied a sustainable growth rate in his second DCF model analysis. (TR 1129) The sustainable growth rate is determined by the proportion of the utility’s earnings that is retained and reinvested in its plant and equipment. These reinvested earnings enhance the earnings base. The earnings grow as the plant, funded by the reinvested earnings, is put into operation, allowing the utility to receive its authorized return on the additional rate base investment. (TR 1129) In his sustainable growth DCF model, witness Walters calculated an adjusted dividend yield of 3.08 percent. (EXH 49) The mean and median sustainable growth rates for the proxy group were 6.43 percent and 6.26 percent, respectively. (TR 1130) Witness Walters’ sustainable growth rate DCF model returned a mean and median result of 9.51 percent and 9.34 percent, respectively. (TR 1130, EXH 49)
In his third DCF model analysis, witness Walters applied a multi-stage DCF methodology. (TR 1130-1137) The multi-stage DCF model reflects three growth periods: (1) a short-term growth period consisting of the first five years; (2) a transition period consisting of the next five years (6 through 10); and (3) and a long-term growth period starting in year 11 and extending into perpetuity. (TR 1132) The growth rates used in the first, second, and third periods are 8.11 percent, an average of 6.05 percent, and 3.99 percent, respectively. The results from his multi-stage DCF averaged 7.90 percent, with a median of 7.70 percent. (TR 1136)
OPC witness Walters’ results from his multi-stage DCF model are lower than his constant growth and sustainable growth DCF models because the overall growth rate is substantially less than the other two DCF model applications. OPC argued that utilities cannot indefinitely sustain a growth rate that exceeds the growth rate of the economy in which they sell services. (TR 1132) Witness Walters contended that the long-term maximum sustainable growth rate for a utility investment is limited by the projected long-term growth rate. (TR 1128-1129) Witness Walters used the consensus projected U.S. GDP of 3.99 percent as published by Blue Chip, issued June 1, 2026. (TR 1129; EXH 50)
Witness Walters testified that the constant growth DCF using analysts’ growth rates assume an average long-term growth rate of 8.11 percent, which is approximately 103 percent higher than the long-term projected GDP growth rate of 3.99 percent. (TR 1136) OPC argued that this is an unsustainable assumption and likely leads to an overstatement in the cost of equity for a low risk regulated utility. (TR 1136) As such, witness Walters opined that primary weight should be given to the sustainable growth and multi-stage models of the DCF while minimal weight should be given to the constant growth DCF model based on three-to-five-year analyst growth rates. (TR 1136) Staff disagrees with witness Walters’ opinion about growth limitations because the GDP measures the growth of the U.S. economy as a whole, whereas individual business sectors can grow at different rates. As stated previously, staff believes witness Walters’ multi-stage DCF result is unreasonable due to the low growth rates used in the derivation and it is 180 basis points below FCG’s current authorized ROE of 9.50 percent.
CAPM
The CAPM is based on the theory that the market-required ROR for a security is equal to the risk-free rate plus a market risk premium (MRP) associated with that security. (TR 237) The CAPM estimates the cost of equity by adding the risk-free rate to the MRP multiplied by beta. (TR 239) In its basic form, the CAPM formula is mathematically expressed as ROE = risk-free rate + beta × (market return – risk-free rate). (TR 239-240)
FCG provided testimony for the CAPM analysis that produced a range of ROEs from 10.63 percent to 13.15 percent using two separate models that included different MRPs. The average of the median results (11.05 percent and 12.57 percent) from FCG’s two CAPM applications averaged 11.81 percent. (EXH 80, MPN D6-194a)
OPC provided testimony that included twelve different applications of the CAPM using a combination of four different beta estimates and three different MRP estimates. (TR 1148-1159) The first three results presented are based on the proxy group’s current average Value Line beta of 0.77. The results of the CAPM based on these inputs range from 8.83 percent to 11.71 percent. The next set of three results presented are based on the proxy group’s historical Value Line beta of 0.76. The results of the CAPM based on these inputs range from 8.74 percent to 11.56 percent. The third set of results presented are based on the proxy group’s current S&P Global MI beta of 0.38. The results of the CAPM based on these inputs range from 6.84 percent to 8.16 percent. The final set of results presented are based on the proxy group’s three-year beta estimate of 0.57. The results of the CAPM based on these inputs range from 7.81 percent to 9.89 percent. (TR 1158) The overall average of OPC’s CAPM results is 9.01 percent. (TR 1159; EXH 58)
Risk-Free Rate
FCG witness Haag initially applied a risk-free rate of 4.79 percent based on the average historical yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury bonds over the six-month period ending November 2025, which was updated in his rebuttal testimony to 4.93 percent to reflect more recent U.S. Treasury yield data. (TR 238, 241; EXH 17, MPN C10-317; EXH 80, MPN D6-194x) In contrast, OPC witness Walters relied on the forecasted 30-year Treasury bond yield of 4.80 percent, as published by Blue Chip, issued June 1, 2026. (TR 1150)
Staff believes the record supports the use of a forecasted risk-free rate as the proper risk-free rate to use in the CAPM. During cross examination, witness Haag explained that his preference is to use the historical rate because the historical rate is known, and forecasts can change. (TR 316) Witness Haag admitted he was unaware of any academic literature that supports his opinion. Witness Haag used the historical risk-free rate in his CAPM analysis because it is his practice to apply the methodology as prescribed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). (TR 318-319) Witness Haag did acknowledge that according to Dr. Roger Morin’s authoritative book, Modern Regulatory Finance, interest rate forecasts are preferable given that rate making is a forward-looking process. (OPC BR 59; TR 317-318; EXH 160)
Beta
FCG witness Haag relied on the adjusted betas provided by Value Line for each of the proxy group companies as of November 2025. (TR 241) The beta value used in his rebuttal testimony was updated to reflect the most recent Value Line data. (EXH 80, MPN D6-194f, D6-194o) While witness Haag used only current published betas from Value Line, OPC witness Walters considered multiple approaches for his beta estimation. (TR 1150) The results were beta values of 0.77, 0.76, 0.57, and 0.38. (EXH 57) The four approaches included the current published betas from Value Line (0.77), a long-term average of Value Line betas (0.76), three-year betas adjusted using Value Line’s methodology (0.57), and Vasicek-adjusted betas from S&P Capital IQ’s Beta Generator Model (0.38). (TR 1150)
OPC witness Walters testified that the S&P Vasicek-adjusted betas use the S&P 500 index as the benchmark, which aligned with his use of the S&P 500 to estimate the market return as opposed to the Value Line beta estimates, which are based on the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index. (TR 1150) Witness Walters contended that because the Value Line beta values do not account for the reliability of the underlying data, they can be overstated for utilities. (TR 1151) The reason the Vasicek-adjusted betas are lower stems from how each method handles estimation error. (TR 1152) Witness Walters explained that the Vasicek method adjusts raw betas toward an industry-specific mean, weighting more reliable estimates more heavily. (TR 1152) In contrast, Value Line adjusts betas toward the market mean of 1.0 regardless of estimation accuracy. Thus, witness Walters contended that the Vasicek-adjusted betas may better capture utilities’ defensive characteristics and provide a more accurate measure of systematic risk. (TR 1152)
FCG witness Haag testified that contrary to witness Walters’ opinion, there is no consensus that the Vasicek-adjustment provides a more accurate measure of risk for regulated utilities and is more superior to the Value Line – Bloomberg beta adjustment. (TR 291) Staff agrees with witness Haag that OPC witness Walters’ CAPM analysis that relied upon the Vasicek-adjusted betas produced questionable results that are too low and should be given little weight, if any. (TR 291) Staff also agrees with FCG witness Haag that most of the beta coefficients used by ROE analysts in regulatory proceedings employ only Value Line and/or Bloomberg sourced betas. (FCG BR 57; TR 291) Therefore, staff believes the most reasonable beta values are the current Value Line adjusted betas used by both witnesses, and they are identical.
Market Equity Risk Premium
FCG witness Haag’s market return was determined using the method approved for FERC cases. (TR 318) It is a forward-looking approach based on a one-step DCF model analysis of all dividend-paying companies in the S&P 500, excluding any companies with IBES or Value Line growth rates that are negative or more than 20 percent. (TR 241) The short-term growth projections in the DCF model analysis reflect the IBES and Value Line growth rates of all dividend-paying S&P 500 companies. (TR 241-242) The DCF based market return is then calculated using the market-capitalization weighted average of the current market dividend yield (1.51 percent for IBES and 1.54 percent for Value Line) plus the market-capitalization weighted average growth rate (12.61 percent for IBES and 10.63 percent for Value Line) for each eligible stock, yielding a total market return of 14.12 percent for IBES and 12.17 percent for Value Line. (TR 242; EXH 80, MPN D6-194f, D6-194o) To calculate the market risk premium, witness Haag subtracted the risk-free rate of 4.93 percent from the applicable total market return, yielding a MRP of 9.19 percent (14.12% − 4.93% = 9.19%) for IBES and 7.24 percent (12.17% − 4.93% = 7.24%) for Value Line. (TR 242, EXH 80, MPN D6-194f, D6-194o) This market risk premium is then multiplied by each of the proxy group entity’s Value Line beta and added to the risk-free rate to obtain the unadjusted returns. (TR 242-243)
OPC witness Walters used three different MRPs in his CAPM analysis. His MRP estimates were derived using both a risk premium approach and a DCF approach. (TR 1152) Witness Walters also used the normalized market risk premium of 5.00 percent with the normalized risk-free rate of 4.97 percent as recommended by Kroll, formerly known as Duff & Phelps. (TR 1152) FCG witness Haag disagreed with the use of the Kroll MRP and risk-free rate stating that the MRP was last updated in September 2025 and Kroll’s risk-free rate is currently 5.22 percent as of July 30, 2026. (TR 288) Therefore, witness Haag postulated there is no clear relationship between the Kroll MRP and risk-free rate, which is contrary to the interrelationship between the two economic measurements – they are inversely related. (TR 288-289) Staff agrees with witness Haag that academic analysis brings into question the dependability of Kroll’s MRP recommendation, and as such, should not be considered in determining the ROE for FCG. (TR 289)
Witness Walters’ second MRP approach using a risk premium methodology calculated an expected market return by combining the historical average real market return for the period 1928 to 2025 of 8.61 percent, as reported by Professor Aswath Damodaran of the New York University Stern School of Business, and a consensus for projected inflation of 2.20 percent, as published by Blue Chip, issued June 1, 2026. (TR 1153, TR 287) Based on these estimates, the expected market return was 11.00 percent. The projected risk-free rate of 4.80 percent is then subtracted to obtain a MRP of 6.20 percent. (TR 1153, TR 287)
Witness Walters also employed two versions of the constant growth DCF model to develop his MRP estimates: the FERC’s method of estimating the expected return on the market and an alternative version of the FERC DCF method using all companies in the S&P 500 index rather than just dividend-paying companies. Witness Walters’ expected market return using the FERC DCF model was 13.91 percent and using the alternative DCF model was 13.60 percent. Subtracting the projected risk-free rate of 4.80 percent from the expected market returns resulted in MRP estimates of 9.10 percent and 8.80 percent, with an average of 8.95 percent. (TR 1153-1155) FCG witness Haag did not indicate in his rebuttal testimony that he had concerns or disagreed with witness Walters’ risk premium or DCF model derivations of the MRP.
Size Adjustment
Rather than using the traditional CAPM equation that only requires three inputs (risk-free rate, beta, and market risk premium) as discussed above, FCG witness Haag added a size premium to the standard formula to account for the notion that the betas of small companies undercompensate for their risk. (TR 240) The formula utilized by witness Haag in his CAPM analysis can be mathematically expressed as ROE = risk-free rate + beta × (market return – risk-free rate) + size adjustment. (TR 240) Witness Haag applied the size adjustment factor, which was sourced from the December 2025 Kroll Cost of Capital Navigator to each proxy company’s unadjusted return for a final CAPM result. (EXH 80, MPN D6-194y) FCG’s size adjustment increased the CAPM results by 72 basis points. The median unadjusted CAPM result was 11.09 percent as compared to 11.81 percent including the size adjustment. The CAPM size adjustment increased FCG witness Haag’s overall average ROE result by 36 basis points.
OPC argued that this increase is excessive compared to typical size adjustments granted by commissions which range from five to twenty basis points. (OPC BR 58; TR 1195-1196) OPC further argued that no size effect exists for regulated utilities because they operate as regional monopolies with multiple cost-of-service recovery mechanisms which insulate earnings from size-based volatility. (OPC BR 57-58; TR 1178-1179; TR 312) OPC witness Walters contended that 1993 empirical research in Professor Wong’s article in the Journal of the Midwest Finance Association concluded that although the size phenomenon in the CAPM has been strongly documented for industrial firms, there is no need to adjust for size in utility rate regulations.[35] (TR 1177-1178) FCG witness Haag objected and contended that Professor Wong’s results demonstrate no material difference between utilities and industrial firms with respect to size premiums. (TR 294) A review of the concluding remarks of Professor Wong’s study confirms OPC witness Walters’ characterization of the study. The results described in the article indicated that there is “some weak evidence that firm size is a missing factor from the CAPM for the industrial but not for the utility stocks.” (Confidential EXH 157, BSP 000799-000805)
FCG witness Haag also provided evidence that a more recent study published in the Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance that reconsidered Professor Wong’s study and concluded there is a small firm effect in the CAPM for utilities.[36] (TR 294; EXH 120, MPN E2840-E2844) Witness Haag also cited Dr. Morin from his textbook, New Regulatory Finance, wherein Dr. Morin confirms that all else remaining constant, small companies on average have higher returns than larger ones. (TR 294-295) Witness Haag cites two more sources that also indicate the CAPM could understate the cost of equity for small firms. (TR 295) Based on the record, staff believes that the CAPM size adjustment is a reasonable adjustment to account for FCG’s additional risk based on its smaller size as compared to the average of the proxy group. However, this should be the only size adjustment considered due to its magnitude. FCG’s proposed CAPM-based size adjustment increases the staff recommended OPC and FCG average results of the CAPM by 36 basis points and increases the overall average ROE results by 15 basis points. (EXH 80, MPN D6-194a, D6-194f, D6-194o; EXH 58, MPN C20-3260)
Staff believes OPC’s two CAPM results of 9.59 percent and 11.71 percent using current Value Line beta values averaging 0.77, combined with the risk premium and DCF derived MRPs of 6.20 percent and 8.95 percent should be given significantly more weight than witness Walters’ other ten iterations of the CAPM. These versions of witness Walters’ CAPM are preferred because the beta values reflect the most recent data, and the risk premium and DCF derived MRPs reflect actual market returns. The average of the two OPC CAPM results is 10.65 percent (9.59% + 11.71% = 21.3% ÷ 2 = 10.56%). As stated previously, FCG’s median CAPM results averaged 11.81 percent, including a 72 basis point small size adjustment. The average of OPC’s staff modified CAPM result (10.65 percent) and FCG’s CAPM results (11.81 percent) is 11.23 percent (10.56% + 11.81% = 22.46% ÷ 2 = 11.23%). Staff believes this is a balanced and reasonable estimate of the CAPM result based on the record.
Risk Premium Analysis
The bond yield plus RP model is based on the principle that equity investors require a higher return than bond investors because common equity carries greater risk. (TR 1137) FCG witness Haag did not include a RP analysis in his testimony. He opined that the risk premium model is like the CAPM because the CAPM also provides an estimate of the market risk premium that investors require to account for the risk of investing in stocks over bonds. He explained his MRP in the CAPM estimates the MRP as compared to 30-year U.S. Treasury Yields over the most recent 6-month period. (TR 286) Witness Haag contended that RP analyses are based solely on averages and do not account for the unique business risks and financial risks of FCG. (TR 289)
OPC witness Walters relied on two approaches to estimate the equity risk premium. First, witness Walters calculated the annual difference between regulatory commission-authorized ROEs for utility companies and the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds since 1986, which reflects the equity risk premium over risk-free rates. (TR 1137) Witness Walters’ second approach was based on the annual difference between authorized ROEs and Moody’s “A”-rated utility bond yields over the same period. (TR 1137) Witness Walters calculated an ROE of 10.05 percent using U.S. Treasury bonds and an ROE of 9.89 percent using utility bonds. (TR 285) Witness Walters estimated an equity risk premium of 4.05 percent over “A”-rated utility bond yields and an equity risk premium of 5.25 percent over 30-year U.S. Treasury Bond Yields. (TR 1139) Witness Walters also used a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) regression analysis based on the same authorized ROEs, long-term Treasury bond yields, and corresponding ERP since 1986 that yielded an estimated ROE of 9.74 percent. (TR 286, 1140)
Witness Walters’ average result from his four iterations of the RP model was 9.90 percent. This set the high end of witness Walters’ estimated range of ROE for FCG at 9.00 percent to 9.90 percent based on his various methodologies used in his testimony. (TR 1160) Staff has two concerns with witness Walters’ RP analysis. First, it uses historical data that does not reflect forecasted interest rates or expected future market returns during the projected test year. Second, witness Walters’ RP analysis uses historical authorized ROEs across the U.S. that may not reflect the risks that affect natural gas distribution companies currently and prospectively. Therefore, staff believes little weight should be given to witness Walters’ RP analysis.
Company Specific Risks
FCG argued that on balance, the Company faces significantly higher competitive, financial, and operational risks than the median of the proxy group, justifying a higher ROE. (FCG BR 55) FCG witness Haag contended that as a small, stand-alone utility operating solely in southern Florida, FCG is significantly smaller and less diversified than the proxy group companies. (TR 244-245) Because investment risk increases as company size diminishes, a rational investor would require a higher return. (TR 245) Witness Haag asserted that FCG’s risk must be evaluated as a standalone entity rather than relying on its parent company’s size or capital structure, as corporate ownership can change and standalone financing for an entity of FCG’s size would be more costly and uncertain. (TR 245) However, this is not the case as pointed out by OPC.
OPC argued that FCG is not a vulnerable standalone enterprise. It is a wholly owned subsidiary of CUC, a $3.5-plus billion enterprise, with over 91 percent institutional ownership. (OPC BR 58; TR 1182) OPC argued that ratepayers pay roughly $21.8 million a year in service company allocations for parent credit strength, centralized treasury, and capital markets access. (OPC BR 58; TR 1184-1185) Therefore, OPC contended that FCG cannot collect those costs while claiming to be a small, isolated entity struggling to raise capital. (OPC BR 58) In OPC witness Walters’ words, “FCG’s access to capital is secure, paid for, and priced at the parent level, and his [Haag’s] speculation about whether lenders or investors would finance a standalone FCG is irrelevant to the rates being set in this proceeding.” (OPC BR 58; TR 1182-1185) OPC alluded to FCG witness Russell’s testimony that CUC’s Fitch rating of BBB+ “indicates strong creditworthiness and a low expectation of default risk” and ensures access to capital at competitive rates. (OPC BR 60-61; TR 485). Witness Russell testified that its rating helps ensure access to capital at competitive rates, which benefits both CUC and FCG. (OPC BR 61; TR 485)
FCG witness Haag testified the Company faces direct competition from electric utilities, renewable generation, and customer bypass options. (TR 248) This has contributed to a 3.4 percent drop in Florida’s residential gas volumes and a 4.8 percent drop in industrial volumes from 2021 to 2023. Additionally, conservation mandates reduce demand; because FCG has high fixed costs, lower demand drives up customer rates, further hurting competitiveness. (TR 248) Witness Haag also contended that Florida’s interstate pipeline system lacks sufficient capacity to transport the volumes of natural gas needed to meet projected demand in FCG’s service territory. (TR 252) Without additional firm capacity, FCG cannot easily support rapid customer growth. (TR 253) Witness Haag further elaborated that while population growth increases demand - especially from the LNG/cruise industries in Brevard and power generation in Miami-Dade - it simultaneously restricts the land available to build new pipeline infrastructure. (TR 253)
FCG witness Haag also contended that because the Company’s asset base ($979 million, including goodwill) is drastically smaller than the proxy groups total assets, which ranges from $3.5 billion to nearly $32 billion, FCG has less capacity to absorb adverse revenue or expense shocks. (TR 250) Witness Haag claimed that because of its smaller asset base, FCG faces greater inflation risk than the companies in the proxy group. Witness Haag opined that high inflation (averaging 4.5 percent recently) increases the risk of under-recovering service costs and drives up the cost of long-term debt capital due to potential future increases in interest rates. (TR 251) As a result, witness Haag opined if investors expect increased levels of inflation, they will require higher returns on investment. (TR 252) Witness Haag did not provide any empirical evidence that the amount of assets on a regulated local gas distribution company (LDC) affects its level of exposure to inflation risk. OPC argued that, by contrast, regulated LDCs operate as regional monopolies with cost-of-service ratemaking and statutory clause cost recovery mechanisms like the SAFE program which insulate earnings from size-based volatility. (OPC BR 57-58; TR 1178-1179) Considering OPC’s argument, staff disagrees with FCG that it faces greater inflation risk due to its smaller size. Further, using forecasted interest rates and analyst forecasted growth rates in the ROE models would account for expected increases in inflation.
FCG Risk Adjustment
FCG argued that its size and business risks should be considered when establishing the appropriate ROE for the Company. (TR 300) From the overall average results of his DCF and CAPM analysis in his direct testimony (10.36 percent), witness Haag established a zone of reasonableness of 9.75 percent to 12.01 percent. He divided this zone into a lower third (9.75 percent to 10.50 percent), a middle third (10.50 percent to 11.25 percent), and an upper third (11.25 percent to 12.01 percent) Witness Haag then selected the top of the middle third, 11.25 percent, as his recommendation. (TR 1168) In his rebuttal testimony, witness Haag derived a zone of reasonableness of 10.23 percent to 12.44 percent. He divided this zone into a lower third (10.23 percent to 10.97 percent), a middle third (10.97 percent to 11.70 percent), and an upper third (11.70 percent to 12.44 percent). Witness Haag continued to believe that 11.25 percent is a reasonable and appropriate estimate of FCG’s ROE, even though the same “top of the middle third” was 11.70 percent. (TR 300; EXH 80, MPN D6-194a)
Staff notes that the top of the middle third of witness Haag’s zone of reasonableness is the same as the bottom of the upper third. FCG witness Haag’s upper third of his range reflects ten individual company results from his CAPM analysis and two from his DCF model. The range of the results from his CAPM is 10.63 percent to 13.15 percent. The average of his CAPM results is 11.81 percent. The highest individual result was 14.23 percent from Southwest Gas using the DCF model and an IBES growth rate of 14.80 percent, which ultimately set the top of his overall zone of reasonableness. (TR 1173) The next highest result was 12.75 percent for Spire using his DCF model and an IBES growth rate of 11.20 percent. The DCF model results from Spire and Southwest Gas are unreasonably high compared with the other proxy companies, whose DCF results averaged approximately 9.70 percent, with a median of 9.81 percent. (TR 1173)
OPC witness Walters disagreed with witness Haag’s proposed “company-specific adder,” stating it fundamentally conflicts with the CAPM on which his testimony relies. (OPC BR 59; TR 1181-1182) Witness Walters contended that the core tenet of the CAPM dictates that the market compensates investors exclusively for non-diversifiable, or systematic risk, which is quantified via beta. Because firm-specific risks can be eliminated through portfolio diversification, the market does not command a risk premium for such factors. (TR 1181) Although witness Haag concedes that beta values measure relative market risk, he introduces an adder based entirely on diversifiable, firm-specific risks, including FCG’s size, pipeline constraints, and regional competition. (TR 1182)
To the extent these factors possess a systematic component, OPC argued that risk is already reflected in the market-determined betas, stock prices, and dividend yields of the proxy group. (OPC BR 59; TR 1182) Witness Walters asserted that layering a company-specific risk premium on top of FCG witness Haag’s market-derived results constitutes impermissible double-counting. (TR 1182) Furthermore, several enumerated factors, such as inflation and interest rate sensitivity, are economy-wide conditions that impact the proxy group equally, providing no legal or economic basis for a premium. (TR 1182) Accordingly, OPC witness Walters contended that witness Haag’s proposed risk adjustment departs from the market evidence and must be rejected. (TR 1181-1182)
Staff believes the record demonstrates that FCG, on a stand-alone basis, is smaller than the average companies in the proxy group which would increase risk by some degree, but certainly not by 89 basis points based on witness Haag’s direct testimony ROE model results, or 48 basis points based on his rebuttal testimony. (EXH 17, MPN C10-293; EXH 80, MPN D6-194a) As discussed previously, witness Haag’s CAPM size adjustment accounts for FCG’s smaller size by adding 36 basis points to his overall average results of 10.77 percent (based on rebuttal testimony), which ultimately increased the overall average of FCG’s and OPC’s ROE results by 15 basis points.
FCG witness Haag admitted that there is not a quantitative analysis in the record that supports his risk adjustment. (OPC BR 57; TR 325) Witness Haag testified that his risk adjustment is based on his range of reasonableness [of his ROE model results] and his professional judgement looking at the unique risks that FCG faces. (TR 325) Conversely, OPC questioned witness Haag’s experience and professional judgement regarding FCG’s risks, noting that this was witness Haag’s first rate case for a natural gas LDC. (OPC BR 58) OPC asserted witness Haag’s background is almost exclusively FERC-regulated interstate pipelines with a different regulatory framework and risk profiles. (OPC BR 58; TR 212-213, TR 316-319, TR 1183-1184) In contrast, OPC argued witness Walters has sponsored testimony before 27 state regulators and the City of New Orleans. (OPC BR 58; TR 1081-1082) Therefore, staff believes the record indicates that FCG witness Haag’s nascent professional judgement regarding the business risks of natural gas LDCs should be taken into consideration when determining if any additional risk adjustments are warranted in this case.
Financial Risk
As discussed in Issue 28, financial risk is created by the introduction of debt into the capital structure. The higher proportion of debt in the capital structure the greater the financial risk. Consistent with the basic principle of risk and return, common equity investors require higher returns as compensation for bearing higher financial risk.
FCG witness Haag testified that the equity ratio in the current capital structure of CUC (50.14 percent) is within the zone of reasonableness when compared to the other utilities in the proxy group (36.15 percent to 60.12 percent). The average equity ratio of the six proxy group companies is 46.87 percent. (EXH 18, MPN C10-319) Therefore, witness Haag concluded utilizing it as a proxy for FCG’s equity ratio and capital structure for ratemaking purposes is wholly reasonable. (TR 255) This practice is consistent with the determination of the equity ratio and capital structure in FCG’s last rate case in Docket No. 20220069-GU.[37]
FCG witness Haag testified that FCG clearly benefits from the application of the capital structure of CUC, while he also claims it impacts the Company’s relative risks. (TR 250) Witness Haag asserted that his is true because CUC’s capital structure is not necessarily reflective of what FCG’s actual capital structure would be for a small local gas distribution system operating on a standalone basis — assuming that CUC divested itself of FCG. (TR 250) However, staff believes witness Haag’s posit does not reflect the reality of FCG’s financial position. Staff believes FCG cannot claim additional financial risks exist for FCG based on a postulation that is unsupported by the record, and on the other hand, argue that FCG’s access to capital through its corporate sponsorship by CUC benefits its customers.
Because FCG’s requested equity ratio is lower than the average of the comparable proxy group companies, FCG’s financial risk based on leverage (the level of debt in the capital structure) is less than that of the proxy group. Consequently, FCG’s allowed ROE should reflect the lower risk. In this case, neither FCG nor OPC recommended a specific quantitative adjustment to the ROE to reflect the lower financial risk. Staff believes the record supports a financial risk adjustment to recognize the less risky capital structure of FCG as compared to the average proxy group. FCG’s higher equity ratio provides the Company with a stronger balance sheet than the average proxy group company that — on a standalone basis — would allow FCG to better withstand the economic and business risks described by FCG witness Haag.
Summary
Staff believes the record supports a range of ROEs from 9.45 percent to 11.25 percent based on OPC witness Walters’ and FCG witness Haag’s respective testimonies. After thorough analysis and consideration, staff believes the record evidence can be narrowed to an ROE of 10.50 percent. Staff concurs with OPC that FCG’s risk adjustment is excessive considering it is primarily based on FCG’s smaller amount of total assets as compared to the average of the proxy group. (OPC BR 59-60; TR 1181) Staff’s recommended ROE of 10.50 percent includes a 15-basis point increase above the staff recommended average of the parties ROE model results of 10.35 percent without FCG’s CAPM size adjustment. Staff agrees with FCG that there are operational risks from constrained gas supply and pipelines faced by FCG that may be more pronounced than those faced by companies in the proxy group, however, these specific risks were not quantified by FCG witness Haag. Staff believes any ROE increase that would be appropriate to account for FCG’s increased operational risks are offset by a decrease in the ROE to account for FCG’s decreased financial risk based on FCG’s higher equity ratio in the capital structure. Accordingly, staff believes a mid-point ROE of 10.50 percent, with a range of plus or minus 100 basis points, will enable FCG to generate the cash flow needed to meet its near-term financial obligations, make the capital investments needed to maintain and expand its system, maintain sufficient levels of liquidity to fund unexpected events, and sustain confidence in Florida’s regulatory environment among credit rating agencies and investors. Therefore, an ROE of 10.50 percent represents a reasonable middle ground between all the models and recommendations presented by FCG and OPC.
CONCLUSION
The ROE that should be approved for establishing FCG’s 2027 projected test year revenue requirement is 10.50 percent, with a range of plus or minus 100 basis points.
What capital structure and weighted average cost of capital should be approved for establishing FCG’s 2027 projected test year revenue requirement?
Recommendation:
A capital structure consisting of 50.14 percent common equity, 44.31 percent long-term debt, and 5.55 percent short-term debt as a percentage of investor sources should be approved for the 13-month average test year ending December 31, 2027. A weighted average cost of capital of 7.37 percent should be approved for establishing FCG’s 2027 projected test year revenue requirement. (D'Sa)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate capital structure for FCG is 50.14 percent common equity and 49.86 percent debt, which is consistent with CUC’s capital structure, and which benefits customers because of its lower equity to debt ratio. The appropriate weighted average cost of capital to use is 8.31%.
OPC:
The weighted average cost of capital should be no more than 6.25% in establishing the projected test year revenue requirement. Rate base and capital structure reconciliation issues identified by OPC witness Kollen should be adopted to protect customers as described at TR 1214-1224.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
The capital structure and WACC is a fall-out issue that incorporates the amounts and cost rates of the capital sources into a final WACC, also referred to as the overall ROR. FCG requested a WACC of 8.31 percent. (EXH 8, MPN K724) Initially, OPC witnesses Walters and Kollen supported an adjusted WACC of 6.32 percent in direct testimony to reflect an authorized ROE of 9.45 percent, re-price FCG direct debt to CUC’s embedded cost of 4.72 percent, eliminate acquisition goodwill solely from investor capital, and restore a $38.814 million zero-cost regulatory liability. (TR 1084, 1221-1226, 1231-1232) Subsequently, incorporating the comprehensive rate base, operating income, and expense adjustments as seen in OPC witness Schultz’s Exhibit HWS-2, Schedule D, page 1 of 2, OPC formally established its prehearing position stating that the WACC should be 6.25 percent. (EXH 66, MPN C19-867) The cost rates and amounts of the capital components are recommended in Issues 23 to 29.
In MFR Schedule G-3, page 2 of 11, FCG presented its requested projected test year capital structure based on a 13-month average as of December 31, 2027, consisting of common equity in the amount of $358,433,349 (50.14 percent), long-term debt (CUC and FCG Direct combined) in the amount of $316,731,450 (44.31 percent), and short-term debt in the amount of $39,638,250 (5.55 percent) as a percentage of investor-supplied capital. (EXH 8, MPN K724) FCG revised its requested capital component balances to reflect the inclusion of $448,472 of accumulated deferred income taxes and other rate base corrections. (FCG BR 45; EXH 143, MPN E4189-E4190) Additionally, as discussed in detail in Issue 23, FCG reflected a per-books FAS 109 regulatory liability balance of $14,715,746 associated with the TCJA, which the company proposed adjusting to $9,105,416 in its original filing through a pro rata reconciliation. (EXH 8, MPN K724; FCG BR 45) As reflected in FCG's brief, these pro-rata adjustments shifted the final requested balances of individual capital components such as reducing long-term debt to $316,522,706, short-term debt to $39,612,128, and customer deposits to $4,665,155. (FCG BR 46-48) It did not change the Company's requested 8.31 percent WACC. (FCG BR 58) The initial capital structure submitted by FCG is summarized in Table 30-1.
Table 30-1
FCG Recommended Weighted Average Cost of Capital
|
Capital Component |
Amount |
Ratio |
Cost Rate |
Weighted Cost |
|
Common Equity |
$358,433,349 |
48.28% |
11.25% |
5.43% |
|
Long-Term Debt - CUC |
$102,116,089 |
13.75% |
4.72% |
0.65% |
|
Long-Term Debt - FCG Direct |
$214,615,361 |
28.91% |
6.78% |
1.96% |
|
Short-Term Debt |
$39,638,250 |
5.34% |
4.66% |
0.25% |
|
Customer Deposits |
$4,665,303 |
0.63% |
2.64% |
0.02% |
|
Deferred Taxes |
$13,838,900 |
1.86% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
Other (FAS 109) |
$9,105,703 |
1.23% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
Total |
$742,412,956 |
100.00% |
|
8.31% |
Source: EXH 8, MPN K724.
OPC initially recommended that the Commission set FCG’s regulatory equity ratio at 44.48 percent with an ROE of 9.45 percent, resulting in an overall WACC of 6.32 percent. (TR 1232) OPC witness Walters recommended an authorized ROE of 9.45 percent within an indicated range of 9.00 percent to 9.90 percent. (TR 1084) OPC witness Kollen recommended setting FCG’s long-term and short-term debt cost rates at 4.72 percent and 4.66 percent, respectively, by eliminating the 6.78 percent direct acquisition debt. (TR 1224-1226) OPC witness Kollen also made adjustments that increased the ADIT balance and customer-supplied capital in the capital structure, including establishing a $38.814 million zero-cost regulatory liability for extinguished Section 338(h)(10) deferred taxes and adding $448,472 in common plant ADIT. (TR 1221-1223; 1231-1232) Incorporating the rate base, operating income, and expense adjustments by OPC witness Schultz as seen in Exhibit HWS-2, Schedule D, page 1 of 2, OPC stated that the WACC should be 6.25 percent. (EXH 66, MPN C19-867) OPC’s initial recommended adjusted capital structure and WACC are summarized in Table 30-2.
In its post hearing brief, OPC revised its position regarding the appropriate test-year WACC, stating it should be no more than 6.25 percent and ultimately calculating a final WACC of 6.22 percent. (OPC BR 61-63) OPC modified its recommended capital structure by arguing that due to fluctuations in CUC's financing, the Commission should not rely on a projected equity ratio and should instead adopt the last reported actual equity ratio of 49.7 percent from the December 31, 2025, ESR. (OPC BR 53) Staff disagrees with OPC’s last minute recommendation to use a historical equity ratio in a projected test year. OPC failed to cite any Commission rule or precedent that supports its new position to set the equity ratio based on historical earnings surveillance reports. Additionally, reflecting witness Schultz’s recommended rate base adjustments, OPC’s brief updated its requested debt amounts to $263,180,522 for long-term debt and $32,936,468 for short-term debt. (OPC BR 49) Incorporating this 49.7 percent equity ratio with OPC witness Walters' recommended ROE of 9.45 percent, CUC's non-acquisition long-term debt cost rate of 4.72 percent, and the restoration of customer-supplied zero-cost capital, OPC calculated a revised overall WACC of 6.22 percent. (OPC BR 63)
Table 30-2
OPC Recommended Weighted Average Cost of Capital
|
Capital Component |
Amount |
Ratio |
Cost Rate |
Weighted Cost |
|
Common Equity |
$297,831,731 |
43.94% |
9.45% |
4.15% |
|
Long-Term Debt - CUC |
$263,180,522 |
38.83% |
4.72% |
1.83% |
|
Long-Term Debt - FCG Direct |
$0 |
0.00% |
6.78% |
0.00% |
|
Short-Term Debt |
$32,936,468 |
4.86% |
4.66% |
0.23% |
|
Customer Deposits |
$7,539,606 |
1.11% |
2.64% |
0.03% |
|
Deferred Taxes |
$22,813,547 |
3.37% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
Reg Liability-Section 338 DTL |
$38,814,000 |
5.73% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
Other (FAS 109) |
$14,715,746 |
2.17% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
Total |
$677,831,620 |
100.00% |
|
6.25% |
Source: EXH 66, MPN C19-867.
Acquisition Goodwill Adjustment
One of the more contentious issues in this case is how the acquisition goodwill is removed from the capital structure. Acquisition goodwill is the amount of the purchase price paid by CUC to FPL less the net book value of the assets included in the sale. The amount of goodwill recorded on CUC’s books for the 2027 projected test year was $440,416,939. (EXH 8, MPN K647) FCG included this amount in its regulatory per books balance for the capital structure and rate base. (TR 1216; EXH 8, MPN K647-648) FCG specifically included a line item for goodwill in the plant balance (rate base) on MFR Schedule G-1, page 7, line 7; and removed it through a specific adjustment on MFR Schedule G-1, page 4, line 7. (EXH 8, K643, K647) However, FCG’s capitalization balance sheet on MFR Schedule G-1, page 8, did not include any of the capital components that comprise the requested capital structure, nor any adjustment to specifically remove the goodwill from the capitalization. All the capital from CUC is recorded as “Accounts Payable to Associated Companies” in the amount of $1,176,744,603 on line 12. (EXH 8, K648)
The first effect of this error was to overstate the per books rate base and the FCG capitalization before the specific and pro rata adjustments to reduce the per books financial capitalization to the regulatory capitalization (equal to the rate base amount) as shown on MFR Schedule G-3, page 2. (TR 1216; EXH 8, MPN K724) In its filing, FCG made an adjustment to remove the amount of the acquisition goodwill from the 2027 projected capital structure balance on a pro rata basis over all sources of capital which includes FCG-specific customer deposits, ADITs, and the FAS 109 deferred tax regulatory liability. (TR 1215) The Company’s pro rata adjustment assumed that the goodwill amount created by CUC’s purchase of FCG was financed on a pro rata basis over FCG’s regulatory capital structure which included FCG customer supplied capital. (TR 1214-1215) Witness Kollen testified, the correct approach is to remove the acquisition goodwill from the capital structure over the capitalization components that were used to finance the transaction and resulting goodwill, and not from the overall regulatory capitalization, which includes capitalization components that were not used to finance the acquisition goodwill. (OPC BR 52, 62; TR 1217) OPC witness Kollen recommended that the goodwill should be removed from the 2027 projected test year over only investor sources (common equity, long-term debt, and short-term debt). The effect of this adjustment decreases the WACC by 33 basis points, all else equal. (OPC BR 62; TR 1216, EXH 157, MPN E7243-E7244)
FCG objected to witness Kollen’s proposed method to remove the goodwill. (TR 1603) FCG witness Russell contended that the adjustment misunderstands the mechanics of MFR Schedule G-3, and if made, would understate the level of investor funding and improperly reduce the WACC. (TR 1603) Witness Russell testified that the pro rata adjustment applied to all the components in the capital structure is consistent with the Company’s prior rate cases. (TR 1603) In FCG’s last rate case, the Company was owned by FPL and did not include a goodwill adjustment in its regulatory balance sheet or capitalization. Witness Russell testified that if witness Kollen’s adjustment was made to remove the acquisition goodwill from only investor-supplied capital, a corresponding adjustment should be made to reflect the acquisition financing at the time of the transaction (November 2023). (OPC BR 52; TR 1603) In his rebuttal testimony, witness Russell recalculated OPC witness Kollen’s goodwill adjustment. (TR 1603-1605; Exhibit 84, MPN D11-324, Table 4) In his calculations, witness Russell removed the acquisition goodwill based on the ratios of the sources of capital CUC used to purchase FCG in November 2023. (TR 1602-1603; EXH 84, MPN D11-324) Those ratios are 39.25 percent common equity, 23.32 percent CUC debt, 33.56 percent FCG-Direct debt, and 3.87 percent short-term debt. (EXH 84, MPN D11-327) FCG’s proposed alternative adjustment would increase its requested regulatory equity ratio from 48.28 percent to 53.49 percent, resulting in a 59-basis point increase of the weighted cost of equity. (EXH 84, MPN D11-327)
Staff disagrees with FCG witness Russell’s “corrected” adjustment. First, as stated previously, FCG removed the acquisition goodwill from the capital structure pro rata over all sources in its proposed 2027 projected test year without recognizing the “acquisition financing incurred [by CUC] at the time of the transaction” in the capital structure. (TR 1603) Second, staff agrees with OPC witness Kollen that the acquisition goodwill should have been removed from the per books balance prior to any other adjustments made in the 2027 projected capital structure. (TR 1217) The acquisition goodwill is already included on CUC’s books and records and should not be flowed down to FCG’s regulatory books unless approved by the Commission. Including the acquisition goodwill in FCG’s per books capital structure balance and then removing it pro rata over all sources of capital reduces the FCG customer-supplied capital sources (ADITs, customer deposits, FAS 109 regulatory liability) by 36.70 percent, and consequently, increases the WACC by 18 basis points.
Because FCG does not issue its own debt or equity and relies on CUC for the entirety of its capital, a reasonable hypothetical capital structure must be developed for regulatory purposes. Staff believes a reasonable methodology for developing a per books capital structure is to use FCG’s customer deposits and deferred taxes and allocate investor sources of capital using CUC’s 2027 projected percentages of investor capital. Subsequently, all capital structure adjustments should be made on a pro rata basis unless there is a justifiable reason to adjust a specific capital structure component. After development of the reasonable hypothetical capital structure, the per books capitalization is $759,432,284. As noted above, staff reconciled the rate base amount of $701,147,491 to the capital structure by first recognizing the amounts of the FCG created capital (customer deposits, deferred taxes, FAS 109 regulatory liability). Staff then applied the investor sources of capital in the ratios that match CUC’s investment in FCG as described below.
Based on staff’s recommendation in Issues 23 through 29, staff recommends a capital structure consisting of 50.14 percent common equity, 44.31 percent long-term debt, and 5.55 percent short-term debt as a percentage of investor sources be approved for the 13-month average projected test year ending December 31, 2027. The result is a weighted average cost of capital of 7.37 percent as summarized in Tables 30-3 and 30-4.
Table 30-3
Staff Recommended Weighted Average Cost of Capital
|
Capital Component |
Staff Per Books Balance |
Specific Adjustments |
Per Books Adjusted |
Pro rata Adjustment |
|
Common Equity |
$358,427,182 |
($224,883) |
$358,202,299 |
$(27,482,064) |
|
Long-Term Debt - CUC |
$316,747,106 |
($219,827) |
$316,527,279 |
$(24,284,665) |
|
Short-Term Debt |
$39,637,569 |
($24,869) |
$39,612,700 |
$(3,039,173) |
|
Customer Deposits |
$7,539,606 |
$0 |
$7,539,606 |
$(578,455) |
|
Deferred Taxes |
$22,365,075 |
$448,472 |
$22,813,547 |
$(1,750,305) |
|
Other (FAS 109) |
$14,715,746 |
$0 |
$14,715,746 |
$(1,129,024) |
|
Total |
$759,432,284 |
($21,107) |
$759,411,177 |
$(58,263,686) |
Source: Staff Analysis.
Table 30-4
Staff Recommended Weighted Average Cost of Capital
|
Capital Component |
Staff Adjusted |
Ratio |
Cost Rate |
Weighted Cost |
|
Common Equity |
$330,720,235 |
47.17% |
10.50% |
4.95% |
|
Long-Term Debt – CUC consolidated |
$292,242,614 |
41.68% |
5.15% |
2.15% |
|
Long-Term Debt - FCG Direct |
$0 |
0.00% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
Short-Term Debt |
$36,573,527 |
5.22% |
4.66% |
0.24% |
|
Customer Deposits |
$6,961,151 |
0.99% |
2.64% |
0.03% |
|
Deferred Taxes |
$21,063,242 |
3.00% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
Other (FAS 109) |
$13,586,722 |
1.94% |
0.00% |
0.00% |
|
Total |
$701,147,491 |
100.00% |
|
7.37% |
Source: Staff Analysis.
CONCLUSION
A capital structure consisting of 50.14 percent common equity, 44.31 percent long-term debt, and 5.55 percent short-term debt as a percentage of investor sources should be approved for the 13-month average test year ending December 31, 2027. A weighted average cost of capital of 7.37 percent should be approved for establishing FCG’s 2027 projected test year revenue requirement.
Has FCG properly removed Purchased Gas Adjustment and Natural Gas Conservation Cost Recovery Clause revenues, expenses, and taxes-other-than-income from the 2027 projected test year? If not, what adjustments, if any, should be made?
Recommendation:
Yes. The Company has properly removed the Purchased Gas Adjustment and Natural Gas Conservation Cost Recovery Clause revenues, expenses, and taxes-other-than-income (TOTI) from the 2027 projected test year. (Prewett, Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. FCG has properly removed Purchased Gas Adjustment and Natural Gas Conservation Cost Recovery Clause revenues, expenses, and taxes-other-than income from the projected test year.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This issue addresses whether revenues and expenses recovered through the PGA and Natural Gas Conservation Cost Recovery Clause (NGCCR) have been properly excluded from FCG’s 2027 projected test year for purposes of establishing base rates. These costs are recovered through separate cost recovery mechanisms, and therefore the associated revenues, expenses, and TOTI should be removed from the projected test year to avoid their inclusion in base rates.
FCG witness Napier stated the Company accounts for such clause-related revenues and expenses through separate dockets not associated with base rates. (EXH 167, MPN F2-295) For the 2027 projected test year in this proceeding, FCG removed $58,252,837 in PGA revenues and $6,069,632 in conservation revenues. The Company also removed $57,961,292 in PGA expenses and $6,039,255 in conservation expenses. (EXH 8, MPN K672)
FCG reflected corresponding reductions to TOTI of $291,545 related to PGA revenues and $30,377 related to conservation revenues. (EXH 8, MPN K673) Purchased gas revenues were projected using the PGA cap recovery factor in effect as of January 1, 2026. For purposes of the rate case, FCG assumed that purchased gas costs would be fully recovered through corresponding PGA revenues and excluded both the purchased gas revenues and related expenses from rate case revenues and expenses. (EXH 8, MPN K740)
OPC stated that FCG has not made the proper adjustments and has proposed adjustments of their own, although its witnesses did not offer testimony or exhibits on this issue supporting its position. (TR 1345) FEA has provided no specific position on this issue.
Staff reviewed FCG's proposed adjustments contained in MFR Schedule G-2, pages 1 through 3. The purpose of these adjustments is to remove revenues and expenses that are recovered through the PGA and NGCCR mechanisms from the revenues and expenses used to establish base rates.
For the 2027 projected test year, FCG projected PGA revenues of $58,252,837. The Company removed the corresponding PGA expense of $57,961,292 and $291,545 of associated TOTI. The PGA expense and associated TOTI total $58,252,837 fully offsets the PGA revenue removed from the projected test year.
Similarly, FCG projected conservation revenues of $6,069,632. The Company removed $6,039,255 of conservation expenses and $30,377 of associated TOTI. The conservation expense and associated TOTI total $6,069,632, which fully offsets the conservation revenue removed from the projected test year.
Based on staff's review of MFR Schedule G-2 (EXH 8, MPN K673) and the supporting assumptions in MFR Schedule G-6, (EXH 8, MPN K738-K741) the Company's adjustments properly remove the PGA and NGCCR revenues, expenses, and associated TOTI from the 2027 projected test year. Staff therefore recommends that no additional adjustment is necessary.
CONCLUSION
The Company has properly removed the PGA and NGCCR revenues, expenses, and TOTI from the 2027 projected test year. No adjustments are necessary.
Has FCG made the appropriate adjustment to Net Operating Income to remove amounts associated with the transfer of SAFE investments as of December 31, 2026, from clause recovery to base rates? If not, what adjustments, if any, should be made?
Recommendation:
Yes, FCG has made the appropriate adjustment to Net Operating Income (NOI) to remove amounts associated with the transfer of SAFE investments as of December 31, 2026, from clause recovery to base rates. (Byrne, Prewett)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. Consistent with Order No. PSC-2015-0390-TRF-GU, FCG has made the appropriate adjustments to Net Operating Income to reflect the transfer of SAFE investments as of December 31, 2026, from clause recovery to base rates.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG has demonstrated that the appropriate adjustments have been made to NOI to remove amounts associated with the transfer of SAFE investments. OPC did not propose any additional adjustments.
FCG requested $16,402,944 of total rate base increase in association with the transfer of SAFE investments as of December 31, 2026, from clause recovery to base rates. (TR 589; EXH 2, MPN K9) This is consistent with the initial Order No. PSC-2015-0390-TRF-GU approving SAFE. (TR 589) Since the approval of this order, issued September 15, 2015, FCG has transferred SAFE program balances into base rates twice, once as a result of the Settlement approved by Order No. PSC-2018-0190-FOF-GU issued April 20, 2018, and again by Order No. 2023-0177-FOF-GU, issued June 9, 2023. (TR 714-715) FCG argued that it has made the appropriate adjustments to NOI to reflect the transfer of $16.4 million in SAFE investments again as of December 31, 2026, from clause recovery to base rates. (TR 367)
FCG made several adjustments to NOI to reflect the transfer of SAFE investments, eliminating SAFE-related amounts of $8,449,987 from operating revenues, $872,036 from depreciation expense, $1,352,229 from TOTI, $1,235,494 from federal income taxes, and $342,415 from state income taxes. (EXH 4, MPN K49-K50) FCG also included the SAFE property tax transfer of $2,207,649 into base rates. (EXH 8, MPN K673)
No parties contested that FCG appropriately reflected adjustments to NOI based on the transfer of SAFE investments as of December 31, 2026. This issue was not included in OPC’s briefs. Staff has no further adjustments to NOI based on the removal of amounts associated with the transfer of SAFE investments as of December 31, 2026, from clause recovery to base rates.
CONCLUSION
Staff has reviewed the specific
adjustments made by FCG and concludes that FCG has made the appropriate
adjustments to NOI to remove amounts associated with the transfer of SAFE
investments from clause recovery to base rates as of December 31, 2026.
Should the projected test year O&M expenses be adjusted to reflect changes to the non-labor trend factors for inflation and customer growth?
Recommendation:
No. Staff believes no adjustment to FCG’s projected test year O&M expenses is needed to reflect changes to the non-labor trend factors for inflation and customer growth. The Company used reasonable estimates of inflation (CPI-U) and customer growth to estimate test year non-labor O&M expenses. Additionally, staff recommends no adjustments to FCG’s estimate of self-insurance reserve accrual or the injuries and damages insurance expense in the 2027 projected test year. (Prewett, Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
No. The Company has applied appropriate trend factors to the trended accounts and has made sure that the applications of these factors have produced reasonable results. It appropriately direct projected insurance costs with input from its broker and believes the appropriate self-insurance reserve accrual is $502,739.
OPC:
O&M expenses should reflect the reasonable and prudent costs to serve its own customers without reference to the experience of peers. The Commission should consider the magnitude of cost increases in the brief period the Company has been under CUC ownership that are not due to inflation and customer growth.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This issue addresses whether FCG’s projected test year O&M expenses should be adjusted to reflect changes in the non-labor trend factors used for inflation and customer growth. FCG projected certain non-payroll O&M expenses by applying inflation, customer growth, or a combination of the two to normalized 2025 expenses. (EXH 8, MPN K705) Also, because certain insurance expense increases are projected to uniquely exceed inflation for the 2026 and test year 2027, FCG’s self-insurance reserve accrual and injuries and damages insurance expense are addressed in this issue. (TR 502, 582, 584)
FCG’s methodology for projecting non-payroll O&M expenses starts with FCG’s separation of projected O&M expenses into payroll and non-payroll components. The Company projected non-payroll expenses using the historic year as a starting point, and then trended those expenses with an appropriate trend factor or directly projected the expense using the expertise of internal managers. FCG separately projected those expenses for which management determined the application of the general trend factors would not adequately reflect expected costs. (EXH 8, MPN K705) This methodology and application of trend factors used for non-payroll O&M expenses are consistent with prior rate proceedings. (TR 580-583)
FCG witness Baugh argued that its original estimates of non-labor trend factors are reasonable for use in this case, and no adjustment is necessary because all the estimations of CPI-U were based on the best estimates available when the projected test year was developed, and any changes would still be estimates. The Company asserted that it applied the trend factors appropriate to each O&M account and reviewed the resulting expenses for reasonableness. (FCG BR 59)
The trend factors used by FCG applied variably to its expense accounts are several, including factors for inflation only, customer growth only, and the combination of inflation and customer growth. FCG featured an inflation factor of 1.0247 and a customer growth factor of 1.0184 for 2026, with cumulative factors of 1.0502 and 1.0385, respectively, through 2027. The combination factor of inflation and customer growth was 1.0435 and 1.0906 for 2026 and 2027. (EXH 8, MPN K705)
FCG further stated that certain expenses were directly projected rather than trended by the factors noted above when management determined that the general trend factors would not adequately reflect expected costs. These expenses include property insurance, injuries and damages insurance, regulatory commission expense, bad debt, and rent. FCG maintained that insurance costs are expected to increase at rates greater than general inflation and, therefore, the Company directly projected those expenses based on anticipated premiums, recent renewal experience, and market conditions. (EXH 8, MPN K740)
OPC did not offer testimony or exhibits on the topic of applying inflation and growth trend factors to O&M expenses. OPC took a position on this issue that FCG’s O&M expenses should reflect the reasonable and prudent costs necessary to serve FCG’s customers and should not be justified by reference to the experience of peer utilities. Instead, OPC stated that the Commission should consider the magnitude of FCG’s cost increases, occurring since the time the Company came under CUC ownership, that are not attributable to inflation or customer growth. (OPC BR 63) FEA did not assert a position on this issue.
Staff considered OPC’s concern regarding increases in O&M expenses following CUC’s acquisition of FCG. FCG performed an analysis of costs per customer following its acquisition by CUC, which indicated that FCG’s costs per customer were generally consistent with those of its peer utilities. Except as it may pertain to the self-insurance reserve accrual and injuries and damages insurance expense, staff believes OPC’s concerns regarding cost increases for specified expenses impacted by non-trend factors are reasonably addressed by the examination of such expenses in other expense-related issues, such as Issues 41-43. A re-estimation/adjustment of inflation or customer growth factors would not directly address expenses that were causally linked to other factors or that were directly projected rather than trended.
Staff reviewed the inflation and customer growth trend factors FCG used to project O&M expenses for 2026 and 2027. FCG relied upon inflation trend factors of 2.47 percent for 2026 and 2.49 percent for 2027 in developing its projected O&M expenses, which it obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics in December 2025. (EXH 90, MPN E56-57) During this proceeding, FCG also provided updated CPI-U inflation forecasts for both years in May 2026 from the same source. The updated CPI-U forecast was 3.5 percent for 2026 and 2.46 percent for 2027. Thus, the 2.47 percent inflation factor used by FCG for 2026 is below the Company’s subsequently updated CPI-U forecast of 3.5 percent, while the 2.49 percent inflation factor used for 2027 is generally consistent with the updated CPI-U forecast of 2.46 percent. (EXH 4, MPN K92; EXH 8, MPN K705)
Staff also reviewed FCG’s projected customer growth factors of 1.84 percent for 2026 and 1.97 percent for 2027. These projected growth rates were compared with FCG’s actual customer growth experienced during the four-year period from 2022 through 2025 and are within the range (1.82 percent to 2.10 percent) of the Company’s historical customer growth over that period and are consistent with staff’s recommendation in Issue 2. (EXH 126, MPN E3050)
Last, staff also reviewed how FCG applied its trend factors to individual O&M expenses. These schedules identify the portions of each FERC account that were projected using inflation, customer growth, or a combination of inflation and customer growth, as well as expenses that were directly projected rather than trended. Staff believes the trend factors were appropriately applied because the factor selected for each expense generally reflects the underlying cost driver. Expenses expected to vary primarily with general price changes were trended for inflation, while expenses expected to be affected by changes in the number of customers were trended with a combination of customer growth and inflation. Where FCG determined that general trend factors would not reasonably reflect expected future costs, the Company separately projected those expenses using specific information. (EXH 8, MPN K701-705)
Based on the comparison of the inflation and customer growth factors used to develop the Company’s projected O&M expenses with FCG’s subsequently updated CPI-U forecasts, as well as the comparison of projected customer growth with the Company’s recent historical customer growth, staff believes the trend factors were appropriately applied to O&M expenses, and FCG’s inflation and customer growth assumptions are reasonable for purposes of developing the 2027 projected test year.
Regarding the insurance topics addressed in this issue, FCG requested in its initial filing injury and damages expense of $2,592,499 in its 2027 projected test year based upon estimates with the Company’s insurance broker, not solely based on the inflation trend. (FCG BR 61; TR 584) FCG witness Russell further testified that the expense amount included in the 2027 projected injury and damages expense was determined by underwriting conditions, claim severity trends, litigation trends, coverage structures, deductible levels, claim and reinsurance capacity, and the overall risk profile being insured. (TR 1617-1618) Witness Russell continued that the Company expects that insurance premiums will continue to increase at rates higher than inflation and therefore, the Company will directly project insurance premium expense. (FCG BR 61; TR 505-506) Witness Russell also testified that the Company’s self-insurance reserve has not been adequate to account for the expense of actual claims. (FCG BR 61; TR 505-506) Witness Russell asserted that the shortfall was due partly to additional eligible expenses that can be charged to the Company’s self-insurance policy, including charges within the deductible level, charges exceeding policy limits, or charges outside the scope of coverage. (FCG BR 61; TR 505-506) OPC did not argue the injuries and damages insurance expense or the self-insurance accrual in its brief under Issue 33, but OPC did mention its recommendation under Issue 43 in its brief. (OPC BR 82) Staff will include OPC’s argument in Issue 33. OPC witness Schultz recommended an allowed injuries and damages insurance expense of $1,223,650. (TR 1382-1383) Witness Schultz calculated his adjustment based on the actual expense from 2021 escalated by the Company’s inflation factor from 2021 to 2027. (TR 1382-1383) As such, staff recognizes that insurance costs have increased past that of inflation and agrees that FCG properly estimated its insurance expense by a direct projection. Therefore, staff does not recommend any further adjustment to FCG’s requested injuries and damages insurance expense or self-insurance reserve accrual.
CONCLUSION
No adjustment to FCG’s projected test year O&M expenses is needed to reflect changes to the non-labor trend factors for inflation and customer growth. FCG used CPI-U and customer growth to estimate test year non-labor O&M expenses. Additionally, staff recommends no adjustments to FCG’s estimate of self-insurance reserve accrual or the injuries and damages insurance expense in the 2027 projected test year.
What amount of 2027 projected test year Uncollectible Accounts and Bad Debt should be included in the Revenue Expansion Factor?
Recommendation:
The appropriate 2027 amount of Uncollectible or Bad Debt expense for the 2027 projected test year is $600,441, and the appropriate bad debt rate of 0.3288 percent should be included in the revenue expansion factor. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of bad debt expense is $600,441, and 0.3288% is the appropriate rate to be included in the revenue expansion factor. The Company appropriately used a five-year average bad debt expense to revenues ratio in computing its proposed bad debt rate in the revenue expansion factor.
OPC:
Uncollectible or bad debt expense for the 2027 projected test year should be $420,281 which results in a reduction of $180,160. The Bad Debt rate to include in the NOI Multiplier for the 2027 projected test year should be 0.2301%.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG stated that the appropriate amount of bad debt expense is $600,441, and the appropriate bad debt rate of 0.3288 percent should be included in the revenue expansion factor. (TR 578; EXH 8, MPN K696, MPN K705, MPN K707, MPN K736) FCG projected bad debt expense by utilizing a 5-year historical average methodology. (TR 578; TR 1772-1773)
OPC witness Schultz argued that the Company’s request for $600,441 ignored the historical three-year average net write-offs are $321,013, and that the Company’s requested expense is based on expensed amounts rather than actual net write-offs. (TR 1395-1396). Witness Schultz continued that the issue with using expensed amounts rather than actual net write-offs is the expensed amount reflects an accrual on estimated expense, which greatly exceeds the actual net write-offs. (TR 1396) Consequently, customers are being asked to absorb costs that are substantially higher than the standard actual bad debt write-off. (TR 1396) Witness Schultz suggested the actual historical write-offs should serve as the benchmark for rate-setting, rather than estimated accruals. (TR 1396) Witness Schultz raised concerns with the Company’s methodology of using a 5-year historical average, and questioned that the Company claimed historic information prior to the month of December 2023 was unavailable; the five-year historical average used to determine the Company’s request included information from 2021, 2022, and 2023. (TR 1395-1396) OPC recommended applying a three-year average net write off rate of 0.23 percent to the Company’s forecasted revenue of $182,641,677. (TR 1397) This would result in an uncollectible or bad debt expense for the 2027 projected test year of $420,281, a reduction of $180,160. (TR 1397)
FCG witness Galtman argued in rebuttal testimony the 5-year average used to determine the Company’s request is consistent with the methodology approved by the Commission by Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, in Docket 20220067-GU. (TR 1772-1773) Witness Galtman further explained, that there was a $639,004 correction to bad debt expense in the historic base year, made to accurately reflect the reported 2025 bad debt expense of $550,570. (TR 1772-1773) In response to OPC’s position, witness Galtman clarified the 2023 to 2025 time period should not be viewed as a normalized baseline for bad debt expense, as it was impacted by the CUC operational transition and the 1CX implementation and stabilization for FCG. (TR 1773) During this time period, disconnections were temporarily suspended, and certain write-offs were postponed to allow customer billing and collection processes to stabilize. (TR 1773) These conditions skew the overall write-off trend, making this time period an inadequate standalone benchmark for forecasting ongoing uncollectible expense. (TR 1773)
Staff reviewed the bad debt expense used to calculate the bad debt rate in the Company’s MFRs, and the testimony provided by witness Schultz and witness Galtman and agrees with the Company that the appropriate amount of uncollectible or bad debt expense is $600,441 with a bad debt rate of 0.3288 percent. FCG’s 5-year average methodology for determining its projected test year uncollectible and bad debt expense is consistent with the Commission’s past approval in Docket No. 20220067-GU for FPUC, and FCG has provided the proper justification for the bad debt expense during the time period from 2023 to 2025 during the Company’s transition into CUC’s operations. For these reasons, staff is not recommending any adjustments the Company’s proposed uncollectible or bad debt expense for the 2027 projected test year.
CONCLUSION
As stated above, staff recommends no adjustments to the Uncollectible or Bad Debt expense for the 2027 projected test year. The appropriate amount of Uncollectible or Bad Debt expense for the 2027 projected test year should be $600,441, and the appropriate bad debt rate of 0.3288 percent should be included in the revenue expansion factor.
Has FCG made the appropriate adjustments to remove all non-utility activities from operation expenses, including depreciation and amortization expense? If not, what adjustments, if any, should be made?
Recommendation:
Yes. FCG has made the appropriate adjustments to remove all non-utility activities from operation expenses, including depreciation and amortization expense. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
FCG does not have any non-utility investments and, therefore, adjustments were not required.
OPC:
No. Chesapeake Utilities Parent Company (CU) and Florida Public Utilities Parent Company (FU) expenses are caused by or incurred for the benefit of only the affiliates but are improperly allocated to FCG. This effectively places non-utility activity costs on the FCG regulated books. Expenses should be reduced at least $597,000.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG stated that it is the Company’s accounting policy to allocate costs to the business units that incurred the cost or the business units that benefited. (EXH 102, MPN E319; FCG BR 64-65) FCG stated that it does not have any non-utility investments and therefore no adjustments are required. (EXH 102, MPN E319; EXH 112, MPN E1284; FCG BR 64-65)
The OPC argued that the parent company, CUC, and FPUC, expenses are caused by or incurred for the benefit of only the affiliates but are improperly allocated to FCG. (OPC BR 66-67) Thereby including non-utility activity expenses on FCG’s financial statements. (OPC BR 66-67) OPC witness Kollen recalculated the Distrigas allocations to include CUC, resulting in a reduction to affiliate expenses in the amount of $596,946. (TR 1243-1244; EXH 66, C19-850) FCG witness Navo contested that CUC has utilized the modified Distrigas formula for many years and it allocates corporate costs based on three equally weighted factors; gross plant, operating income before interest and income taxes, and labor costs, at the operating business unit’s level. (TR 1546-1547) Furthermore, witness Navo stated the modified Distrigas formula is designed to allocate costs among operating business units, and CUC, as the parent company, is not itself an operating business unit. Including CUC separately would result in double-counting operating plant, labor, and earnings already reflected in its subsidiaries, thereby distorting the allocation factors. (TR 1547) Witness Navo continued to explain that FPUC, as a corporate entity, does not receive corporate services from CUC separate from those provided to its electric and natural gas divisions. (TR 1547) Accordingly, a separate allocation to the FPUC parent company would duplicate costs already allocated to the operating divisions and result in double-counting. (TR 1547) Furthermore, witness Navo stated that the cost allocation manual is appropriately structured, transparent, consistent with FERC-approved methodology, and aligned with the Commission’s prior practice for CUC’s Florida-regulated affiliates. (TR 1547) As such, staff agrees that FCG appropriately allocated affiliate expense and no further adjustment is necessary to remove non-utility activities.
As discussed in Issue 18, OPC witness Kollen recommended a reduction to plant in service based on his recalculation of the modified Distrgas allocations, which resulted in a $59,059 reduction to depreciation and amortization expense. (TR 1221-1222; EXH 66, C19-850) Staff agrees with FCG’s methodology to allocate common plant among the operating entities that benefited from the associated assets and services and to not include allocation to non-operating parent companies. Based on staff’s previous recommendation of recognizing FCG’s allocation methods, no further adjustments are required.
CONCLUSION
FCG has made the appropriate
adjustments to remove all non-utility activities from operation expenses,
including depreciation and amortization expense.
Are there any transaction costs associated with the acquisition of FCG by CUC included in the projected test year? If so, what adjustments, if any, should the Commission make to the 2027 test year?
Recommendation:
No. There are no transaction costs associated with the acquisition of FCG by CUC included in the 2027 projected test year. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
No. There are no transaction costs associated with the acquisition of FCG by CUC included in the 2027 projected test year.
OPC:
Yes. These costs are residually included in the rate base and should be removed through the recognition of a regulatory liability as described in Issue 19.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
As discussed previously in Issue 19, FCG witness Galtman testified that the transaction costs were not recorded in FCG’s financial statements and not reported for regulatory purposes. (TR 1753-1754) Witness Galtman asserted that transaction costs were incurred in 2023 and 2024 to finalize the acquisition of FCG from FPL and were included in CUC’s consolidated financial disclosures for investor reporting. (TR 1752-1754; FCG BR 65) Further, FCG stated in its briefs that its MFRs did not include transaction costs for 2025, 2026, or 2027. (FCG BR 65)
However, in response to Staff Interrogatory No. 214, FCG noted that there were $563,000 of transaction costs mis-categorized as transition costs, $90,000 in 2023 and $473,000 in 2024. (EXH 108, MPN E503; FCG BR 65) Witness Galtman clarified that it was due to a reporting error that duplicated costs for nonrecurring transition expense and the transaction expense; however, the expenses were only recorded once on financial statements. (FCG BR 65, TR 1813-1814) Therefore, FCG argued that no adjustments were necessary to remove transaction costs from the 2027 projected test year. (FCG BR 65)
OPC argued that the proposed RSAM correction liability as discussed in Issue 19 should be approved by the Commission in order to remove transaction costs that are residually included in rate base. (OPC BR 67-68) OPC argued that FCG did not meet its burden of proof to demonstrate that transaction costs were not included in the 2027 test year. (OPC BR 68) OPC continued that in discovery responses the Company did not provide a clear definition of the terms transition and transaction and what those costs included. (OPC BR 68) However, in response to Staff’s Interrogatory No. 214, FCG provided a detailed breakdown of the transaction and transition costs. (EXH EXH 108, MPN E503-E506) In witness Galtman’s rebuttal testimony, he further clarified that FCG recognized transaction costs and transition cost either recurring or non-recurring. (TR 1752-1753) Witness Galtman continued that transaction costs include costs associated with evaluating, negotiating, structuring, financing, obtaining approvals, and closing the acquisition, while transition costs are costs incurred to operate, stabilize, and integrate FCG into CUC’s operation. (TR 1753)
OPC stated that FCG had to record all regulated costs on FCG’s financial statements. (OPC BR 70) However, OPC noted that in published CUC investor information, that at the transactions close the financial positions and results of operations of FCG will be included with CUC’s regulated energy segment. (EXH 73, MPN C19-2895; OPC BR 69) OPC maintained that FCG did not provide where the costs were recorded or produce journal entries. (OPC BR 70) In response to Staff’s Interrogatory No. 216, witness Galtman stated that transaction costs totaling $14.5 million were reflected within operating expenses and interest expenses in the consolidated statement of income in the 2023 Form 10K. (EXH 108, MPN E508-E510)
In OPC’s brief, it raised concern that FCG may at a future filing request recovery of the acquisition related expenses. (OPC BR 73; TR 1804-1806) During the hearing, witness Galtman testified that there is in fact a possibility that FCG could request recovery of the transaction costs in a subsequent filing, if FCG could meet the five-factor test and reflect a customer benefit. (TR 1804-1806; OPC BR 73)
In its brief, OPC argued that the Starnik costs should be considered as acquisition costs because they resulted from the early termination, rather that an determination that the system was unusable. (OPC BR 74) OPC referred to FCG witness Bhatwadeker’s testimony during the hearing where he stated that Starnik was useful and performed the functionality of accurately billing customers. (TR 454; OPC BR 74) However, during the hearing, witness Bhatwadeker stated that Starnik was a stand-alone customer billing system and within CUC’s SAP platform it was more difficult to integrate. (TR 453) Furthermore, witness Bhatwadeker testified that FCG moving to the 1CX platform was a necessity. (TR 429) The benefits of 1CX compared to Starnik are discussed further in Issue 6.
Staff reviewed the $563,000 identified in response to Staff Interrogatory No. 214 as transaction costs miscategorized as transition costs. Witness Galtman’s explanation that the costs were recorded only once addresses the duplication in reporting, but the relevant inquiry is whether those costs affected FCG’s regulatory operating results or RSAM calculations. Based on testimony provided and Exhibit 108, MPN E504-E506, staff verified that these costs did not affect FCG’s regulatory operating results and RSAM calculations. The Company would not have earned over their authorized range given the information and staff does not believe an adjustment is necessary. Accordingly, the reporting error did not result in a residual effect on the 2027 projected test-year rate base and does not warrant an adjustment in this issue or through OPC’s proposed RSAM correction liability in Issue 19.
As discussed in Issue 19, staff does not recommend the RSAM correction liability and staff agrees that FCG did not include transaction costs in the 2027 projected test year. As such, staff does not recommend any adjustments to the 2027 projected test year to remove transaction costs.
CONCLUSION
There are no transaction costs associated with the acquisition of FCG by CUC included in the 2027 projected test year.
How should the Commission treat costs, if any, included in the test year representing the costs of transition, integration, and rebranding associated with CUC’s December 1, 2023, acquisition of FCG? What adjustments, if any, should the Commission make to the 2027 test year to account for the costs of transition, integration, and rebranding associated with CUC’s acquisition of FCG?
Recommendation:
Staff agrees that FCG has made the appropriate adjustments to remove transition costs from the 2027 projected test year associated with the December 2023 acquisition of FCG. Therefore, staff recommends no adjustments to the 2027 projected test year to account for transition costs associated with CUC’s acquisition of FCG. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Transition costs, which FCG interprets to include integration and rebranding, are costs incurred to operate, stabilize, and integrate FCG into its parent, CUC’s operations. FCG has not included any transition, integration and rebranding costs associated with CUC’s 2023 acquisition of FCG in the 2027 projected test year. Additionally, FCG appropriately utilized the RSAM in both 2023 or 2024. Therefore, no adjustment to the 2027 projected test year is necessary.
OPC:
All costs included in the 2027 test year for the transition, integration, and rebranding associated with CUC’s December 1, 2023, acquisition of FCG should be removed. “But for” transition, integration, and rebranding costs that would not be incurred or included in the test year absent the Commission’s consideration of an acquisition adjustment should be excluded from any recovery from customers. Such consideration or approval would be tantamount to approval of an acquisition adjustment that is not being requested at this time.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
As previously discussed in Issue 19, FCG witness Galtman asserted that transition costs were necessary to main day-to-day operations after the acquisition of FCG from FPL. (TR 1754-1755) Additionally, FCG stated that it interprets transition cost to include integration and rebranding costs. (FCG BR 66; TR 1754) FCG stated that transition costs were included in the historic year, the costs were subsequently removed for trending the O&M for the 2027 projected test year. (EXH 8, MPN K706) Additionally, if FCG would have excluded the transition costs it would negate that they were necessary in order for FCG to continue its ongoing operations. (FCG BR 66; TR 1749, 1756, 1757, 1794) In FCG’s briefs, it explained that the 2004 AGLR acquisition and the merger of FPUC and CUC did include transition costs that were recorded and deferred for consideration in a subsequent proceeding. (FCG BR 67) Additionally, concerning the 2004 AGLR acquisition, a regulatory asset was created regatrding the merger of FPUC and CUC. CUC was allowed to record the regulatory assets because it agreed to adjust its books and records based upon the outcome of a future proceeding.[38] (FCG BR 67) As addressed in Issue 19 and above, FCG maintained that it has not included any transition costs associated with the 2023 acquisition of FCG in the 2027 projected test year. (FCG BR 68)
OPC argued that the transition costs should not be included in any form of recovery from customers. (OPC BR 75) OPC continued that the transition costs should travel with the acquisition and only be approved for recovery if FCG requested an acquisition adjustment. In this proceeding, FCG has not requested an acquisition adjustment. (OPC BR 75)
As addressed in Issue 19, staff agrees with the inclusion of transition costs, considered to be necessary for day-to-day operations, and allowed to be included for recovery through the RSAM. This is because of the nature of the services provided, rather than solely on whether the costs arose from the acquisition. Accordingly, staff does not agree that those operating costs required approval of an acquisition adjustment before being reflected in regulatory operating results.
Additionally, staff reviewed the adjustments reflected in Exhibit 8, MPN K706, and finds that FCG removed the historical acquisition-related transition costs in the 2027 projected test year, and thus, staff agrees that FCG made the appropriate adjustments. Based on these adjustments and the treatment addressed in Issue 19, staff recommends that no further adjustments are required to the 2027 projected test concerning transition costs.
CONCLUSION
Staff agrees that FCG has made the appropriate adjustments to remove transition costs from the 2027 projected test year associated with the December 2023 acquisition of FCG. Therefore, staff recommends no adjustments to the 2027 projected test year to account for transition costs associated with CUC’s acquisition of FCG.
What amount of employee full time equivalent additions should be included in the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
FCG has requested recovery of 246 full time equivalents (FTEs) for the projected average at the year end of 2027. Staff recommends reducing FTEs by two, for the AMI Analysts, based on staff’s recommended removal of the AMI costs in Issue 8. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The average FCG FTEs were 222 for 2025 and 246 for 2027. The year end FCG FTEs were 215 for 2025 compared to 253 for 2027. Total position additions impacting FCG are 48, but most of those are allocated to FCG and represent partial FCG FTEs. FCG FTE headcounts reflect specific, identified positions supported by the record and include vacancies, ERP redeployment and new positions.
OPC:
Using the known and measurable employee count of 226 FTEs, the adjusted payroll expense, excluding incentive compensation, of $15,327,389, should be reduced by at least $1,359,688 to no more than $13,968,071.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG has projected an average of 246 FTEs for the projected test
year, as identified in the direct testimonies of Company witnesses Haffecke, Barrington,
Bhatwadekar, and Navo. (FCG BR 68-72) The test year headcount additions are
listed in Schedules G2-12 to G2-19. (EXH 8, MPN K693-K700)
FCG witness Haffecke supported the addition of 15 FTEs in
operations, stating that these positions are required across field operations,
network/system oversight, compliance, and damage prevention. (TR 729) These
positions consist of the following: two field laborers for Collection Support
to improve receivables management and customer account field support; four
positions for Damage Prevention and Asset Protection, including one Supervisor
of Pipeline Integrity and three Line Locators, which are required due to
expanding service territories and increasing locate volumes; five positions for
AMI Deployment and Network Operations, which includes three Meter Technicians
and two AMI Analysts; two positions for SCADA and Real-Time System Oversight,
which includes one SCADA Technician to support alarm configuration, system
uptime, and cybersecurity controls and one SCADA Analyst to reinforce real-time
data analysis; one position for Measurement Program Support to provide support
for calibration, testing, and maintenance of measurement equipment; and one
Compliance Engineer to manage regulatory requirements related to AMI, metering,
SCADA, and pipeline safety. (FCG BR 69) The three Meter Technicians are not new
positions as they will replace the three current meter readers. (TR 731-732) As
discussed in Issue 8, staff recommends the disallowance of FCG’s
proposed Phase 1 AMI costs. Therefore, staff recommends a disallowance
of the two AMI Analysts positions as they are exclusively added to monitor and
manage the AMI meters. (TR 731-732)
FCG witness Barrington provided support for eight headcount
additions to assist with the growing needs of the HR Department. (TR 1053) The
additions to human resources include the following positions: three Change
Management Specialists and Analysts, who will manage employee preparedness,
mitigate productivity risks during transitions, implement workforce analytics
and self-service system capabilities, ensure regulatory compliance, and support
the workforce through essential infrastructure initiatives and improve overall
business performance; one Payroll Manager to support the Financial Services
Manager by overseeing Accounts Payable and Payroll and serve as a subject
matter expert for the ERP project; one Technical Instructor, critical for
equipping personnel with the practical skills required to safely and effectively
execute complex, high-risk operational procedures; one Director of Training
dedicated to overcoming the industrywide challenge of an aging workforce; one
Training Coordinator to facilitate formal training programs to reduce
compliance risks and minimize operating errors; and one HRIS Analyst to align
HR and IT capabilities, providing accurate reporting on headcount, labor costs,
and benefits administration while enhancing operational efficiency and data
privacy compliance. (FCG BR 70-71)
FCG witness Bhatwadekar provided support for the 12 additions to
IT. These IT additions which include eight roles in SAP which are necessary to
support the Company’s SAP platform by providing expertise in configuration,
testing, architecture decisions, integration between modules, and other non-SAP
platforms. (TR 438-440; FCG BR 69-70) The remaining four IT roles include: one
Reporting Analyst to design and deliver Power BI dashboards and reports that
provide actionable insights to business and IT stakeholders and to ensure data
accuracy, performance, and alignment with enterprise reporting standards; one
Service Desk Analyst to provide frontline IT support; one Senior Manager of
Customer Technology to manage all business transformation efforts and day-to-day
support around customer technology solutions; and one ServiceNow Administrator
to provide day-to-day ServiceNow system administration and monitoring to ensure
platform stability and performance. (TR 440)
FCG witness Navo supported the two additional Administrative and General
FTEs. (TR 438; TR 663) The two additional Administrative and General positions
include: one Regulatory South Financial Planning and Analysis Manager,
responsible for coordination between operations, regulatory and finance teams
to ensure accurate reflections of utility-specific costs, capital investments,
and rate recovery mechanisms in regulatory filings and internal decisions
making; and one Revenue and Rates Manager to provide oversight of rate design
support, revenue requirement analysis, and coordination of rate case filings, a
critical role for ensuring customer rates are accurate to cost information,
comply with regulatory standards, and appropriately align revenues with prudent
investments necessary to maintain safe and reliable gas service. (TR 663-664)
Witnesses Haffecke, Barrington, Bhatwadekar, and Navo each
emphasized that only a portion of the costs related to these positions in
Operations, IT, Human Resources, and Administrative and General are allocated
to FCG based on the Company’s cost allocation methodology. (FCG BR 69-72)
Additionally, when adding new position FCG considered if the new position was
replacing a temporary service agreement and ensured that the temporary service
expense was not included in the projected test year. (FCG BR 68)
OPC recommended a reduction to 2027 projected
FTE positions, using the most known and measurable FTE count of 226 from May
2026. (TR 1357) FCG provided the actual count by month for 2026 in a response
to OPC discovery, starting at 209 FTEs in January 2026 and reaching 227 in July
2026. (EXH 143, MPN E4194) OPC witness Schultz questioned the increase from 187
FTEs in 2023 to the 253 FTEs projected by December 2027, especially considering
the Company’s annual reports for 2024 and 2025, which reported significantly
different employee counts between the original and revised versions. (TR 1350;
TR 1353) Witness Schultz argued that if the Commission determined the 187
positions in 2023 to be sufficient to provide safe and reliable service, it
does not make sense, in a supposedly more efficient and cooperative
post-acquisition environment, for FCG to require an increase to a December 2027
FTE count of 253. (TR 1354)
FCG witness Navo addressed OPC’s concern
regarding the accuracy of the Company’s FTE count, stating that the added
positions are not speculative, and that each addition is identified in the
direct testimonies of the multiple aforementioned Company witnesses. (FCG BR
71) Additionally, FCG stated each addition to FTE count is directly tied to identifiable
operational, regulatory, compliance, or support needs originating from the
post-acquisition operating model. (TR 1550; FCG BR 71) Reflected in the
Company’s July 13, 2026, supplemental discovery responses, FTEs were reconciled
to guarantee consistency between the Company’s reported additions and amounts
provided in the annual reports, which did not change the Company’s 2027
projected staffing requirements. (TR 1550) While the Company has projected a
total of 253 FTEs at the end of 2027, it is seeking recovery of 246 FTEs, the
projected average at year end. (EXH 129, MPN E3311; FCG BR 72) Witness Navo
testified that the Company’s projected headcount includes a built-in vacancy
rate to account for discrepancies in hiring and added that many of the
positions included in the projected 253 headcount have already been hired, and
many were expected to be filled before December of 2027 and had actual
projected hiring dates. (TR 1570; FCG BR 72)
In addition, witness Navo clarified that
despite any synergies or efficiencies associated with the acquisition, the
Company’s projected staffing requirements remain reasonable, as the new
efficiencies post-acquisition primarily come from integration of CUC’s systems,
processes, governance, purchasing, and support functions. (TR 1550) Witness
Navo emphasized that the existence of operational efficiencies and staffing
growth are not mutually exclusive, that the Company’s requested FTE headcount
reflects identifiable needs of the Company following the transition from FPL
operations to CUC operations. (FCG BR 71-72) Witness Navo continued that through
this transition, FCG’s customer and infrastructure base have grown,
establishing the need for additional staffing in operational, regulatory,
compliance, and technology sectors. (TR 1550-1551) FCG provided the average
headcount by calendar year in a response to OPC discovery, which started at 169
FTEs in 2023, increasing to 187 in 2024, to 208 in 2025, to 224 in 2026, and
then to 246 in 2027. (EXH 129, MPN E3305) FCG also provided the number of
budgeted FTEs by month from December 2023 to December 2027, demonstrating the
projected hiring for the remainder of 2026 and the 2027 projected test year to
reach the projected 253 headcount. (EXH 129, MPN E3311) These discovery
responses show the incremental and steady increases in staffing from year to
year and demonstrate a rate of hiring that is reasonable and proportional to
the Company’s growth and corresponding staffing needs.
Staff believes that the 2027 projected
additions to FTE are reasonable and necessary considering the growth in the
Company’s customer and infrastructure base and the identifiable operational,
regulatory, compliance, and technology requirements discussed in the testimony
of Company witnesses. Other than the disallowance of the two AMI Analysts based
on staff’s recommendation in Issue 8, staff agrees with FCG and recommends no further
adjustments to the amount of FTE additions in the 2027 projected test year.
CONCLUSION
What amount of salaries and benefits should be approved for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate amount of salaries is $20,061,242. Staff recommends a reduction of $43,025 to remove the cost associated with the Non-Deferred Compensation Plan, resulting in a total benefits amount of $3,845,632. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of payroll is $20,694,172 and benefits is $3,888,657, including incentive compensation amounts allocated from CUC, to include in the Test Year.
OPC:
The total salaries and benefits including incentive compensation for the 2027 projected test year should be no more than $15,327,389.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG stated that the total forecasted payroll for the 2027 projected test year is $20,061,242 and the total forecasted benefits is $3,888,657. (EXH 8, MPN K704; EXH 8, MPN K698). As discussed in Issue 9 and explained by FCG Witness Galtman, the Company made an ERP adjustment of $632,930 that represents additional payroll expenses for project staff, which will be redeployed to other roles after the implementation of ERP. (FCG BR 73) The $20,694,172 payroll expense projected in MFR G-2, page 19, already included the $632,930 of payroll expenses. The adjustment to ERP reduces payroll to $20,061,242. (EXH 8, MPN K700)
OPC Witness Schultz is recommending a payroll amount of no more than $15,327,389. (OPC BR 76) Witness Schultz stated that FCG’s payroll expense request, excluding incentive compensation, was $16,914,137. Witness Schultz argues this represents a 59.6 percent increase above the Company’s expensed payroll request for 2023. (TR 1350) Witness Schultz cited a contributing factor to this increase includes FCG’s actual headcount additions, to-date and projected for 2026 and 2027. (TR 1350) Witness Schultz noted that FCG’s allocation of payroll to expense increased from 58.65 percent in 2025 to 70.43 percent for 2027. (TR 1351) In response, OPC proposed an expense ratio adjustment resulting in a reduction of $1,586,748. (TR 1351) This was calculated by applying a 63.83 percent factor to the total requested payroll establish by witness Schultz, $24,014,295, excluding incentive compensation, based on a two-year average from 2024 and 2025, also excluding incentive compensation. (TR 1351) Witness Schultz determined the resulting payroll expense of $15,327,389. (TR 1351)
Witness Schultz also stated actual total payroll for 2027 represents a 95 percent increase from the requested amount in 2022, which was FCG’s last full year under FPL management, and that under CUC management, payroll has greatly increased. However, Witness Schultz also identified that the Company’s forecasted payroll is lower than the 2025 amount. (TR 1356) Witness Schultz’s defined a major cause of the significant increase as the 43.4 percent increase in employee complement from 2022 to 2027. (TR 1357) As covered in Issue 38, OPC adjusted the 2027 projected FTE complement to reflect 226 FTEs, which, excluding incentive compensation, led to a $1,359,688 reduction in payroll expense. (TR 1357) Witness Schultz explained the OPC adjustment to payroll expense, regarding the OPC recommended 226 FTEs was calculated by multiplying the known vacancies as of May 2026 by the adjusted average payroll expense per employee, excluding incentive compensation. (TR 1357) Combined with the expense ratio adjustment, OPC’s proposed payroll expense is $13,968,071, a total reduction of $2,946,436. (TR 1357)
In rebuttal, FCG Witness Navo opposed both OPC proposed adjustments to payroll. Regarding the 63.83 percent expense ratio adjustment, Witness Navo explained that the two-year average of 2024 and 2025 utilized by Witness Schultz was a period of transition from FPL ownership to CUC operations. (TR 1549) Forecasting for projected test year costs should be done based on known and measurable changes and using an average from a transitional period as the basis is inconsistent with this framework. (TR 1549-1550) Witness Navo justified the Company’s projected test year expense allocation ratio of 70.43 percent, stating that it is representative of the anticipated allocation of operational versus capital project activities during the test year. (TR 1549) As discussed in Issue 38, witness Navo addressed OPC’s adjustment to FCG’s 2027 projected FTE complement to 226 FTEs, which witness Schultz used to calculate his second reduction to payroll expense of $1,359,688. (TR 1550; TR 1357) Witness Navo specifically argued against the basis of Witness Schultz’s reduction for known vacancies as of May 2026, which relies on the assumption that vacancies recorded 19 months prior to the end of the projected test year will remain to the end of 2027. (TR 1551) Witness Navo contested witness Schultz’s assumption of vacancy rates, because the Company’s payroll forecast does not reflect vacancy rates from a single point of time in 2026, but instead is calculated based on actual hiring. (TR 1551) Witness Navo continued that adjusting payroll based on May 2026 vacancies would cause vacancies to be double counted with those already represented. (TR 1551)
Witness Navo also argued that the forecasted payroll process is based on the most up to date payroll information, and for this case in the Company’s MFRs, forecasted payroll was based on current employees’ pay rates and bonus percentage as of October 31, 2025. (FCG BR 73) The forecast for payroll included an annual increase to payroll of three percent, which occurs in April of each year. (FCG BR 73) In response to an interrogatory, FCG explained the three percent increase is a generic merit assumption. (EXH 99, MPN E259) Salaries and bonuses for new positions were based on an estimated average rate for the positions. Temporary service assumptions were also taken into consideration, eliminating temporary service costs in instances where a new position would replace services provided under a temporary service agreement. (FCG BR 73) In addition to the three percent annual increase, a major factor behind the increase in forecasted payroll are the Company’s projected additions to FTE headcount, discussed in detail in Issue 38. FCG provided a comprehensive list highlighting all new positions in response to staff interrogatory. The additional positions listed make up 32.3 percent of the total forecasted payroll. (EXH 99, MPN E265) As discussed in Issue 38, the Company’s additions to FTE headcount can each be tied to identifiable operational, regulatory, compliance, or support needs originating from the post-acquisition operating model. (FCG BR 71) With the additions to FTE headcount comprising such a significant portion of forecasted payroll, Witness Schultz’s use of a 226 FTE headcount as the basis of his adjustments conflicts with the basis of FCG’s forecasted payroll. FCG Witness Barrington testified regarding the Company’s employee rewards and benefits plans, including the Company’s Team Incentive Plan (TIP). (TR 1048-1049) CUC offers a total compensation package for employees that includes health, dental and vision plans, 401(k) plans, flexible spending accounts, paid time off and sick leave, Employee Assistance Program, tuition reimbursement, volunteer opportunities, the Aspiring Scholars scholarship program and other rewards and recognition programs. (TR 1046-1047) CUC also offers incentive performance plans, sign-on bonuses, life and disability insurance, and hospital indemnity and critical illness insurance. (TR 1046-1047) Witness Barrington explained that TIP is a multi-tiered bonus program, based on overall team performance of achieving operational goals. TIP is paid out in March, if specified operational objectives are met in the previous year. (TR 1048)
FCG Witness Navo stated that while executive incentive compensation was removed in the 2025 historic year, in accordance with Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, he did not recommend applying the same adjustments to current executive compensation. (TR 664) Witness Navo stated that the incentive compensation program is a prudent and reasonable cost because it is necessary to attract, retain, and motivate employees to perform to ensure the best possible service for customers. (TR 665) CUC utilized third-party compensation specialists to assess the appropriateness of CUC’s total compensation relative to market and industry trends. (TR 664-665) With this evaluation, witness Navo argued that the Company is more conservative in its approach than many of its peers. (TR 664-665) Witness Navo also stated that if it did not offer incentive compensation, the Company would potentially need to increase base salaries to be able to compete with other companies in attracting and retaining qualified employees, which, in turn, would increase overall costs to customers. (TR 665-666) Witness Navo noted that in the last two rate cases for FPUC, the Commission did not make any adjustment to executive payroll or incentive compensation.[39] (TR 666)
OPC recommended a full disallowance of the requested incentive compensation from base rates. (TR 1372) Witness Schultz argued that there is no evidence that the plan provides a benefit to customers that is greater than the day-to-day performance already expected of employees. (TR 1372) Witness Schultz questioned whether there was really a motive for employees to perform above regular contractual obligations in a situation where everyone receives an incentive payment. (TR 1365) Witness Schultz also questioned the significant 365.3percent increase in incentive compensation from $1,320,210 in 2022, to $5,152,145 in 2025, $4,822,610 in 2027, without proper justification, and the Company’s portrayal of the incentive compensation plan as supporting safety and customer care, when it is based on financial results. (TR 1365-1366) Witness Schultz contended that TIP is based upon financial goals and does not encourage employee performance beyond normal expectations. However, in his testimony, Witness Schultz ignores the fact that the forecasted amount of incentive compensation for 2027 is lower than the actual amount for 2025. Additionally, in response to OPC discovery that asked the Company to provide the various goals upon which incentive payments were to be determined, the Company provided TIP metrics that demonstrated various goals that included employee participation in trainings, safety observations, surveys, and community support. (EXH 126, MPN E3004–E3006) The Company also indicated in another discovery response that it reviewed prior year performance to determine appropriate goals for the new year, which is intended to drive employee behaviors that encourage safety, service, and collaborative teamwork. (EXH 126, MPN E3007)
OPC also recommended a reduction to employee benefit expense of $384,399, which consists of an exclusion of the 401(k) Supplemental Executive Retirement Plan (SERP), a Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan, in the amount of $43,025 and a reduction of $341,374 based on Witness Schultz’s recommended adjustment to projected FTE complement. (TR 1375) Regarding the 401(k) SERP plan, FCG has provided conflicting responses to discovery from OPC inquiring about the cost of the plan. In response to OPC’s interrogatories requesting the amount of SERP in each year from 2021 to 2027 and to identify the number of employees eligible for SERP, FCG stated that there was no SERP expense allocated to FCG from 2023 through the 2027 test year, and there were no SERP-eligible employees from 2022 through 2023, and that therefore, all of FCG’s employees are considered ineligible for SERP. (EXH 128 MPN E3288–E3291) In a response to another interrogatory, the Company stated that in order for an employee to become eligible to participate in the Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan, or 401(k) SERP, the employee must be among a select group of management or highly compensated employees and be designated as an eligible employee by the Company. (EXH 136 MPN E3927) In a later response, FCG stated that the details provided regarding the costs related to the Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation plan are unrelated to SERP, the costs were labeled as SERP erroneously, and there is no SERP. (EXH 141, MPN E4164) Witness Schultz argued that the information provided by FCG regarding the 401(k) SERP, or Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan, has been unclear. (TR 1374) Regardless, witness Schultz argued that based on FCG’s description of the plan as a benefit only available to special group of employees or highly paid management, it seems that regular employees are limited from accessing this benefit. (TR 1374) In this case, FCG has the burden of proof and has not provided a sufficient argument for the inclusion of the cost. Staff agrees with OPC that the program is an excessive benefit and recommends removing the $43,025 associated with the Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan.
As addressed in Issue 38, staff is recommending the disallowance of the two AMI Analysts due to the removal of the AMI costs in Issue 8. However, there is no adjustment to be made in salaries O&M expense because those positions are capitalized, as indicated in FCG’s response to OPC interrogatory regarding new hires and salaries. (EXH 126, MPN E3026-E3027)
As addressed in Issue 9, staff is recommending the implementation of a step-increase of the ERP program and as discussed above witness Galtman stated that FCG made an ERP adjustment to payroll expenses totaling $632,930. As such, staff recommends the reduction of payroll expense in the amount of $632,930 to account for the proposed step-increase.
Staff believes FCG has adequately addressed concerns related to staffing levels and incentive compensation. However, FCG has the burden of proof and has not provided a sufficient argument to justify the inclusion of costs related to the Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan, in the amount of $43,025. As such, staff recommends decreasing employee benefits by $43,025 to remove costs associated with the Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Plan. Based on the adjustments above, the appropriate amount of salaries to include in the projected test year is $20,061,242 and the appropriate amount of benefits is $3,845,632.
CONCLUSION
Staff recommends a total of payroll of $20,061,242, this includes a reduction of $632,930 due to staff’s recommendation to implement a step-increase of the ERP program. Staff also recommends a reduction of $43,025 to remove cost associated with the Non-Deferred Compensation Plan, resulting in a total for benefits of $3,845,632.
What amount of annual storm damage accrual and cap, if any, should be approved for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
Staff recommends the continuation of FCG’s Storm Damage Reserve, as supported by FCG’s 2022 Storm Damage Self-Insurance Reserve Study (Storm Reserve Study) and consistent with Commission Rule 25-7.0143, F.A.C. Accordingly, there should be no change to the annual storm damage accrual of $57,500 or the target reserve amount of $800,000. (Willis, Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The Commission should allow FCG to maintain the currently approved Storm Damage Reserve accrual and target reserve amounts of $57,500 and $800,000, respectively.
OPC:
The annual accrual of $57,500 should be discontinued beginning January 1, 2027.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Rule 25-7.0143, F.A.C., addresses the establishment of a storm reserve account and outlines the types of storm related costs that an investor-owned natural gas utility can charge to the storm reserve. FCG witness Russell testified that the Company was authorized to implement a storm reserve as part of its 2018 settlement agreement, which established the annual accrual of $57,500 and a target reserve balance of $800,000.[40] (TR 506) The 2023 settlement agreement continued the terms without modification.[41] Witness Russell further testified that storm-related costs the Company incurs are recoverable consistent with Rule 25-7.0143, F.A.C. FCG is not requesting any changes to the annual accrual or the target reserve amounts. (TR 507)
OPC witness Schultz testified that the storm reserve balance was $377,617 as of December 31, 2025. He further stated that since the acquisition of FCG by CUC, customers have contributed $199,922 to the reserve through December 2025 with no storm-related damages being charged. As of April 30, 2026, the reserve balance was approximately $396,785. (TR 1375; EXH 126, MPN E3016) Witness Schultz stated that he has reviewed FCG’s 2022 Storm Reserve Study twice and used the probabilities from the study to state that there is an approximately 13.9 percent chance that the April 2026 balance would be exceeded by a storm. (TR 1376; EXH 146, MPN E4891) He agreed with the study’s observation that the yearly storm costs would often fluctuate between little to no charges while rarely having a major charge. (TR 1377)
Witness Schultz asserted that the total costs charged against the storm reserve balance in the last 7-years totaled $58,426, corresponding to an annualized expense of $8,347 per year. (TR 1377) Based on the April 2026 storm reserve balance of $396,785 and using the historic annualized cost of $8,347 per year, he calculated that the April 2026 balance would be sufficient for approximately 47.5 years. (TR 1377) Furthermore, he stated that the December 31, 2026, amount would total $435,117, provided no storm occurs which would result in a charge against the storm reserve. (TR 1378; EXH 126, MPN E3016) As a result, witness Schultz recommended that the annual accrual amount of $57,500 be discontinued beginning January 1, 2027. (TR 1378)
In rebuttal, witness Russell testified that witness Schultz’s recommendation, based on historical storm data and reserve utilization used to extrapolate future costs, was inconsistent with the purpose of a storm reserve. Witness Russell contended that the purpose of the storm reserve is to protect against low-frequency, high-severity events rather than average annual historical costs. (TR 1614-1615) He stated that since storm-related costs are episodic, periods with little storm activity do not predicate future storm events and are not a reliable indicator for evaluating the adequacy of the storm reserve. (TR 1615) Witness Russell stated that the storm reserve accrual and target reserve amounts were supported by the 2022 Storm Reserve Study which used probabilistic, potential hurricane scenarios instead of past storm events.[42] (TR 1615) He continued that following witness Schultz’s recommendation would be inconsistent with the 2018 and 2023 settlement agreements which established and continued, respectively, the Company’s ability to build and maintain the Commission-approved storm reserve balance. (TR 1615) Witness Russell further testified that the Commission should reject witness Schultz’s recommendation to discontinue the $57,500 storm reserve accrual beginning January 1, 2027. (TR 1616)
Based on the conclusions of the Storm Reserve Study, staff recommends the storm reserve should be continued at an annual accrual of $57,500 and with a target reserve balance of $800,000. The 84-month or 7-year period witness Schultz used to extrapolate future storm costs was limited and did not use enough hurricane data to be a reliable indicator. For comparison, the 2022 Storm Reserve Study used over 110,000 potential simulated hurricane events affecting the eastern United States to calculate the probabilistic annual costs. (EXH 146, MPN E4882, MPN E4889) The data utilized for the study was partially based on the Florida Commission on Hurricane Loss Projection Methodology’s Official Storm Set, which includes hurricanes affecting Florida during the period of 1900 to 2017. (EXH 146, MPN E4884) Hence, only using 7 years of hurricane data for predicting the next 47 years of storm related costs is insufficient. The Storm Reserve Study estimated the expected annual cost from hurricanes to be $190,000 per year, noted that annual aggregate storm costs could exceed $2.5 million, and supported the target reserve balance of $800,000. (EXH 146, MPN E4890-E4891) Additionally, the Storm Reserve Study found that the probability of annual aggregate storm-related costs exceeding the $800,000 storm-damage reserve balance in one year is 7.39 percent, equivalent to an average occurrence of approximately once every 14 years over a long period of time. (EXH 146, MPN E4891) At the annual accrual rate of $57,500 per year, it would take approximately 14 years to reach the specified target reserve balance of $800,000, assuming no storm-related costs are incurred, further supporting the established annual accrual and target reserve amounts. Accordingly, staff concludes that there was insufficient evidence presented to support discontinuing FCG’s Commission-approved storm reserve accrual amount.
CONCLUSION
FCG’s Storm Damage Reserve should be continued, as
supported by FCG’s 2022 Storm Reserve Study and consistent with Commission Rule
25-7.0143, F.A.C. Accordingly, there should be no change to the annual storm
damage accrual of $57,500 or the target reserve amount of $800,000.
What is the appropriate annual amount and amortization period for Rate Case Expense?
Recommendation:
The appropriate total amount of Rate Case Expense should be reduced to $3,606,861 resulting in an annual amortization amount of $721,372. The appropriate amortization period is five years. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of FCG’s rate case expense is $4,215,262 amortized over a five-year period at $843,052 per year.
OPC:
The Company’s rate case expense request should be reduced by $520,718. Rate case expense should be no more than $3,494,544 and amortized over 5 years.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG requested a total of $4,215,262 for rate case expense for the 2027 projected test year, amortized over 5 years at an annual amount of $843,052. (EXH 4 MPN K64; EXH 8 MPN K708; TR 914) Total rate case expense includes the costs for outside consultants, legal services, depreciation study expense, travel expenses, additional staffing and temporary pay, and other expenses. (EXH 4, MPN K64; EXH 145, MPN E4801-E4802) The Company is requesting to recover these expenses at $843,052 annually over a 5-year period in order to spread the expense over a longer period of time to reduce customers’ bill impact. (TR 914-915) The Commission has previously approved a 5-year amortization for other companies, specifically by Order No. PSC-2023-0103-FOF-GU in the 2022 FPUC rate case, in which the Commission affirmed that it is appropriate to amortize rate case expense over the period of time between rate case proceedings. (TR 914-915)
Table 41-1
Rate Case Expense
|
Category |
Initial Filing |
Revised |
|
Outside
Consultants: Cost of Capital & Cost of Service |
$1,358,775 |
$1,148,057 |
|
Legal
Services |
652,121 |
461,167 |
|
Affiliate
Support |
0 |
0 |
|
Travel
Expenses |
120,100 |
120,100 |
|
Additional
Staffing / Temp Pay |
1,394,375 |
1,387,646 |
|
Other
Expenses |
689,890 |
489,890 |
|
Total |
$4,215,262 |
$3,606,861 |
Source:
EXH 4, MPN K64; EXH 135, MPN E3893.
OPC witness Schultz recommended that rate case expense be reduced by a total of $1,467,663, which includes adjustments to remove depreciation study costs of $373,117, outside consultant cost for the acquisition adjustment of $40,000, temporary staff cost of $475,750, travel cost of $60,050, Other Notices/Supplies cost of $171,145, Tariff Other cost of $100,000, Other Prior Owner cost of $100,000, and the amortization of the prior rate case cost of $147,601. (TR 1390) In FCG’s response to OPC discovery, the Company provided depreciation study expenses totaling $408,401. (EXH 135 MPN E3891-E3893)
Witness Schultz argued that the $40,000 included for the outside consultant providing testimony only for the retention of the 2004 acquisition adjustment was redundant because there were already two Company witnesses providing testimony on the five factors. (TR 1387-1388) FCG witness Deason contended that his testimony was necessary to discuss the policy implications of OPC’s arguments as they pertained to the 2004 acquisition adjustment because at the time of filing his testimony the Supreme Court had not decided on OPC’s appeal of the 2023 FCG Rate Case. (TR 999) Witness Schultz contested the $475,750 included in rate case expense for temporary staff covering, stating that it is inappropriate to include employee pay in rate case expense and the same employee’s compensation in payroll expense for the 2027 projected test year. (TR 1388) Witness Husted asserted that a rate case is an atypical event and, therefore, the associated estimated rate case expense does not represent normal O&M expense and is specific to this filing. (TR 944) Witness Husted continued that if FCG maintained sufficient staffing to handle rate cases internally it would result in significantly higher annual payroll expenses and result in a greater impact on customer rates than the amortization of rate case expense. (TR 944) Witness Schultz argued that the increase to travel and Notices/Supplies costs was excessive and that both expenses should be reduced by 50 percent to align with the previous rate case. (TR 1389) Witness Husted testified that these costs have been properly classified as rate case expenses and these costs reflect a projection of the expenses that will be incurred by the rate case. (TR 946) Witness Schultz stated that the amortization of the prior rate case, $147,601, should not be included in the rate case expense because it was FCG’s discretion to come in for a rate case and it should not be allowed to compound rate case costs. (TR 1389) Witness Husted contested that the prior rate case expense was approved by the Commission as appropriate and that filing a subsequent rate case does not dismiss those previous expenses incurred. (TR 945) Concerning the OPC proposed adjustments mentioned above, staff agrees with the Company on the appropriateness of including these expenses in rate case expense.
Witness Schultz contested the Other Tariff expense of $100,000 FCG included in addition to the $258,750 expense for Tariff Changes and Management. (TR 1389) Witness Schultz described the Other Tariff expense as a contingency and should not be allowed in rate case expense. (TR 1389) In FCG’s response to staff’s discovery, witness Husted described the Other Tariff as an expense for additional changes to tariff forms that could result from this proceeding, such as translating forms into multiple languages or redesigning forms. (EXH 107 MPN E485) In witness Husted’s rebuttal testimony, she argued that Other Tariff expenses should be included in rate case expense because the costs are directly caused by the rate case and would not otherwise be incurred. (TR 946) Staff agrees that the Other Tariff expense is a contingency and excessive, therefore, recommends disallowing the $100,000 Other Tariff expense.
In a response to an interrogatory, FCG clarified that the correct amount of depreciation study expense is $408,401. (EXH 135, MPN E3893) FCG witness Husted justified including the depreciation study because it was filed with the intention of allowing FCG to delay in filing a rate case, but the outcome of the study was not sufficient. (TR 944-945) Witness Husted further explained that the results of the study were utilized in the current rate case proceeding and led to a reduction in revenue requirement of approximately $504,000, making the depreciation study expense prudent and reasonable to include in rate case expense. (TR 945; EXH 135, MPN E3891) Witness Schultz contended that the purpose of the depreciation study in Docket No. 20250035-GU, was not only to update the depreciation rates, but to restore a RSAM for FCG. (TR 1387) Witness Schultz continued that the costs for the depreciation study were incurred in 2024, before the test year letter was filed for the current rate case proceeding, and that FCG did not identify the depreciation study as being part of a future rate case there is no basis for the Commission to consider the cost to be deferred for recovery in 2027 through 2031. (TR 1387) Furthermore, witness Schultz contested that the cost of the most recent deprecation study is more than twice the cost of the study conducted in the last rate case. (TR 1387) In a previous FPUC rate case, Docket No. 140016-GU, FPUC requested to establish the fees associated with the depreciation study as a regulatory asset to be amortized over a 5-year period.[43] However, FCG has not requested to establish depreciation study expense as a regulatory asset in this current rate case. Staff is recommending the removal of depreciation study expense from rate case expense. Though FCG has stated the depreciation study was filed with the intention to delay filing a rate case, the outcome of the study meant this was ultimately not accomplished. In addition, the costs of the depreciation study were incurred even before the filing of the current rate case, causing staff to view these costs as unreasonable to include in the current rate case expense. To this point, FCG did not designate the study as being part of a future rate case or request the depreciation study expense to be established as a regulatory asset in the current docket.
Witness Schultz also argued that the $100,000 for Other Prior Owner Assistance, which consists of payments made from CUC to FPL for information and access to books and records, is inappropriate. (TR 1389) Witness Schultz continued that when CUC acquired FCG, it should have ensured complete access to any information needed to support its burden of proof and any related cost as part of the acquisition. (TR 1389) Witness Schultz argued that it is inappropriate to require customers to pay for costs that should be considered acquisition costs. (TR 1389) While FCG requested $100,000 for these costs, in response to OPC discovery, the Company provided invoices for payments to FPL, which totaled $35,753.79, as of August 20, 2026. (EXH 143 MPN E4196-E4200) Witness Husted stated that the projected costs reflected the Company’s best estimate of the necessary incremental expenses, and that these costs are directly and solely caused by the rate case. (TR 946) However, because CUC did not perform due diligence in acquiring the required information from FPL as part of its acquisition of FCG, staff believes it is not reasonable to include the costs for Other Prior Owner Assistance in rate case expense. (TR 1389)
In OPC’s brief, it maintained its opposition to the Company’s requested rate case expense. However, OPC concluded that it seeks removal of the depreciation study costs and the unamortized 2023 rate case expense. (OPC BR 79) OPC’s recommendation is to reduce rate case expense by $520,718. (OPC BR 79) This total does not make sense as it disregards the correct total provided by FCG of $408,401 for depreciation study costs. While OPC is recommending a reduction of $520,718, in its argument, it suggests that rate case expense in the test year be reduced by $144,144, making it unclear what calculations OPC has performed to reach either amount. In addition, if OPC were to reduce FCG’s requested $4,215,262 rate case expense by $520,718, the total would come out $3,694,544. This is $200,000 greater than the $3,494,544 that OPC is recommending post-adjustment in the brief. (OPC BR 79)
Staff has examined the requested actual and estimated expenses, along with supporting documentation, and recommends that rate case expense be decreased by $408,401 for the removal of depreciation study expense, by $100,000 for the removal of Other Prior Owner Assistance expense, and by $100,000 for the removal of Other Tariff. (EXH 135, MPN E3893) As shown in Table 41-1, depreciation case expense has been removed from the categories for Outside Consultant, Legal Services, and Additional Staffing, and Other Prior Owner Assistance expense and Other Tariff expense have been removed from the Other Expenses category. Based on Staff’s adjustments to remove $608,401 from rate case expense, staff’s total adjusted 2027 projected test year rate case expense is $3,606,861, amortized over five years with an annual amount of $721,372.
CONCLUSION
Based on staff’s adjustments above the recommended total rate case expense is $3,606,861 resulting in an annual amortization amount of $721,372. The appropriate amortization period is five years.
What amount of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance expense should be included in for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The amount of Directors and Officers Liability Insurance expense included in the 2027 projected test year should be $75,917, to reflect half of the expense. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of D&O liability insurance expense in the 2027 projected test year is $151,835. Reducing this amount would diminish the importance of fiduciary oversight, governance and overall risk management and adversely impact FCG's ability to incur costs to retain and attract talent.
OPC:
The Commission should completely disallow $151,835 of DOL insurance expense because the cost associated with benefits of the insurance primarily accrue to shareholders, some of whom generally are the parties initiating any suit against the directors and officers. If the Commission does not agree with the concept that shareholders are the prime beneficiary, then at the very least equal sharing between the shareholders and customers should be done.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
FCG requested $151,835 for Directors and Officers Liability (DOL) Insurance expense in the 2027 projected test year. (TR 498) OPC witness Schultz argued that DOL insurance primarily benefits shareholders because it is designed to protect shareholders from “directors’ and officers’ imprudent decision making”. (TR 1386) Due to shareholders being the primary beneficiary of DOL insurance, witness Schultz argued that there should be a complete disallowance of the entire cost of $151,835. (TR 1385) Witness Schultz suggested that if the Commission does not move to disallow the entire cost, it should at least reduce the cost by $75,918, or 50 percent, to continue an equal sharing of the cost between shareholders and customers. (TR 1386). In the last FCG rate case the Commission approved to disallow 50 percent of DOL insurance expense, by Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU. (TR 1384) FCG reflected an adjustment complying with this order for 2025 and 2026. (EXH 4, MPN K50; EXH 8, MPN K672) However, FCG did not include an adjustment in its 2027 request, FCG witness Russell maintained that the cost is necessary because many officers and non-employee directors would decline to accept positions without DOL insurance coverage. (TR 498)
In witness Russell’s rebuttal testimony, he testified that DOL insurance benefits customers and reiterated that maintaining an appropriate DOL insurance policy enables FCG to attract and retain experienced, skilled leaders who can deliver effective fiduciary oversight and governance across all business units, ultimately benefitting FCG’s customers. (TR 1620-1621) Witness Russell asserted OPC’s proposed full disallowance of the requested DOL insurance expense would make it difficult for the Company to attract and retain the necessary officers and directors. (TR 1621)
The 2023 FCG Rate Case and the 2023 FPUC Rate Case demonstrated the Commission’s consistent policy regarding DOL insurance expense, in which the Commission reiterated its consideration of factors including the necessity of DOL insurance in attracting and retaining directors and officers, the necessary role of insurance in conducting business effectively, and how customers benefit from being part of a large public company.[44] However, in both cases, the Commission recognized that the benefits to both customers and shareholders warranted cost sharing of DOL insurance expense, and concluded to decrease DOL insurance expense by half.
CONCLUSION
Staff believes that the more recent cases provide a reasonable basis for continuing to recognize the benefits to both customers and shareholders through cost sharing. Therefore, staff recommends an adjustment to remove half, $75,918, of the DOL insurance expense from the projected test year. Thus, staff recommends DOL insurance expense of $75,917 in the projected test year.
What is the appropriate amount of 2027 projected test year O&M expenses?
Recommendation:
The appropriate amount of 2027 projected test year O&M expense is $43,580,676. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of O&M expenses in the projected test year is $46,513,711.
OPC:
The appropriate amount of 2027 projected test year Other O&M expenses should be no more than $35,487,798.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Although this is identified as a fallout issue of staff recommendations on previous NOI issues, additional expenses included in projected test year O&M expenses will also be addressed.
Outside Services
In response to Staff’s Interrogatory No. 215, FCG witness Navo reflected a total amount of $3,975,752 for outside services expense in the 2027 projected test year (EXH 108, MPN E507) OPC recommended a reduction of $507,598 to the outside service expense, this reduction is comprised of reducing legal services, audits services, other, and an adjustment consistent with the previously discussed recalculation of the Distrigas allocation adjustment. (EXH 66, C19-861; TR 1391-1395) The breakdown of the recommended adjustments by expense category is shown in the table below.
Table 43-1
Outside Services Expenses – OPC Recommended Adjustments
|
Expense Category |
OPC Recommended Adjustment |
|
Legal Services |
($78,462) |
|
Audit Services |
(211,965) |
|
Other |
(261,591) |
|
Distrigas Allocation Adjustment |
44,421 |
|
Total |
($507,598) |
Source: EXH 66, MPN C19-861.
OPC witness Schultz testified that the legal expenses for 2026 and 2027 were calculated by applying an escalation factor of 2.5 percent per year from the reported 2025 legal expense. (TR 1392) Witness Schultz recommended using 2024 as the base year to apply FCG’s escalation factor because the Company stated that the major increase between 2024 and 2025 was due to costs associated with a personal injury case. (TR 1391-1395) Accordingly, witness Schultz escalated the 2024 legal expenses of $124,814 by 2.5 percent annually over 3 years to establish a normalized expense level of $134,411, resulting in a recommended reduction of $78,463 from FCG’s requested amount of $212,874. (TR 1391-13995; EXH 66, C19-861)
Witness Schultz recommended reducing the 2027 outside audit expense of $423,930 by 50 percent, asserting that the reduction would reflect a more reasonable level of expense based on historical costs. (TR 1393-1394) Witness Schultz noted that outside audit expenses under FPL management were $114,000 and $95,000 in 2021 and 2022, respectively. (TR 1393-1394) Witness Schultz adjustment to other outside services was calculated by escalating the 2025 costs, excluding legal and audit fees, by 2.5 percent annually for 2026 and 2027. (TR 1394-1395) Then a separate adjustment was made to account for OPC witness Kollen’s recalculation of the modified Distrigas allocation method. (TR 1395)
FCG witness Navo argued that witness Schultz based his adjustments on the fact that the costs have increased excessively since the 2023 FCG Order. (TR 1557) Witness Navo Continued that FCG based its projected 2027 outside services expenses to reflect specific legal, consulting, and audit services necessary to support its regulated operations under CUC ownership. (TR 1557) FCG addresses the outside services expense in its brief under Issue 33, where FCG argued that witness Schultz failed to consider that FCG provided account level and project level support for its 2027 projected test year. (FCG BR 62; TR 1516) FCG contested witness Schultz argument that audit fees should reduced by half based on the expense being higher than it was when under FPL management. (FCG BR 62; TR 1393-1394) FCG continued that witness Schultz did not provide a reason for utilizing the 2.5 percent escalation factor from 2025 to determine the normalized amount for other outside services. (FCG BR 62; TR 1394)
Staff recognizes that FCG is under new ownership and therefore has different expenses from when FCG was under FPL management. As such, staff agrees with FCG that witness Schultz adjustments to audit fees, other outside services, and the recalculation of the modified Distrigas allocation method do not provide sufficient rationale for their reduction. However, staff does agree with witness Schultz on the reduction to outside legal expense, because the escalation factor should not include an anomaly based on a personal injury case that would not be indicative of typical legal expenses.
General Cost per Customer
As addressed in FCG’s brief under Issue 33, FCG witness Baugh stated that after FCG’s acquisition in 2023 an analysis of cost per customer was performed and it reflected that FCG costs per customer are in line with its peer companies. (FCG BR 62) In response to Staff’s Interrogatory No. 218, FCG further explained that FCG’s estimated average cost per customer in 2025 was $357, which is below the American Gas Association’s average of $366. (EXH 108, MPN E512) The cost per customer analysis also reflected that FCG’s average cost per customer was in line with People’s Gas, $338, and FPUC-Gas, $484. (EXH 108, MPN E512) FCG reasoned that this trend indicated that increases in cost per customer were not limited to FCG but were also experienced by other natural gas companies. (EXH 108, MPN E512)
Summary
Based on staff’s recommended adjustment above and previous NOI issues, the appropriate amount of projected O&M expenses for FCG is $43,580,676. Staff’s recommended projected test year O&M expenses and adjustments are reflected in Table 43-2.
Table 43-2
Staff Adjusted O&M Expenses
|
Issue # |
MFR Amount Requested |
$46,623,424 |
|
|
Staff Adjustments |
|
|
8 |
Remove AMI |
(284,740) |
|
9 |
Remove ERP |
(2,329,210) |
|
39 |
Remove Non-Qualified Deferred Plan |
(43,025) |
|
41 |
Reduction of Rate Case Expense |
(121,680) |
|
42 |
Remove Half DOL Expense |
(75,918) |
|
43 |
Outside Services – Legal |
(78,462) |
|
43 |
Damage Prevention Software |
(109,713) |
|
|
Total Staff Adjustments |
(3,042,748) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Staff Adjusted Amount |
$43,580,676 |
Source: Staff Calculations.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate amount of 2027 projected test year O&M expense is $43,580,676.
What amounts of amortization expense associated with the AGLR acquisition adjustment should be included in the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
Consistent with staff’s recommendation to allow the continuation of the AGLR acquisition adjustment, the annual amortization expense should be $721,895 for the 2027 projected test year. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of amortization expense associated with the 2004 acquisition adjustment associated with AGLR’s acquisition of FCG to be included in the projected test year is $721,895.
OPC:
None. The $721,894 acquisition amortization associated with the 2004 AGLR acquisition should be excluded from the 2027 projected test year.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
As addressed in Issue 13, FCG requested an annual amortization expense of $721,894 related to the 2004 AGLR acquisition adjustment. OPC argued an adjustment be made to exclude the $721,894 amortization expense associated with the AGLR acquisition from the 2027 projected test year based on OPC’s recommendation on disallowing the continuation of the 2004 AGLR acquisition. (TR 1326) However, as discussed in Issue 13, staff recommends the continuation of the 2004 AGLR acquisition adjustment. (EXH 3, MPN K25) The unamortized balance as of December 31, 2025, is approximately $6.4 million. (TR 956) Therefore, staff recommends that the amortization expense associated with the AGLR acquisition adjustment be $721,894 for the 2027 projected test year.
CONCLUSION
Consistent with staff’s recommendation to allow the continuation of the AGLR acquisition adjustment, the annual amortization expense should be $721,895 for the 2027 projected test year.
What is the appropriate amount of Depreciation and Amortization Expense for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate amount of Depreciation and Amortization Expense for the 2027 projected test year is $22,328,021. (Dasher, Wu)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of depreciation and amortization expense for the year ended December 31, 2027, is $24,318,831.
OPC:
The appropriate amount of Depreciation and Amortization Expense for the 2027 projected test year should be no more than $16,796,516.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fallout issue. Based on staff’s recommendations in Issues 8 and 9 regarding the AMI costs and ERP project, respectively, and on the supplemental testimony provided by FCG witness Haffecke, as discussed in Issues 14 and 18, FCG witness Haffecke provided supplemental testimony with an update to the damage prevention software that resulted in an adjustment to depreciation expense in the 2027 projected test year in the amount of $2,207. (EXH 33, MPN C11-363) The appropriate amount of depreciation and amortization expense for the 2027 projected test year is $22,328,021.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate amount of Depreciation and Amortization Expense for the 2027 projected test year is $22,328,021.
What is the appropriate amount of 2027 projected test year Taxes Other than Income?
Recommendation:
The appropriate amount of Taxes Other than Income for the 2027 projected test year is $10,190,264. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of Taxes Other Than Income Taxes is $10,190,264 (adjusted) for the 2027 projected test year.
OPC:
The appropriate amount of Taxes Other than Income for the 2027 projected test year should be no more than $6,705,877.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Per MFR Schedule A-4, FCG reflected TOTI of $10,190,264 for the 2027 projected test year. (EXH 2, MPN K11) OPC has proposed a reduction of $404,155 to payroll tax expense, which is a flowthrough of OPC’s adjustments to payroll. (TR 1403) However, in Issue 39, staff concluded that FCG provided the proper justifications for payroll expense, and thus is not recommending any adjustments to payroll tax expense.
Per MFR Schedule G-7, FCG reflected a $8,858,620 for property tax. (EXH 8, MPN K743) OPC has recommended an adjustment to property tax of $2,819,027, to reduce the expense on the Company-forecasted average plant in service multiplied by the effective tax rate of 0.63percent for 2023. OPC witness Schultz calculated this tax rate based on the Company’s 2023 property taxes as a percentage of 2023 average plant in service. Witness Schultz proposed a second adjustment of $189,852, calculated by multiplying OPC’s recommended adjustments to plant in service by the same 0.63percent effective tax rate. (TR 1406) Witness Schultz points to a spike in property taxes following FCG’s acquisition, stating that in 2024, property taxes jumped by 83.6percent from 2023. (TR 1405)
In rebuttal, FCG witness Navo opposes witness Schultz’s adjustments to property tax, stating that the Company’s projection methodology is consistent with prior practice, having been utilized in the 2022 FPUC rate case. (TR 1559) Witness Navo continued that the increase in property tax is driven by the growth in taxable plant in service, because as the taxable asset grows, the associated property tax also grows. In addition, the Company’s calculated effective tax rate is lower than the actual effective rate for 2025, because the rate is being applied to the gas plant in service. (TR 1559) Furthermore, witness Navo stated if If the Company estimated its effective tax base instead, using the higher rate would have resulted in a similar projected. (TR 1559) However, the Company chose to remain consistent with approved Commission methodology, because the gas plant is a known measurable item. (TR 1559)
Based on staff’s recommendation in Issue 39, staff is not recommending any adjustments to payroll tax expense. Staff agrees that FCG’s methodology for calculating property tax is consistent with the Commission approved methodology in the prior 2022 FPUC rate case, and FCG has provided sufficient reasoning for the increase in property due to growth in taxable plant in service. Based on these factors, staff recommends that the appropriate amount of TOTI is $10,190,264 for the 2027 projected test year.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate amount of TOTI for the 2027 projected test year is $10,190,264.
Is a Parent Debt Adjustment pursuant to Rule 25-14.004, F.A.C., appropriate and if so, what is the appropriate amount?
Recommendation:
No, a parent debt adjustment pursuant to Rule 25-14.004, F.A.C., is not required. (D. Buys)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
No. Chesapeake, the parent company of FCG, maintains all the third-party debt and when filing a consolidated tax return for CUC and its subsidiaries (including FCG), the tax deduction for interest expense is determined by the interest associated with the third-party debt held by the parent. As such, there is no tax deduction for interest expense recorded on the subsidiary's Federal income tax return. Moreover, the interest synchronization calculation already captures the tax benefits of the allocable parent company debt.
OPC:
Yes. A parent debt adjustment in the amount of $1,773,908 should be made for the 2027 projected test year.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
By definition, Rule 25-14.004, F.A.C., Effect of Parent Debt on Federal Corporate Income Tax, (PDA rule) provides that the income tax expense of a regulated utility will be adjusted to reflect the tax benefit of the interest expense of the parent company where the parent company’s debt may be invested in the equity of the regulated utility and both join in the filing of a consolidated income tax return. (TR 514) The premise that debt issued by the parent is invested in the equity of the subsidiary presumes double leverage exists. Leverage exists when debt is used, at least in part, to finance assets. If the firm overall earns more than the after-tax cost of debt, shareholder returns are increased, i.e., levered. Double leverage is presumed to exist when a parent company issues debt and a portion of the debt is assumed to be invested in a subsidiary that also issues its own debt, i.e., the leverage is doubled.
FCG argued that the PDA rule is intended to capture the income tax benefit associated with double leverage which does not apply in this case. (FCG BR 87) FCG witness Russell testified FCG is not a borrower of any third-party debt and when filing a consolidated tax return through CUC, instead, the tax deduction for interest expense is determined by the interest associated with the debt issued and held by its parent company, CUC. (FCG BR 95-96; TR 515) FCG has proposed a 2027 projected test year capital structure based on the capital structure of FCG’s parent, CUC, which consists of investor sources of funds of 50.14 percent common equity, 44.31 percent long-term debt, and 5.55 percent short-term debt as presented on MFR Schedule G-3, page 2 of 11. (FCG BR 95; TR 515; EXH 8) FCG witness Haag testified the Company does not have its own source of capital, that is, it does not issue its own debt or equity in the marketplace. (TR 214) FCG argued that because FCG does not issue its own debt, there is no double leverage, and therefore, the parent debt rule does not apply in this case. (FCG BR 87) Since FCG has no third-party debt, the interest synchronization adjustment appropriately captures the tax benefit associated with the parent debt allocated in FCG’s capital structure (FCG BR 95) The tax benefit associated with CUC’s tax deduction is nonetheless reflected in FCG’s capital structure, because the ratios of CUC’s capital structure are applied to FCG’s rate base, thus, the tax benefit reflected in the parent debt is carried over to FCG as a reduction to income when calculating income tax expense. (FCG BR 95; TR 515-516; EXH 8, MPN K724, K729)
OPC argued the Commission is required under the PDA rule to recognize the tax effect of the interest expense associated with the debt that is presumed to be invested in the equity of FCG. (OPC BR 85) This tax effect means that income tax expense of FCG must be reduced by the impact of the interest deduction that would be available to FCG for that debt that is embedded in the equity assigned to FCG. (OPC BR 85) OPC argued that CUC [FCG] erred in not making the parent debt adjustment and CUC’s [FCG’s] effort to avoid the PDA rule with its request to allocate and impute the CUC equity and debt financing as an artificial and hypothetical capital structure to FCG for determining the WACC. (OPC BR 85) OPC witness Walters argued that a parent debt adjustment is required if the Commission adopts FCG’s artificial capital structure based on an allocation of the CUC capitalization to FCG. (TR 1237) OPC witness Kollen contended that when CUC acquired FCG from FPL, CUC issued new equity, long-term debt, and short-term debt to finance the acquisition. (TR 1211-1212) OPC witness Kollen contended that the PDA rule is a function of the debt used by CUC to finance its investment in the FCG equity. (TR 1213) Because CUC allocated to FCG most of the higher cost debt CUC issued to obtain the capital to purchase FCG from FPL, the effect on FCG’s capital structure implicates the parent debt adjustment. (TR 1213) OPC witness Kollen contended that FCG’s capital structure is artificial and hypothetical and doesn’t reflect CUC’s actual capital allocation method which is 100 percent debt financing represented by the intercompany payable/receivable method used to fund FCG’s capital needs. (TR 1239-1240)
In its brief, OPC affirmed that the PDA rule contains a rebuttable presumption that reads, “[i]t shall be a rebuttable presumption that a parent’s investment in any subsidiary or its own operations shall be considered to have been made in the same ratios as exist in the parent’s overall capital structure.” (OPC BR 85; TR 1238) OPC argued that absent meeting this presumption the rule must be applied. (OPC BR 85)
In Issue 26, staff recommends that the Commission approve the long-term debt cost rate of 5.15 percent based on the embedded cost of CUC’s consolidated long-term debt. As a result, CUC’s requested recovery of the higher cost “FCG Direct” long-term debt on which OPC partly based its parent debt adjustment argument is not used to determine the WACC and calculate the interest expense of FCG. FCG’s long-term debt cost rate is the same as CUC’s (5.15 percent) and FCG would pay the same amount of interest expense as CUC on a proportional basis.
FCG does not issue its own debt or equity in the marketplace; consequently, CUC manages financing needs for FCG at the parent level. (TR 656-660) Because FCG does not issue its own debt, there is no double leverage. In the instant case, FCG has petitioned, and staff is recommending, that because FCG does not issue its own debt or equity in the marketplace, it is reasonable to allocate CUC’s investor sources of funds, debt and equity, to FCG for the purpose of setting FCG’s rates. This approach recognizes that CUC’s investor sources of funds are FCG’s investor sources of funds. Because the investor sources of funds, and in essence, the capital structures, are one and the same, the debt of CUC is not invested in the equity of FCG, and a parent debt adjustment is neither necessary nor appropriate under the PDA rule. Therefore, staff believes the record demonstrates that FCG has met the rebuttable presumption included in the PDA rule and a parent debt adjustment is not required. This is consistent with the Commission’s decision in FCG’s last rate case.[45]
CONCLUSION
A parent debt adjustment pursuant to Rule 25-14.004, F.A.C., is not required.
What is the appropriate amount of 2027 projected test year Income Tax Expense?
Recommendation:
The appropriate amount of projected test year Income Tax Expense, including current and deferred income taxes and interest synchronization, is negative $3,492,806. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate revised amount of Income Taxes Expense is $2,168,469 for the 2027 Test Year.
OPC:
The appropriate amount of Income Tax Expense for the 2027 projected test year should be no more than $3,959,700.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fallout issue. The interest synchronization in the amount of $2,572,114, is based on the changes to the capital structure as recommended by staff. Based on staff’s recommendations in previous issues, the appropriate amount of projected test year Income Tax Expense, including current and deferred income taxes and interest synchronization, is negative $3,492,806.
Table 48-1
Staff Adjusted Income Tax Expense
|
MFR Amount Requested |
($2,195,888) |
|
Staff Adjustments: |
|
|
Interest Synchronization Adjustment |
($2,572,114) |
|
Fallout Adj. – Federal Income Taxes |
998,472 |
|
Fallout Adj. – State Income Taxes |
276,724 |
|
Total Staff Adjustments |
($1,296,918) |
|
|
|
|
Staff Adjusted Amount |
($3,492,806) |
Source: MFR G Schedules, Staff Calculations.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate amount of 2027 projected test year Income Tax Expense, including current and deferred income taxes and interest synchronization is negative $3,492,806.
What is the appropriate amount of Total Operating Expenses for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate amount of Total Operating Expenses for the 2027 projected test year is $72,606,155. (Byrne)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate amount of Total Operating Expenses in the projected test year is $78,854,336. Furthermore, outside services expense should not be reduced, because the 2027 projected amount reflects expenses related to specific engagements for legal, consulting, and audit services which are required to support FCG’s regulated operations, including external audit fees for the FERC Form No. 2 and for SEC reports, legal support for regulatory proceedings, and technical support related to the ERP implementation.
OPC:
The appropriate amount of Total Operating Expenses for the 2027 projected test year should be no more than $62,949,891.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fallout issue. Based on staff’s recommendations in previous issues, the appropriate amount of Total Operating Expenses for the projected test year is $72,606,155.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate amount of Total Operating Expenses for the projected test year is $72,606,155.
What is the appropriate amount of Net Operating Income for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate amount of NOI for the 2027 projected test year is $21,177,153. (Dasher)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate Net Operating Income amount to be included in the projected test year is $14,928,971.
OPC:
The appropriate amount of Net Operating Income for the 2027 projected test year should be at least $32,044,508.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fallout issue. Based on staff’s recommendations in previous issues, the appropriate amount of net operating income for the 2027 projected test year is $21,177,153.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate amount of NOI for the 2027 projected test year is $21,177,153.
What revenue expansion factor and net operating income multiplier should be approved for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate revenue expansion factor for FCG is 74.0363 percent and the appropriate net income multiplier for FCG is 1.3507. (Dasher)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate revenue expansion factor and net operating income multiplier for the 2027 projected test year are 74.0363% and 1.3507, respectively.
OPC:
This issue is dependent on the resolution of Issue 34. Based on OPC’s recommended bad debt rate, the revenue expansion factor and net operating income multiplier should be 74.1099% and 1.349347, respectively.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
As reflected on MFR G-4, FCG requested the revenue expansion factor and net operating income multiplier for the 2027 projected test year are 74.0363 percent and 1.3507, respectively. Based on staff’s recommendation in Issue 34, the revenue expansion factor and the net operating income multiplier for the 2027 projected test year are 74.0363 percent and 1.3507, respectively.
OPC witness Schultz stated that the Company erred in its calculation of bad debt expense and the revenue expansion factor and net income multiplier is dependent on Issue 34. Witness Schultz recommended an adjustment that resulted in the revenue expansion factor and net operating income multiplier for the 2027 projected test year of 74.1099 percent and 1.349347, respectively. (OPC BR 88)
Table 51-1
Revenue Expansion Factor & NOI Multiplier Per MFRs
|
Line No. |
Description |
Company |
|
1 |
Revenue Requirement |
100.0000% |
|
2 |
Regulatory Assessment Rate |
0.5000% |
|
3 |
Bad Debt Rate |
0.3288% |
|
4 |
Net Before Income Taxes (1)-(2)-(3) |
99.1712% |
|
5 |
State Income Tax Rate |
5.5000% |
|
6 |
State Income Tax (5 x 6) |
5.4544% |
|
7 |
Net Before Federal Income Tax (5-7) |
93.7168% |
|
8 |
Federal Income Tax Rate |
21.0000% |
|
9 |
Federal Income Tax (8 x 9) |
19.6805% |
|
10 |
Revenue Expansion Factor (8)-(10) |
74.0363% |
|
11 |
Net Operating Income Multiplier 100% /Line 11 |
1.3507 |
Source:
EXH 2, MPN K9.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate revenue expansion factor for FCG is 74.0363 percent and the appropriate net income multiplier for FCG is 1.3507.
What is the appropriate annual operating revenue increase for the 2027 projected test year?
Recommendation:
The appropriate annual operating revenue increase for the 2027 projected test year is $41,192,522. This amount includes an incremental increase of $24,789,578 and revenue associated with the transfer of SAFE investments. (Dasher)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate total annual operating revenue increase is $63,163,068, which reflects a total incremental revenue increase of $46,760,124 and the difference of $16,402,944 representing SAFE investments rolled into base rates.
OPC:
None. Based on OPC’s adjustments, FCG has a revenue sufficiency of at least $4,514,058 for the 2027 projected test year.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fallout issue. Based on staff’s recommendations in previous issues, the appropriate total annual operating revenue increase for the 2027 projected test year is $38,372,961, as reflected on the table below:
Table 52-1
Staff’s Recommended Annual Operating Revenue Increase
|
Operating Revenue Increase |
$41,192,522 |
|
Transfer of SAFE Investments |
(16,402,944) |
|
Incremental Revenue Increase |
$24,789,578 |
Source: Staff Calculations.
CONCLUSION
The appropriate annual operating revenue increase for the 2027 projected test year is $41,192,522. This amount includes an incremental increase of $24,789,578 and revenue associated with the transfer of SAFE investments.
What is the appropriate cost of service methodology to allocate costs to the rate classes?
Recommendation:
Based on the evidence presented, the appropriate cost of service methodology to allocate costs to the rate classes is the methodology proposed by FCG (proposed COSS) and set forth in the MFR H schedules. FCG showed that there is a correlation between customer growth and distribution mains investment. This proves that customer expansion drives mains investment rather than being driven solely by peak demand or annual usage. Furthermore, staff does not believe it would be appropriate for the Commission to direct FCG to change the demand allocation factor in the next rate case as advocated by FEA. The appropriate demand allocation factor should be based on the evidence presented in the next rate case. Therefore, the proposed Cost Of Service Studies (COSS) contained in FCG’s MFR H schedules should be approved. (Ward)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The appropriate cost of service methodology is set forth in the Company’s MFR H schedules and includes a proposed Customer/Demand classification and allocation methodology to better match cost causation. The Customer/Demand approach is applied only to small diameter mains and allows the Company to improve cost alignment for a significant portion of distribution mains investment while maintaining continuity with established methods for the remainder of the system.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FCG allocates costs based on a capacity or demand allocation factor based on equal weighting of monthly peak sales and average annual sales. This is problematic. Capacity costs are designed to serve peak day or peak hour demand. Average monthly peaks do not reasonably capture the capacity additions need to provide reliable firm service because a peak month demand can be very different than a peak day demand. The development of demand allocation factors should reflect how the system is designed to serve peak demands and provide reliable firm service. The appropriate cost of service methodology to allocate capacity costs is peak day demand as described by FEA witness Gorman.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
In his testimony, FCG witness Taylor stated that “In this case, two COSS (Cost of Service Studies) were developed for comparative purposes: (1) Proposed COSS – Customer/Demand Classification of Distribution Mains and (2) the Supplemental COSS – Demand-Based Classification of Distribution Mains.” (TR 351) Witness Taylor explained that the supplemental COSS, which was provided for informational purposes, was conducted in accordance with methods widely adopted in this jurisdiction and is presented in his testimony. (EXH 20, MPN C17-544-562; TR 351) Witness Taylor additionally asserted that the proposed COSS reflects the Company’s proposed classification and allocation of mains investments. (EXH 9, MPN K746-766; TR 351)
Witness Taylor asserted that the primary distinction between the supplemental COSS and the proposed COSS is the treatment of distribution mains. (TR 357) He stated that in the supplemental COSS, distribution mains are classified entirely as demand-related, whereas in the proposed COSS, distribution mains are classified using a customer/demand approach. (TR 357). Witness Taylor stated that all other aspects of the methodology remain consistent between the two studies. (TR 357)
Witness Taylor stated that the Company is proposing a shift toward a customer/demand classification and allocation methodology to refine cost allocation to better match cost causation. (TR 356) Witness Taylor explained that “Given that this represents a change in methodology, the Company proposes a phased implementation. Specifically, the Customer/Demand approach is applied only to small diameter mains, while larger diameter mains continue to be classified and allocated under the Peak and Average method.” (TR 356) Witness Taylor clarified that, for purposes of the mains classification analysis, the Company categorizes distribution mains with diameters of 2 inches and less as small mains. (TR 356) Witness Taylor asserted that “Under the proposed customer/demand COSS, small diameter mains are classified as 60 percent customer-related and 40 percent demand-related. Since small mains represent approximately 50 percent of total mains investment, this results in approximately 30 percent of total mains being classified as customer-related.” (TR 356-357) Witness Taylor additionally explained that the customer-related portion is allocated based on the number of customers, while the demand-related portion is allocated based on peak and average factor. (TR 357) He also stated that this approach allows the Company to improve cost alignment for a significant portion of distribution mains investment while maintaining continuity with established methods for the remainder of the system. (TR 357)
Witness Taylor provided a table that showed the relationship between customer growth and distribution mains investment. (TR 364) Witness Taylor explained that the analysis represented in this table highlights a strong correlation between customer growth and investment in distribution mains, demonstrating that as the number of customers increases, so too does the total investment in infrastructure. (TR 364) He testified that this relationship highlights how customer expansion drives mains investment rather than being driven solely by peak demand or annual usage. (TR 364)
FEA witness Gorman testified that he supports the Company’s proposal to classify costs based on both demand and customer components, as this classification more accurately aligns with how these costs are incurred in order to provide service to each of the rate classes. (TR 1425) However, witness Gorman took issue with the Company’s development of the demand or capacity cost allocation factor. (TR 1425) Witness Gorman asserted that the Company develops a capacity or demand allocation factor based on an equal weighting of monthly peak sales and average annual sales, and that developing demand allocation factors in this manner does not align with how the Company designs its system to reliably meet customers’ demands every day of the year and to be able to provide firm service to all of its customers. (TR 1425) Witness Gorman further asserted that monthly peak throughput is a distorted gauge of the design day demand that the system is designed for which causes the system capacity to incur capacity or demand costs. (TR 1431) Witness Gorman stated that witness Taylor’s capacity or demand allocator is largely a throughput allocation because average demand is included in both peak month sales and is the average annual sales factor used by witness Taylor to derive the capacity cost allocator. (TR 1431)
Witness Gorman recommended that the Commission should direct FCG to change its demand allocation factor in the next rate case to use of a design day demand based capacity cost allocator and discontinue the use of a peak and average based capacity cost allocator. (TR 1431-1432; FEA BR 12) Witness Gorman asserted that a design day demand capacity cost allocator would allocate capacity costs to rate classes in proportion to the amount of capacity costs FCG must incur to provide firm service to its rate classes. (TR 1432; FEA BR 12)
In rebuttal testimony, witness Taylor stated that design day is a useful allocation method, and witness Gorman’s recommendation on its use is reasonable, particularly for more northern climates where there is high weather-sensitive usage and design day criteria is more influential than peak month demand when setting capacity requirements. (TR 388) Witness Taylor further stated that, however, other contributing factors should also be considered, including the availability and reliability of class-specific demand data, the extent to which peak conditions are influenced by weather or operating conditions, the diversity of load among customer classes, the relationship between peak-period responsibility and year-round use of the shared distribution system, and the need for an allocation that can be applied consistently and transparently using auditable test-year information. (TR 388) Witness Taylor asserted that, in that context, the peak-month component of the peak and average allocator supplies an observable measure of relative class responsibility during the Company’s peak sales period, while the average component recognizes the degree to which the shared distribution system is used throughout the year and reduces the sensitivity of the allocation to the circumstances of a single month. (TR 388) Witness Taylor stated that the Commission should approve the Company’s proposed COSS in this proceeding. (TR 390) He additionally stated that witness Gorman has not provided a quantified class-specific design-day allocator or demonstrated that replacing the Company’s established approach would produce a more reliable or reasonable COSS for this case, where the residential load or throughput is significantly lower than the industrial or large volume customers and the customers all take service in a much warmer climate with less heating load as compared to more weather sensitive gas utilities. (TR 390-391)
OPC took no position on this issue.
CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence presented, the appropriate cost of service methodology to allocate costs to the rate classes is the methodology proposed by FCG (proposed COSS) and set forth in the MFR H schedules. FCG showed that there is a correlation between customer growth and distribution mains investment. This proves that customer expansion drives mains investment rather than being driven solely by peak demand or annual usage. Furthermore, staff does not believe it would be appropriate for the Commission to direct FCG to change the demand allocation factor in the next rate case as advocated by FEA. The appropriate demand allocation factor should be based on the evidence presented in the next rate case. Therefore, the proposed COSS contained in FCG’s MFR H schedules should be approved.
How should the approved revenue requirement be allocated to the rate classes?
Recommendation:
The final revenue increase to the rate classes is dependent on the Commission-approved revenue increase. Staff agrees with FCG that customer impact and the competitive nature of the natural gas industry should be considered; however, the rate classes should move towards parity to the extent possible, as advocated by FEA. (Ward)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The increase should be allocated as shown in the Company’s MFR Schedule H-1, page 2, which balances the revenue increase requirement, cost causation principles, rate stability, and customer impact considerations, while also recognizing gradualism and the competitive nature of the natural gas industry.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FCG’s proposal moves residential and certain commercial customer classes further away from cost of service. FEA witness Gorman recommends a revenue spread that moves each rate class toward cost of service, with moderation and gradualism incorporated.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This issue addresses the allocation of any revenue increase granted in Issue 52 to the rate classes. The final increase to the customer classes is largely dependent on the final revenue increase amount. To the extent possible, the revenue increase should be allocated to bring all classes closer to cost to serve; however, the Commission could also consider bill impacts, the competitive nature of the gas industry, and apply a degree of judgement.
FCG witness Taylor stated in his testimony that in developing the revenue apportionment analysis, he first adjusted the Company’s current revenue levels to reflect the inclusion of SAFE-related revenues associated with SAFE assets being rolled into base rates. (TR 371) Witness Taylor testified that multiple approaches were evaluated for allocating the increase among customer classes. (TR 371) Witness Taylor stated that, as an initial benchmark, he evaluated a fully cost-based allocation in which each customer class’s revenues were set equal to its respective cost to serve, as derived from the methodologies employed in the FCG proposed COSS. (TR 371) He further stated that a second option considered was to allocate the proposed revenue increase across all customer classes on an equal percentage basis relative to their current revenues. (TR 372) Witness Taylor asserted that while neither approach was ultimately adopted in full, together they established a reasonable range of outcomes. (TR 372) Witness Taylor testified that this range provided a structured framework to guide the development of the Company’s final interclass revenue allocation proposal, balancing revenue increase requirement, cost causation principles, rate stability, potential bypass risks considerations, and customer impact considerations. (TR 372)
FCG’s proposed revenue increase to the rate classes, which includes the proposed transfer of SAFE investment revenues, is contained in Exhibit JT-3 of witness Taylor’s testimony. (EXH 21, MPN C17-563-566) Witness Taylor’s proposed allocation of the revenue increase calculations reflect the ROR on a total and on an individual rate class level. ROR is calculated by dividing NOI by rate base.[46] (EXH 21, MPN C17-563-566)
FCG’s proposed class revenue apportionment was summarized in Table 5 of witness Taylor’s direct testimony. (TR 373) The residential class increase is capped at 70 percent of the system-wide increase, resulting in 30.41 percent revenue increase to the residential class. (TR 372-373; EXH 21, MPN C17-564) Witness Taylor testified that the 70 percent cap was selected as a reasonable rate design judgment to moderate the residential class increase while still moving the class toward its cost of service. (TR 372) Witness Taylors’ revenue increase calculation shows that, at present rates, the RS rate class’s parity is 96 percent while at proposed rates parity is 87 percent. (EXH 21, MPN C17-563-564) This would indicate that the residential class is slightly moving away from parity.
In addition to the residential class, witness Taylor also applied revenue increase moderation to the commercial GS-4 rate class. Witness Taylor’s proposed revenue increase for the GS-4 rate class limits the revenue increase to approximately 30 percent. (TR 373) Witness Taylor testified that this approach was adopted in response to the Company’s assessment of heightened customer sensitivity within this class. (TR 373) In response to staff’s interrogatories, witness Taylor stated that the Company determined that the GS-4 class may have heightened customer sensitivity by evaluating the proposed bill impacts for individual customers within the class. (EXH 97, MPN E194) Witness Taylor stated that the review indicated that the level of increase otherwise supported by the cost-of-service results could create a greater risk of customer response, including the potential for reduced usage, load loss, or switching to alternative energy sources where feasible. (EXH 97, MPN E194) While staff agrees that the natural gas industry has a competitive nature as natural gas customers may have alternate fuel sources or bypass, consideration should be given to both the competitive nature of the natural gas industry and movement towards cost-based rates. The parity ratio of the GS-4 rate class moves from 82 percent at present rates to 75 percent at proposed rates. (EXH 21, MPH C17-565-566)
FEA witness Gorman asserted that witness Taylor’s proposed class spread does not move rate classes closer to cost of service. (TR 1440) FEA asserted that “FCG’s proposal moves residential and certain commercial customer classes further away from cost of service.” (FEA BR 2) Witness Gorman stated that the class revenue spread should be designed to bring all classes to cost of service or closer to cost of service using a gradual movement toward cost of service. (TR 1441) With respect to the residential class, witness Gorman testified that the proposed class spread moves this class further below the cost of service. (TR 1441) Based on FCG’s revenue increase calculations, staff agrees with witness Gorman.
Witness Gorman additionally stated that the proposed class spread moves the GS-2 and GS-3 rate classes further above cost of service. (TR 1441) Witness Gorman recommends “a class revenue spread based on the results of the COSS but limited so no class gets an increase of more than 1.2 times the system average increase, and no less than 0.5 times the system average increase.” (TR 1441)
By limiting the increase to the RS and GS-4 rate classes, as proposed by FCG, the remaining classes would have to absorb the difference. For instance, witness Taylor shows that the GS-2 rate class at current rates has a parity ratio of 99 percent, while under proposed rates the parity ratio is 123 percent. (EXH 21, MPN C17-563-564) Staff notes that any increase would be mitigated by staff’s recommended annual revenue increase shown in Issue 52. To develop the final increase by rate class, FCG should to the extent possible, move the rate classes towards parity and not further away from parity.
In rebuttal testimony, FCG witness Taylor testified that, while FEA proposes an alternative revenue apportionment, witness Gorman does not reject the general principle that class revenues should continue to move closer to cost responsibility while considering gradualism and customer impact. (TR 391) Witness Taylor asserted that FEA’s recommendations primarily concern the degree of movement among classes. (TR 391) He stated that FEA’s proposal generally recognizes cost-of-service results as an important reference point but applies different judgments regarding the appropriate degree of movement among classes in this proceeding. (TR 391) Witness Taylor further testified that
cost-of-service study results provide an important analytical foundation for revenue apportionment, but they do not mechanically determine the revenue increase assigned to each customer class. Different revenue-apportionment proposals may reasonably result because judgment is required to determine how quickly each class should move toward its indicated cost of service while considering gradualism, rate stability, customer impacts, existing rate relationships, contractual limitations, and other relevant ratemaking considerations. (TR 392-393)
Witness Taylor additionally stated that the Company’s proposal applies a more mitigated increase to the residential class in order to limit the magnitude of the rate impact on residential customers, while still materially improving the class’s ROR. (TR 393) Table 1R, provided by witness Taylor in his rebuttal testimony, compares the revenue increase by class between FCG and FEA. (TR 392) Under FCG’s proposal, 34.41 percent of the increase would be allocated to the residential class. (TR 392) Under FEA’s proposal, 53.67 percent of the increase would be allocated to the residential class. (TR 392)
In its brief, FCG asserted that the Company’s proposal appropriately mitigates the impact to the residential class while moving the residential standby generator and commercial standby generator classes to their cost to serve, reflecting appropriate consideration of gradualism, rate stability, and customer impacts. (FCG BR 93)
OPC took no position on this issue.
CONCLUSION
The final revenue increase to the rate classes is dependent on the Commission-approved revenue increase. Staff agrees with FCG that customer impact and the competitive nature of the natural gas industry should be considered; however, the rate classes should move towards parity to the extent possible, as advocated by FEA.
Should the Commission approve FCG’s proposal to consolidate the residential RS-1, RS-100, and RS-600 rate classes into a single residential rate class be approved?
Recommendation:
Yes. The consolidation of residential rate classes RS-1, RS-100, and RS-600 is appropriate and should be approved. If the Commission approves the revised rate structure, FCG should be required to file revised tariffs, for administrative approval by staff, with the approved rate structure in the following clause/surcharge dockets: (1) Safety, access, and facility enhancement program true-up and 2027 cost recovery factors (Docket No. 20260134-GU), (2) Swing Service Rider (Docket No. 20260138-GU), (3) Natural Gas Facilities Relocation (Docket No. 20260011-GU), and (4) Natural Gas Conservation Cost Recovery (20260004-GU).
(P. Kelley)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The existing residential rate schedules are consolidated to simplify the rate structure and improve consistency in how residential customers are served and billed. Consolidating the residential rate schedules will align customers more closely with the cost to serve and reduce intra-class subsidization.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
In order to improve rate design, enhance administrative efficiency, and better align customer classes with usage characteristics, witness Taylor stated that several proposed changes where necessary to its existing rate schedules and customer class structure. (TR 340) For one of the changes, FCG proposed to consolidate its existing residential service classes of RS-1, RS-100, and RS-600 into a single residential class. (TR 342) Witness Taylor asserted that the primary objective in consolidating residential rate schedules is to better align rates with the cost of providing service and minimize subsidies among customers within the same class. (TR 342)
Witness Taylor contended that the proposed consolidation of the residential class is due to an observed ongoing trend of decline in consumption and relatively low customer charges, resulting in under-recovery of fixed costs associated with serving residential customers. (TR 342) Witness Taylor expressed that the issue continues to compound as the customer base grows within the smaller residential classes, increasing the overall shortfall in cost recovery. (TR 342) Also, due to the structure of the classes, customers can move between the different rate classes due to minor changes in their consumption. While this does not cause a meaningful difference in the cost to serve them, it can lead to a variability in their classification and billing outcomes. (TR 343)
In testimony, witness Taylor
stated that FCG expects declining usage and misalignment in cost recovery to
continue under the current rate classes. Without structural changes, such as
the proposed consolidation, FCG states that the condition would result in
ongoing revenue imbalances across residential customers. By consolidating the
existing RS-1, RS-100, and RS-600 into a single class and re-evaluating cost
responsibility, FCG would be able to better align its rate design with the
underlying cost of providing service and establish a more reliable revenue
framework. (TR 343) Staff believes that
the consolidation of residential rate classes RS-1, RS-100, and RS-600 is
reasonable because it better aligns with the cost of providing service and
reduces intra-class subsidization. Therefore, staff recommends the proposed
consolidation should be approved.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the
consolidation of residential rate classes RS-1, RS-100, and RS-600 is
appropriate and should be approved. If
the Commission approves the revised rate structure, FCG should be required to
file revised tariffs, for administrative approval by staff, with the approved
rate structure in the following clause/surcharge dockets: (1) Safety, access,
and facility enhancement program true-up and 2027 cost recovery factors (Docket
No. 20260134-GU), (2) Swing Service Rider (Docket No. 20260138-GU), (3) Natural
Gas Facilities Relocation (Docket No. 20260011-GU), and (4) Natural Gas
Conservation Cost Recovery (20260004-GU).
Should the Commission approve FCG’s proposal to restructure commercial rate schedules GS-1, GS6K, and GS-25K?
Recommendation:
Yes. The restructuring of commercial rate schedules GS-1, GS6K, and GS-25K is appropriate and should be approved. If the Commission approves the revised rate structure, FCG should be required to file revised tariffs, for administrative approval by staff, with the approved rate structure in the following clause/surcharge dockets: (1) Safety, access, and facility enhancement program true-up and 2027 cost recovery factors (Docket No. 20260134-GU), (2) Swing Service Rider (Docket No. 20260138-GU), (3) Natural Gas Facilities Relocation (Docket No. 20260011-GU), and (4) Natural Gas Conservation Cost Recovery (20260004-GU).
(P. Kelley)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The applicability thresholds for commercial rate schedules, including General Service -1 (“GS-1”), General Service - 6K (“GS 6K”), and General Service - 25K (“GS-25K”), are modified to further align customer class definitions with those used by CUC’s other operating entities. This change promotes consistency and supports a more standardized and administratively efficient rate structure. The proposed approach is also consistent with industry literature on developing sound rate structures.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
ANALYSIS
A
s discussed in Issue 55, FCG
proposed changes to its existing rate schedules and customer class structure.
In addition to proposed consolidation of the residential classes, FCG proposed the restructuring of commercial
rate schedules GS-1, GS6K, and GS-25K, while all other rate schedules remain
unchanged. The proposed changes for the commercial rate class involve
adjustments to the applicability threshold. (TR 344) Witness Taylor testified
that the reason for this restructuring is to further align customer class
definitions with those used by CUC’s other operating entities. The change would
help with consistency across companies, by standardizing the rate classes, thus
making a more administratively efficient rate structure. (TR 340) The Company
proposed commercial rate class schedules are shown below in Table 56-1.
Table 56-1
Proposed Restructuring of Rate Classes
|
Current Customer Class |
Current Applicability |
Proposed Customer Class |
Proposed Applicability |
Number of Customers |
Sales in Therms |
|
GS-1 |
0-5,999 |
GS-1 |
0-9,999 |
5,730 |
13,309,708 |
|
GS-6K |
6,000-24,999 |
GS-1 |
< = 9,999 |
1,413 |
10,016,907 |
|
GS-2 (10K) |
>= 10,000 < = 49,999 |
1,329 |
18,108,669 |
||
|
GS-25K |
25,000-119,999 |
GS-2 (10K) |
>= 10,000 < = 49,999 |
291 |
8,283,768 |
|
GS-3 (50K) |
>= 50,000 <= 119,999 |
103 |
6,357,270 |
Source: TR 344; EXH 107, MPN
E470.
Witness Taylor stated that the Company analyzed historical customer
consumption data from 2022 through 2025 to evaluate annual patterns and
establish the appropriate applicability thresholds for commercial rate classes
for CUC’s local distribution operating entities, FCG and FPUC. (TR 344) The
evaluation was focused on commercial classes with consumption levels below
120,000 per year and included reviewing customer frequency distributions, consumption
pattens, and the relative density of customers across usage ranges. (TR
344-345)
Witness Taylor testified that in the evaluation of different customer
classes, FCG found additional classes with breakpoints below 10,000 therms
would not meaningfully distinguish consumption characteristics and would
instead introduce unnecessary complexity, increased administrative burdens, and
have a greater potential for customer to move between classes due to normal
usage variances. (TR 345) Customers with annual consumption between 10,000 and
50,000 therms use enough gas to warrant a structured progression in
applicability thresholds to improve consistency in how customers are grouped as usage increases, as they are in the middle
between low and high usage customers. (TR 345)
Witness Taylor contended that the 50,000 therm threshold was selected as
the start of the upper limit for intermediate classes, to create a clear and practical transition point to higher-volume
customers. Customers using an annual therm threshold of 50,000 or more generally
exhibited larger and more consistent consumption patterns making them more suitable for potential future rate design considerations
such as demand-based components. (TR 345) Witness
Taylor explained that the Company’s proposed commercial rate class structure is
not fully aligned with the current structures used by CUC’s other operating
utilities. (TR 346) However, the Company evaluated consumption for both FCG and
FPUC to establish more comparable applicability thresholds and promote greater
consistency in rate design. According to witness Taylor, CUC anticipates
further alignment to be addressed in future rate proceedings. (TR 346)
Staff believes the proposed commercial rate class structure is reasonable
because it is based on historical customer consumption patterns and establishes
applicability thresholds that meaningfully distinguish customer usage levels. Staff
believes that the restructuring of
commercial rate schedules GS-1, GS6K, and GS-25K, is fair to further align
customer class definitions with those used by CUC’s other operating entities
and to help with the consistency across companies, by standardizing the rate
classes, thus making a more administratively efficient rate structure. The
proposed restructuring is reasonable and should be approved.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above, the restructuring of commercial rate schedules GS-1, GS6K, and GS-25K is appropriate and should be approved. If the Commission approves the revised rate structure, FCG should be required to file revised tariffs, for administrative approval by staff, with the approved rate structure in the following clause/surcharge dockets: (1) Safety, access, and facility enhancement program true-up and 2027 cost recovery factors (Docket No. 20260134-GU), (2) Swing Service Rider (Docket No. 20260138-GU), (3) Natural Gas Facilities Relocation (Docket No. 20260011-GU), and (4) Natural Gas Conservation Cost Recovery (20260004-GU).
Are FCG’s proposed Customer Charges appropriate?
Recommendation:
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference. (Nguyen)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The proposed customer charge adjustments were determined by considering multiple factors. The customer-related unit cost, as calculated in MFR Schedule H-l, served as the baseline. The proposed customer charge for residential class reflects the consolidation of rate classes and aligns the recovery of fixed costs with the nature of the fixed costs incurred by the Company, while also considering customer bill impacts.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
CONCLUSION
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
Are FCG’s proposed per therm Non-Fuel Energy and Transportation Charges appropriate?
Recommendation:
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference. (Nguyen)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The "Non-Fuel Energy Charge”, which applies to the sales service rate schedules and the “Transportation Charge,” which applies to the transportation service rate schedules, should be approved.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
CONCLUSION
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
Are FCG’s proposed Demand Charges appropriate?
Recommendation:
No. This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference. (Nguyen)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The demand charges reflected on MFR Schedule H-l, Schedule A, reflects the appropriate demand charges.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
CONCLUSION
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
Are FCG’s proposed miscellaneous service charges appropriate?
Recommendation:
Yes. Staff recommends that the appropriate miscellaneous service charges are contained in Table 60-1 and should be approved. (P. Kelley)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Company’s proposed miscellaneous service charges were independently evaluated based on operational cost, and projected miscellaneous charge revenues were calculated by applying the proposed service charge amounts to a projected level of occurrences.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
The miscellaneous service charges are fixed charges that are paid when a specified activity occurs, such as the initial connection of a residential or business, a change of account, or a late payment. The miscellaneous service charges are designed to recover the billing, personnel, and other overhead costs associated with the specific charges. FCG proposed revisions to its miscellaneous service charges. Table 60-1 shows FCG’s present and proposed charges, as well as charges that FCG plans to combine into one charge and other charges to be removed.
Table 60-1
FCG Proposed and Staff’s Recommended Miscellaneous Service Charges
|
Current
Miscellaneous Service Charges |
Current |
Proposed |
Staff Recommended |
|
Connect Charge (Residential) |
$90 |
$95 |
$95 |
|
Connect Charge (Non-Residential) |
$150 |
$150 |
$150 |
|
Reconnection Charge (Residential) |
$90 |
$90 |
$90 |
|
Reconnection (Non-Residential) |
$105 |
$120 |
$120 |
|
Failed Trip Charge |
$20 |
$55 |
$55 |
|
Change of Account |
$20 |
$55 |
$55 |
|
Temporary Disconnection |
$35 |
$55 |
$55 |
|
Connect Charge (R) (Outside Business Hours)* |
$110 |
$200 |
$200 |
|
Connect Charge (NR) (Outside Business Hours)* |
$200 |
$200 |
$200 |
|
Reconnection (R) (Outside Business Hours)* |
$105 |
$200 |
$200 |
|
Reconnection (NR) (Outside Business Hours)* |
$120 |
$200 |
$200 |
|
Temporary Disconnect (Outside Business Hours)* |
$45 |
$200 |
$200 |
|
Bill Collection in Lieu of Disconnection |
$25 |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Bill Collection in Lieu of Disconnection (Outside Business Hours) |
$32 |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Meter Read (Outside Normal Schedule) |
$15 |
N/A |
N/A |
|
Meter Read (ONS) (Outside Business Hours) |
$22 |
N/A |
N/A |
|
*Proposed charges are applicable for same day and outside of business hours |
|||
Source:
TR 917.
FCG provided cost justification in support of its proposed miscellaneous service charges. (EXH 6, K133-K138) The increased charges are driven by FCG’s operations department reviewing historical work orders, labor costs, transportation costs, and overheads, which were applied to tasks based upon the estimated time to perform the job. Witness Husted stated that adding in typical costs, and the average time to complete is how FCG determined the final service charge amounts. (TR 916-917) Additionally, witness Husted asserted that the proposed charges align with FPUC’s service charges in preparation for any future consolidation of the entities. (TR 917) For those charges FCG proposed to remove, witness Husted contended that the Company no longer performs the activity for the safety of their employees. (TR 918; EXH 97, MPN E203) Staff believes the proposed charges are reasonable and should be approved.
CONCLUSION
Based on above, staff recommends that the appropriate miscellaneous service charges are contained in Table 60-1 and should be approved.
Are FCG’s proposed revisions to the Area Expansion Program (AEP) appropriate?
Recommendation:
Yes. FCG’s proposed revisions to its AEP, Tariff Sheet No. 7.300, are appropriate and should be approved. The proposed changes will result in more clarity for the customer concerning the AEP surcharge rate and reduce inquiries from customers, as well as allow for more straightforward administration of the AEP surcharge by the Company. (Guffey)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. Approval of the proposed changes to the AEP will make the program less confusing for customers and allow for more efficient administration of the AEP surcharge by the Company. The AEP surcharge will be calculated based on the number of projected premises located on the extension facilities, resulting in a fixed (monthly) AEP recovery charge.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Rule 25-7.054, F.A.C., establishes that the maximum
capital investment to be made by the Company for main and service facilities
without cost to the customer is defined as the maximum allowable construction
cost (MACC). The rule
ensures that costs caused by the new customer are not borne by the general body
of ratepayers. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure that extensions are
made to serve new customers with no upfront cost to the customer if the
anticipated revenue obtained through service to the new customer will provide
the Company with a reasonable opportunity to recoup its initial capital
investment in the new facilities within a reasonable amount of time. If the
MACC exceeds the actual costs, the customer is required to pay an advance or Contributions
in Aid of Construction for the difference. (TR 920)
FCG witness Husted asserted that the AEP is a variation on the cost recovery model for extensions to serve new customers. (TR 919) Witness Husted indicated that the AEP is another way to recover construction costs/capital investments that exceed the MACC and had been in effect for FCG since April 24, 1995. (TR 920-921) The AEP tariff is designed to provide FCG with an optional method to recover its capital investment in providing natural gas service to customers in a discrete geographic area who do not have gas service available and do not meet feasibility criteria to obtain gas without increasing costs to existing customers.[47] The existing AEP tariff provides for the determination of a surcharge, over a ten-year amortization period or 120 billing months, based on the amount of additional revenue required in excess of the applicable tariff divided by the volume of gas forecasted to be sold and transported to customers in the discrete geographic area during the amortization period. (TR 921) FCG witness Husted asserted that the periodic recalculation and adjustments to the AEP surcharge in later periods result in customer confusion and complexities in administration of the charge. (TR 921)
With
the acquisition by CUC, FCG proposed to revise the AEP to align with FPUC’s
natural gas division and prepare for future consolidation of FCG and FPUC. (TR
921) The Company proposed three modifications to its AEP and associated cost
recovery mechanism, as a replacement for FCG’s existing AEP. The proposed
revisions are (1) the AEP Recovery amount would be divided by the number of
customer premises projected to be served to establish a fixed rate, (2) the 120
billing months amortization period would be suspended when the premise is
inactive, and (3) the reassessment of the AEP surcharge would be eliminated due
to the change to a fixed rate. (TR 922) A fixed rate is expected to reduce
customer confusion as it will provide bill stability and be easier for
customers to understand. As such, customers will be able to better anticipate
the impact of the AEP charge on their bill as it would not fluctuate with usage
changes like a volumetric rate would. (EXH 97, MPN E210)
These
revisions align FCG's AEP with FPUC's AEP, except for FPUC’s 72 billing months
amortization period. The Company asserts that if any future consolidation of
the entities occurs, the Company would decide at that time about aligning the
amortization periods of the two programs. (EXH 97, MPN E208) The Company
believes that these changes will result in more clarity for the customer
concerning the AEP surcharge rate and reduce inquiries from customers, as well
as allow for more straightforward administration of the AEP surcharge by the
Company. (TR 922) The AEP Rider is found on Sheet No. 7.300 of the proposed
tariff. (TR 1064)
As
discussed in Issue 11, the Company proposed to discontinue the current AEP
surcharges when new rates go into effect for existing projects and to transfer
all un-recovered excess construction costs from the current AEP program as of
December 31, 2026, to the applicable capital plant construction account. (TR
923; TR 948)
CONCLUSION
FCG’s proposed revisions to its AEP, Tariff Sheet No. 7.300, are appropriate and should be approved. The proposed changes will result in more clarity for the customer concerning the AEP surcharge rate and reduce inquiries from customers, as well as allow for more straightforward administration of the AEP surcharge by the Company.
Is FCG’s proposed new Minimum Volume Commitment (proposed Original Sheet No. 6.152, provision 2) and associated Agreement (proposed Original Sheet Nos. 8.123 – 8.126) for customers who require an extension of facilities appropriate?
Recommendation:
Yes. FCG’s proposed new Minimum Volume Commitment (proposed Original Sheet No. 6.152, provision 2) and associated Agreement (proposed Original Sheet Nos. 8.123 – 8.126) for customers who require an extension of facilities are appropriate and should be approved. The proposed revisions are reasonable and reduce risk to the general body of ratepayers if the revenues do not materialize as projected. (Guffey)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The tariff modification would provide the Company with the option to require a non-residential customer that will need a facility extension to receive service, to commit to receive service at a defined minimum level and to pay for such minimum level of service - whether utilized or not - in accordance with a proposed “take-or-pay” provision.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
The Company proposed a new Minimum Volume Commitment or “take or pay”
provision in tariff Sheet No. 6.152 and the corresponding proposed Minimum
Volume Commitment Agreement in tariff Sheet Nos. 8.123 through 8.126. (EXH 6,
MPN K205; EXH 6, MPN K408-411) FCG witness Grimard explained that the proposed tariff
modification would provide the Company with the option to require a customer
that will need a facility extension to receive service, to commit to receive
service at a defined minimum level of gas and to pay for such minimum level of
service - whether utilized or not - in accordance with the proposed “take-or-pay”
provision. (TR 1064) The Minimum Volume Commitment would not exceed six years.
Staff believes the provision is reasonable because it protects the general body
of ratepayers from bearing any costs associated with Company investments made
to serve individual customers.
CONCLUSION
FCG’s proposed new Minimum Volume Commitment (proposed Original Sheet No. 6.152, provision 2) and associated Agreement (proposed Original Sheet Nos. 8.123 – 8.126) for customers who require an extension of facilities are appropriate and should be approved. The proposed revisions are reasonable because they reduce risk to the general body of ratepayers if the revenues do not materialize as projected.
Is FCG’s proposed revision to its Load Enhancement (LE) rate schedule appropriate?
Recommendation:
Yes. FCG’s proposed revision to its LE rate schedule is appropriate and should be approved. The proposed changes to the LE rate schedule, including a Commission pre-approved pro-forma tariff agreement and an associated affidavit to be executed by the Company and Customer will allow the Company to discount its distribution rates to retain large customers that have the ability to bypass or use alternative fuel on its system. (Guffey)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Company is proposing a tariffed agreement to be included in the Company’s published tariff. Upon entering into a LE-CTS Agreement with a customer, the Company would file a notice with the Commission Clerk notifying the Commission that it is utilizing its LE-CTS agreement for that specific customer. This will enhance the Company’s ability to retain large Customers that have the ability (on a timely basis) to bypass or use alternative fuel.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
The objective of the LE Rate Schedule is to enable the Company to retain or obtain significant load on its system by providing the Company with the flexibility to negotiate individual service agreements with non-Residential Customers considering competitive and economic market conditions and overall system benefits. This rate schedule is applicable to customers with Alternate Fuel capabilities who execute a Load Enhancement - Contract Transportation Service (LE-CTS) Affidavit (Sheet Nos. 8.113-8.114) and an LE-CTS Agreement (Sheet Nos. 8.115-8.122), which is accepted by the Company, for a minimum term of one year, and who transport over 250,000 Therms annually.
The Company proposed changes to its LE rate schedule, including a
Commission pre-approved pro-forma tariff agreement and an associated affidavit to
be executed by the Company and Customer. The Company’s LE Rate Schedule allows it
to discount its distribution rates to retain large system customers that can
bypass FCG or use alternative fuel. Currently, the Company must file a special
contract with the Commission for approval of the service agreement. The Company
is proposing pre-approved pro-forma and a pre-approved agreement. Upon entering
into a LE-CTS Agreement with a Customer, the Company would file a notice with
the Commission Clerk notifying the Commission that it is utilizing its
pre-approved pro-forma agreement for a specific customer. (TR 1065)
In response to staff’s discovery, FCG stated that the LE-CTS agreement
included in the proposed tariff will be a pro-forma agreement that has received
"prior approval" of the form provided by the Commission. The Company
stated that since the Commission has pre-approved the form of service, there
will be no need to petition the Commission for explicit approval, as long as
there are no substantial changes. (EXH 97, MPN E220) FCG stated that a similar
process has been approved for the same types of contracts for Peoples Gas. In
addition, FPUC follows a similar process for Commission notification. (EXH 97,
MPN E221) FCG stated that any negotiated service offering(s) different from
those contained in the pro-forma (pre-approved) agreement will need to be
explicitly approved by the Commission. (EXH 97, MPN E221) Staff believes that
FCG should only be allowed to make administrative changes to its agreement and
any substantial changes should require Commission-approval.
The Company explained that the proposed changes were made to align the
CTS filing processes with those that are currently in effect for FCG contracts.
Customers served under LE-CTS agreements are larger customers who typically
have competitive options available to them. Changing the process applicable to
these agreements will enable the Company to act more quickly to address the
needs of large customers, while still providing transparency regarding the
contracts themselves. (EXH 97, MPN E214) FCG asserts this process has been
approved and is currently used by Peoples Gas System for their CTS customers.
(TR 1065).
FCG stated that the change was made to provide LE-CTS services to those
customers where alternatives to natural gas, such as electric, propane, fuel
oil, and liquified natural gas, is available for use in their industrial
production for large commercial requirements such as citrus and food
processors, bottling companies and hospitals. (EXH 97, MPN E215 - 216)
Typically, because a secondary fuel source or bypass alternative opportunities could be available to larger customers (because of cost), the Company has changed the threshold to better fit with the larger customer classes. If the Company has a customer that uses less than 250,000 therms annually that has an opportunity to bypass or utilize an alternative fuel, the Company can file a Special Contract to address the specific Customer's alternative with the Commission. (EXH 97, MPN E215)
CONCLUSION
FCG’s proposed revision to its LE rate schedule is appropriate and should be approved. The proposed changes to the LE rate schedule, including a Commission pre-approved pro-forma tariff agreement and an associated affidavit to be executed by the Company and Customer will allow the Company to discount its distribution rates to retain large customers that have the ability to bypass or use alternative fuel on its system.
Is FCG’s proposal to eliminate the Gas Lighting, Natural Gas Vehicle Service and Balancing Service Rider rate schedules appropriate?
Recommendation:
Yes. FCG’s proposal to eliminate the Gas Lighting, Natural Gas Vehicle Service, and Balancing Service Rider rate schedules is appropriate and should be approved. Currently, there are currently no customers taking service under the Gas Lighting and Natural Gas Vehicle Service rate schedules. The termination of the Balancing Service Rider has been approved by the Commission in Docket No. 20260138-GU at the November 3, 2026, Commission Conference. (Guffey)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Gas Lighting rate schedule and the Natural Gas Vehicle Service rate schedule are proposed to be eliminated, because of the lack of participation by customers under these rate schedules. The Company proposes to eliminate its Balancing Service Rider because it intends to seek approval to adopt the Swing Service methodology used by Florida Public Utilities Company.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
To improve rate design, enhance administrative efficiency, and to better
align customer classes with usage characteristics, FCG is proposing the elimination
of Gas Lighting Rate Schedule and the Natural Gas Vehicle Service Rate Schedule
as there are currently no customers taking service under these rate schedule.
(TR 341) Additionally, the Commission approved FCG’s proposal to eliminate its
Balancing Service Rider and in its place adopt FPUC’s Swing Service calculation
methodology along with a phased-in approach to implementation in Docket No.
20260138-GU. (TR 1068)
CONCLUSION
FCG’s proposal to eliminate the Gas Lighting, Natural Gas Vehicle Service, and Balancing Service Rider rate schedules is appropriate and should be approved. Currently, there are currently no customers taking service under the Gas Lighting and Natural Gas Vehicle Service rate schedules. The termination of the Balancing Service Rider has been approved by the Commission in Docket No. 20260138-GU at the November 3, 2026 Commission Conference.
Should the Commission approve FCG’s proposed new Operational Balancing Account tariff (proposed original Sheet Nos. 7.212-7.213)?
Recommendation:
Yes. Staff recommends the Commission approve FCG’s proposed Operational Balancing Account tariff, because the tariff would allow FCG to recover Third Party Supplier related costs. Additionally, the proposed tariff would allow FCG to further align its transportation service programs with FPUC. (Hampson)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Company is proposing to adopt FPUC’s Operational Balancing Account schedule that has been previously approved by the Commission. This new rate schedule will serve the same purpose as in the FPUC tariff and will provide a recovery mechanism for TPS fuel-related expenses. By standardizing the transportation service rules and processes for FCG and FPUC, CUC is able to provide a more uniform service level across the sister companies’ platform.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
The Operational Balancing Account tariff states that the intent of the tariff is to allow FCG to recover or refund any changes and credits, related to the provision of Transportation Service, as those costs have historically been recovered from or allocated pursuant to the annual Purchased Gas Cost Recovery Factor proceedings. (EXH 6, MPN K536) FCG argues in its post hearing brief that the proposed changes are practical and reasonable and will lead to efficiencies. (FCG BR 97) FCG witness Grimard stated that the Operational Balancing Account tariff will serve the same purpose as FPUC’s Commission-approved Operational Balancing Account tariff and will provide a recovery mechanism for Third Party Supplier related expenses. (TR 1067) The Commission has previously approved the Operational Balancing Account tariff for FPUC, as shown on page 254 of Order No. PSC-2021-0148-TRF-GU.[48] FCG witness Noia stated that by managing transportation capacity collectively with FPUC, FCG can more efficiently allocate contracted assets, optimize daily nominations and balancing activities, and respond more effectively to changes in load from transportation customers, weather, and market conditions. (TR 889-890)
CONCLUSION
Staff recommends the Commission approve FCG’s proposed Operational Balancing Account tariff as the tariff would allow FCG to recover Third Party Supplier related costs. Additionally, the proposed tariff would allow FCG to further align its transportation service programs with FPUC.
Should the Commission approve FCG’s proposed new Shipper of Last Resort tariff (proposed Original Sheet No. 7.412)?
Recommendation:
Staff recommends the Commission approve FCG’s proposed Shipper of Last Resort tariff, because the tariff would allow FCG to recover the cost of supplying gas to transportation customers in the event a Third Party Supplier defaults. Additionally, the proposed tariff would allow FCG to further align its transportation service programs with FPUC. (Hampson)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Company is proposing to adopt FPUC’s Shipper of Last Resort schedule that has been previously approved by the Commission. This new rate schedule will serve the same purpose as in the FPUC tariff and will provide a recovery mechanism for fuel-related expenses and provide a gas sales mechanism for small commercial and residential transportation customers should their TPS default.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
The proposed Shipper of Last Resort tariff would be applicable to all customers in an Average Daily Delivery Quantity customer pool who receive gas shipments from FCG, upon default of a Third Party Supplier. (EXH 6, MPN K551) Customers would be charged an additional component for gas supplied during any billing period, which would calculate using the weighted average cost of gas. (EXH 6, MPN K551) The proposed tariff further states that the weighted average cost of gas would be determined in accordance with the methodology adopted by the Commission in Order No. 24463, Docket No. 910003-CU, or as such methodology may be amended from time to time by further order of the Commission. (EXH 6, MPN K551) FCG witness Grimard stated in direct testimony that FCG is proposing to adopt FPUC’s Shipper of Last Resort tariff that has been previously approved by the Commission. (TR 1067) The Commission has previously approved the Shipper of Last Resort tariff for FPUC, as shown on page 261 of Order No. PSC-2021-0148-TRF-GU.[49] Additionally, witness Grimard stated that the proposed rate schedule will serve the same purpose as those in the FPUC tariff and will provide a gas sales mechanism for small commercial and residential transportation customers should their Third Party Supplier default. (TR 1067)
CONCLUSION
Staff recommends the Commission approve FCG’s proposed Shipper of Last Resort tariff, because the tariff would allow FCG to recover the cost of supplying gas to transportation customers in the event a Third Party Supplier defaults. Additionally, the proposed tariff would allow FCG to further align its transportation service programs with FPUC.
Should the Commission approve FCG’s proposed non-rate related tariff changes?
Recommendation:
Staff believes the non-rate related tariff modifications are appropriate and designed to align with FPUC’s tariff. Therefore, the non-rate related tariff modifications should be approved. (P. Kelley)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Company’s proposed changes will align FCG’s general rules and regulations and format with that currently applicable to Florida Public Utilities Company. In addition, the Company has proposed adding a new Section 8 and Section 9 to the tariff that will include the standard forms used by FCG and lists the special contracts applicable to FCG.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
Witness Grimard explained that in general the Company seeks to adopt the current Commission-approval general rules and regulations applicable to FPUC. (TR 1065) Witness Grimard testified that FCG proposed non-rate related tariff modifications to update basic information such as a title page, miscellaneous and general information, system maps, technical terms and abbreviations, and general rules and regulations. (TR 1066) In addition, FCG proposed to add a new listing of standard forms. (TR 1067)
CONCLUSION
Staff believes the non-rate related tariff modifications are appropriate and designed to align with FPUC’s tariff. Therefore, the non-rate related tariff modifications should be approved.
What is the appropriate effective date for FCG’s revised rates and charges?
Recommendation:
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference. (Nguyen)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
The effective date for FCG’s revised rates and charges should be January 1, 2027, and apply to bills rendered on or after that date.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
CONCLUSION
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
Should the Commission approve tariffs reflecting Commission approved rates and charges?
Recommendation:
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference. (Nguyen)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes. The Commission should approve tariffs reflecting the Commission’s approved rates and charges effective January 1, 2027. The Commission should direct staff to verify that the revised tariffs are consistent with the Commission’s decision.
OPC:
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
CONCLUSION
This is a fall-out issue and will be decided at the December 15, 2026 Commission Conference.
Should any portion of the interim increases granted be refunded to the customers?
Recommendation:
No. The proper refund amount should be calculated by using the same data used to establish final rates, excluding rate case expense and other items not in effect during the interim period. This revised revenue requirement for the interim collection period should be compared to the amount of interim revenues granted. Based on this calculation, no interim refund is necessary. (Gatlin, Vogel)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
No, no refund is warranted. Suggested refunds predicated on the Section 338(h)(10) ADIT treatment, the direct assignment of CUC acquisition long-term debt, or the RSAM Correction Liability, are without merit and adequate record support. Were the Commission to entertain any refund, the calculation would also need to take into account the fact that the Company had a PGA over-recovery balance for 2025 due to an error in the allocation methodology for over/under recovery. The working capital was erroneously reduced by the inclusion of a PGA over-recovery which resulted in an understatement of our interim revenue requirement.
OPC
Yes. Costs that are not recoverable in rates under Commission, practice, policy or other precedent, including the decision in this case cannot be charged to customers in interim rates and must be refunded. This includes, increases in the WACC and transaction-related expenses caused by the 2023 acquisition and any rate base increment related to the use of the RSAM to transfer imprudent or below-the-line debits from net income to rate base.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
By Order No. PSC-2026-0258-PCO-GU, issued July 24, 2026, the Commission authorized the collection of interim rates, subject to refund, pursuant to Section 366.071, F.S. The approved interim revenue requirements for FCG were $112,614,783. The interim collection period is July 2026 through December 2026.
According to Section 366.071, F.S., adjustments made in the rate case test period that do not relate to the period interim rates are in effect should be removed. Rate case expense is an example of an adjustment which is recovered only after final rates are established.
In this proceeding, the test period for establishment of interim rates is the 12-month period ended December 31, 2025. FCG’s approved interim rates did not include any provisions for pro forma or projected operating expenses or plant. The interim increase was designed to allow recovery of actual interest costs, and the lower limit of the last authorized range for ROE.
OPC argued that costs considered non-recoverable under Commission practice, policy, or other precedent should not be charged to customers in interim rates and therefore should be refunded. (OPC BR 89) OPC continued that the revised interim revenue requirement should be calculated utilizing the same data to establish final rates but must exclude any costs that are prospective in nature and not representative of costs incurred during the interim period. (OPC BR 89) Additionally, OPC argued this includes all costs related to the 2023 acquisition of FCG from FPL, as OPC has stated throughout other issues that all 2023 acquisition costs should be considered non-recoverable until FCG requests and is approved for an acquisition adjustment. (OPC BR 89)
FCG maintained that it did not include any non-recoverable costs in its interim rates, and it utilized the RSAM pursuant to Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, as discussed in Issue 19. (FCG BR 99) FCG continued that if the Commission were to consider an interim refund the calculation would need to include the error discovered in the allocation methodology for the 2025 PGA over-recovery, resulting in the working capital being reduced and the understatement of its interim revenue requirement. (FCG BR 99)
As discussed in Issue 19, staff agrees that the Company utilized the RSAM pursuant to Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU and that the transaction and transition costs were appropriately accounted for and thus, staff recommends that no interim refund is necessary based on OPC’s arguments of non-recoverable costs.
To establish the proper refund amount, staff has calculated a revised interim revenue requirement utilizing the same data used to establish final rates for the 2027 projected test year. Items, such as rate case expense, were excluded because these items are prospective in nature and did not occur during the interim collection period. The revenue requirements granted in Order No. PSC-2026-0258-PCO-GU, for the December 2025 interim test year are less than the revenue requirements of $117,579,882 for FCG, in the interim collection period. Therefore, no refund for the interim period is required.
CONCLUSION
The proper refund amount is calculated by using the same data used to establish final rates, excluding rate case expense and other items not in effect during the interim period. This revised revenue requirement for the interim collection period is compared to the amount of interim revenues granted. Based on this calculation, no interim refund is required.
Should this docket be closed?
Recommendation:
This docket should remain open for the Commission to determine the final rates at a subsequent Special Agenda. (Hixon)
Position of the Parties:
FCG:
Yes.
OPC
No position provided in brief.
FEA:
FEA takes no position.
Staff Analysis:
ANALYSIS
This docket should remain open for the Commission to determine the final rates at a subsequent Special Agenda.
CONCLUSION
This docket should remain open for the Commission to determine the final rates at a subsequent Special Agenda.

[1] EXH 143, MPN E4189.
[2] Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, issued June 9, 2023, in Docket No. 20220069-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas.
[3] Order No. PSC-2026-0219-PCO-GU, issued June 19, 2026, in Docket No. 20260026-GU, In re: Application for rare increase by Florida City Gas.
[4] HDDs are a measure of how cold the weather is relative to a base temperature used to estimate the energy needed to heat buildings. HDDs are calculated as the difference between the base temperature (typically 65°F) and the average daily outdoor temperature when the average is below the base temperature. Higher HDD values indicate colder weather and generally greater demand for natural gas for heating.
[5] R-squared (R˛), also called the coefficient of determination, measures the proportion of variation in the dependent variable that is explained by the explanatory variables included in a regression model.
[6] The Utility’s books and records are organized using the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) Uniform System of Accounts (USoA), which is a standardized accounting framework designed for regulated public utilities. When witness Schultz describes “Accounts,” he is referring to specific accounts in the utility’s NARUC USoA.
[7] Order No. PSC-2023-0103-FOF-GU, issued March 15, 2023, in Docket No. 20220067-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Public Utilities Company, Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation, Florida Public Utilities Company – Fort Meade, and Florida Public Utilities Company – Indiantown Division.
[8] Order No. PSC-2025-0170-TRF-GU, issued May 28, 2025, in Docket No. 20240159-GU, In re: Joint petition by Florida Public Utilities Company and Florida City Gas for approval of tariff changes to standardize and align Florida Public Utilities Company and Florida City Gas's transportation service tariffs and to implement a flexible gas service tariff for Florida City Gas.
[9] A warm-transfer allows Commission staff to directly transfer a customer to FCG’s customer service personnel for resolution.
[10] Order No. PSC-15-0390-TR-FGU, issued September 15, 2015, in Docket No. 150116-GU, In re: Petition for approval of safety, access, and facility enhancement program and associated cost recovery methodology, by Florida City Gas.
[11] Order No. PSC-2024-0438-PAA-GU, issued October 2, 2024, in Docket No. 20240071-GU, In re: Petition for approval of safety, access, and facility enhancement program modifications, by Florida City Gas.
[12] Order Nos. PSC-2018-0190-FOF-GU & PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU.
[13] Order No. PSC-2025-0458-TRF-GU, issued December 15, 2025, Docket No. 20250111-GU, In re: Petition for approval of safety, access, and facility enhancement program true-up and 2026 cost recovery factors, by Florida City Gas.
[14] Order
No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, issued June 9, 2023, in Docket No. 20220069-GU, In
re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas.
[15] Id.
[16] References in the record to Rockledge, a city within Brevard County, were clarified by FCG witness Haffecke to be inclusive of both the city of Rockledge and the greater Brevard County area. (TR 764; EXH 107, MPN E471)
[17] Phase 2 of the AMI project is expected to begin in September 2027 and be completed by October 2029. (EXH 90, MPN E104)
[18] Order No. PSC-2025-0196-FOF-WS, issued June 6, 2025, in Docket No. 20240068-WS, In re: Application for increase in water and wastewater rates in Charlotte, Highlands, Lake, Lee, Marion, Orange, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, and Seminole Counties, by Sunshine Water Services Company.
[19] Order No. PSC-2025-0413-S-GU, issued October 31, 2025, in Docket No. 20250029-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Peoples Gas System, Inc.
[20] Order No. PSC-2026-0055-FOF-GU, issued March 9, 2026, in Docket No. 20250035-GU, In re: Petition for approval of 2025 depreciation study and for approval to amortize reserve imbalance, by Florida City Gas.
[21] Order No. PSC-2025-0196-FOF-WS, issued June 6, 2025, in Docket No. 20240068-WS, In re: Application for increase in water and wastewater rates in Charlotte, Highlands, Lake, Lee, Marion, Orange, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, and Seminole Counties, by Sunshine Water Services Company.
[22] Order No. PSC-2025-0196-FOF-WS, issued June 6, 2025, in Docket No. 20240068-WS, In re: Application for increase in water and wastewater rates in Charlotte, Highlands, Lake, Lee, Marion, Orange, Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, and Seminole Counties, by Sunshine Water Services Company.
[23] Order No. PSC-10-0153-FOF-EI, issued March 17, 2010, in Docket No. 20080677-EI, In re: Petition for increase in rates by Florida Power & light Company.
[24] Order No. PSC-2025-0114-PAA-EI, issued April 7, 2025, in Docket No. 20240099-EI, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Public Utilities Company.
[25] Order
No. PSC-2023-0103-FOF-GU, issued March 15, 2023, in Docket No. 20220067-GU, In
re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Public Utilities Company, Florida Division
of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation, Florida Public Utilities Company - Fort
Meade, and Florida Public Utilities Company - Indiantown Division.
[26] Order No. PSC-07-0913-PAA-GU, issued November 13, 2007, in Docket No. 20060657-GU, In re: Petition for approval of acquisition adjustment and recognition of regulatory asset to reflect purchase of Florida City Gas by AGL Resources, Inc. (AGLR Order).
[27] Order
No. PSC-2018-0190-FOF-GU, issued April 20, 2018, in Docket No. 20170179-GU, In
re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas.
[28] Order
No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, issued June 9, 2023, in Docket No. 20220069-GU, In
re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas.
[29] Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU.
[30] Issued
January 3, 2012, in Docket No. 20110133-GU, In re: Petition for approval of
acquisition adjustment and recovery of regulatory assets, and request for
consolidation of regulatory filings and records of Florida Public Utilities
Company and Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation.
[31] Order No. PSC-2024-0480-FOF-GU, issued November 21, 2024, Docket No. 20240003-GU, In re: Purchased gas adjustment (PGA) true-up.
[32] 26 I.R.C. § 338, Certain stock purchases treated as asset acquisitions.
[33] Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 679, 692 (1923) Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944).
[34] Bluefield, 262 U.S. at 693.
[35] Annie Wong, "Utility Stocks and the Size Effect: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of the Midwest Finance Association (1993) at 95-96.
[36] Thomas M. Zepp, Utility stocks and the size effect – revisited, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, (2003) 578-582.
[37] Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, issued June 9, 2023, in Docket No. 20220069-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas.
[38] See Orders Nos. PSC-07-0913-PAA-GU, issued November, 13, 2007, in Docket No. 20060657-GU, In re: Petition for approval of acquisition adjustment and recognition of regulatory asset to reflect purchase of Florida City Gas by AGL Resources, Inc., and PSC-10-0029-PAA-GU, issued January 14, 2010, in Docket No. 2009125-GU, In re: Petition for increase in rates by Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation.
[39] Order No. PSC-2023-0103-FOF-GU, Issued March 15, 2023, in Docket No. 20220067-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Public Utilities Company, Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation, Florida Public Utilities Company – Fort Meade, and Florida Public Utilities Company – Indiantown Division.; Order No. PSC-2025-0287-AS-EI, Issued July 24, 2025, in Docket No. 20240099-EI, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Public Utilities Company.
[40] Order No. PSC-2018-0190-FOF-GU, issued April 20, 2018, in Docket No. 20170179-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas.
[41] Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, issued June 9, 2023, in Docket No. 20220069-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas.
[42] FCG’s next Storm Reserve Study should be filed in 2027. (TR 507)
[43] Order
No. PSC-14-0698-PAA-GU, in Docket No. 140016-GU, issued December 18, 2014, In
re: 2014 depreciation study by Florida Public Utilities Company.
[44] See Order Nos. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, issued June 9, 2023, Docket No. 20230069-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas., and PSC-2023-0103-FOF-GU, issued March 15, 2023, Docket No. 20220067-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida Public Utilities Company, Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation, Florida Public Utilities Company – Fort Meade, and Florida Public Utilities Company – Indiantown Division.
[45] Order No. PSC-2023-0177-FOF-GU, Issued June 9, 2023, in Docket No. 20220069-GU, In re: Petition for rate increase by Florida City Gas.
[46] A measure of how a rate class’s ROR compares to the system ROR can be calculated by dividing the class ROR by the total ROR. The resulting figure is referred to as the parity index. A rate class with a parity index of 100 percent earns the same ROR as the system average and is at parity. A rate class with a parity index of less than 100 percent is below parity; a rate class above 100 percent is above parity. The ROR by rate class shows which classes are over- or under-earning relative to the system ROR, or stated differently, which class is covering their cost to serve and which class is not.
[47] Order No. PSC-1995-0506-FOF-GU, issued April 24, 1995, in Docket No. 19950206-GU, In re: Petition for approval of tariffs governing extension of facilities by City Gas Company of Florida.
[48] Order
No. PSC-2021-0148-TRF-GU, issued April 22, 2021, in Docket No. 20200214-GU, In
re: Joint petition of Florida Public Utilities Company, Florida Public
Utilities Company-Indiantown Division, Florida Public Utilities Company-Fort
Meade, and the Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation for
approval of consolidation of tariffs, for modifications to retail choice
transportation service programs, and to change the MACC for Florida Public
Utilities Company.
[49] Order
No. PSC-2021-0148-TRF-GU, issued April 22, 2021, in Docket No. 20200214-GU, In
re: Joint petition of Florida Public Utilities Company, Florida Public
Utilities Company-Indiantown Division, Florida Public Utilities Company-Fort
Meade, and the Florida Division of Chesapeake Utilities Corporation for
approval of consolidation of tariffs, for modifications to retail choice
transportation service programs, and to change the MACC for Florida Public
Utilities Company.